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Abstract 
This dissertation examines how various groups in Iran planned, imagined, constructed, 
operated, and used railways from the beginning of the technological imaginary in the 
second half of the nineteenth century to the aftermath of the completion of the Trans-
Iranian Railway in the mid-twentieth century. Specifically, it analyses the experiences of 
such groups as “Western” statesmen and entrepreneurs, the Qajar political elite, including 
travelers who went abroad, merchants, landowners, tribal laborers, foreign and Iranian 
railway workers, modern middle-class vacationers, pilgrims, and all sorts of occupants of 
the railway space. By discussing intensified state-society and intra-social interactions 
linked to the railway project, this dissertation argues that various segments of Iranian 
society actively interpreted the meanings of railways, took advantage of the opportunities 
they presented, and sometimes wove them in heterogeneous understandings of self, 
community, and nation. Thus, contrary to the homogenizing vision of modernists that 
existing scholarship tends to privilege, the Trans-Iranian Railway project created multiple 
experiences with railway technology.  
 ix 
 Additionally, this dissertation makes supplementary arguments. First, by shifting 
focus from the centralizing state to non-state actors, it defies the temptation to narrate the 
history of railways in Iran through Reza Shah’s policies (r. 1925-1941). Rather, it 
presents the continuation of social transformations before and during the Reza Shah 
period as well as state-society and intra-social interactions during and after the Reza Shah 
period. Especially, the hitherto neglected period of the Allied occupation and its 
aftermath was a crucial period of transformation in explaining how Iranians experienced 
the railway project. Second, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of transnational 
connections of non-state actors at various junctures of Iran’s encounter with railways. In 
particular, it emphasizes Iran’s connections with its surrounding world rather than with 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
(Figure 1.1) Commemorating the completion of the Trans-Iranian Railway. In this 
photograph, Reza Shah is fastening the last bolt of the Trans-Iranian Railway during the 
official ceremony held in Sefid Cheshmeh Station on August 26, 1938. The COWI 
Archives, Iran Jernbaner Dias I, F58B, Photo No. 233. 
 
Scope of the Dissertation 
On the hot summer day of August 26, 1938, Reza Shah Pahlavi, accompanied by Crown 
Prince Mohammad Reza, departed Tehran in a royal train, heading south to Sefid 
Cheshmeh Station in the central Iranian province of Lorestan. That day, the small station 
standing alone in the wilderness was uncharacteristically busy to welcome the royal 
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family and prominent invitees who came down to attend the ceremony to celebrate the 
completion of the Trans-Iranian Railway. It had been eleven years since the inauguration 
ceremony for the construction of this first long-haul railway in Iran that connected the 
new Caspian Sea port of Bandar-e Shah (present-day Bandar-e Torkaman) in the northto 
another new port of Bandar-e Shahpur (present-day Bandar-e Emam Khomeini) on the 
Persian Gulf in the south, via Tehran. The royal train arrived from Tehran at 4:30 p.m., 
and Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza in their usual military attire descended on the 
specially decorated station for the occasion. The ceremony immediately began with the 
speech given by the Minister of Roads.  
Embellished with a list of events and technical factoids, his speech included a 
rather dry and formulaic account of the construction of this first railway by the Iranian 
state. He stressed difficulties with the project such as Iran’s mountainous terrain and its 
lack of expertise in railway engineering at the beginning of construction in 1927, which 
was attributed to the Qajar misrule prior to the 1921 coup that brought Reza Khan to 
power.1 He also paid homage to the engineers of Kampsax, a Scandinavian consortium 
that supervised the engineering of the project since 1933, following failed attempts both 
by the German-American consortium and by the Iranian state without foreign assistance. 
Yet, according to the Minister, the engineering feat of building the Trans-Iranian Railway 
was ultimately the manifestation of the “great will power and ambition” of Reza Shah 
himself. It was “the product of the clear thought, wise plans, and capable resolution of 
                                                
1 “Shahrivar,” Salnameh-ye Pars, 1318 (1939): 70.  
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His Highness.”2 Throughout his speech, in numerous expressions, he exalted the Shah for 




(Figure 1.2) Roads and railways in Iran, 1938. COWI Archives, “The Trans-Iranian 
Railway Planning, Design and Supervision, 1933-1938,” in Iran-Kampsax: Consulting 
Engineers, Architects and Economists, no p.n. Highways are indicated in thin black lines, 
and railways are indicated in black and white lines.  
 
                                                
2 Ibid., 69. 
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Following the speech, Reza Shah, along with Mohammad Reza, tightened the last 
bolt of the railway track and officially completed the construction of the 1,394-kilometer 
railway. Then, with his cutting of the tricolor tape, the first train from the south entered 
Sefid Cheshmeh and headed north toward Tehran. The notoriously reticent and sullen 
ruler was unusually loquacious and smiley that day. In his speech, Reza Shah repeatedly 
expressed appreciation for the sacrifices that the people of Iran had made for the railway. 
In particular, he said the following in reference to the hefty taxes levied on tea and sugar 
to partially finance the railway project: “I am extremely satisfied and happy with the 
people of Iran, who, from the bottom of their heart, made themselves available and 
willingly paid the expenses of the railway for the sake of reforming the country.”3 After 
the Shah’s speech, the invitees were allowed to return to Tehran. The royal retinue, on the 
other hand, stayed in Sefid Cheshmeh overnight and departed for Tehran the next 
morning in order to attend an even larger ceremony to be held at Tehran Station in the 
presence of journalists, Majles representatives, notables, representatives of foreign 
governments, their wives, school children, and scouts.4 Awaiting the royal retinue, the 
capital was decorated with Iran’s tricolor flag and electric lights along the main streets. 
School children anxiously waited for the ceremony, in which they were supposed to line 
up with flowers in their hands. Tehran was in a mood of jubilation.  
These celebrations were not isolated events in the 1930s. Throughout the decade, 
a frenzied series of celebrations were held in different cities every time a section of the 
                                                
3 Ibid., 78. 
4 Ibid., 79. 
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Trans-Iranian Railway opened for traffic. The grandiose celebrations were amply covered 
in the censored Iranian press, making the Trans-Iranian Railway the most tangible 
symbol of Iran’s success in achieving “progress” during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi 
(r. 1925-41).5 The press also covered the completion of each of the major bridges and 
tunnels with photographs throughout the decade. In fact, since its construction stretched 
from 1927-1938, immediately followed by the construction of new east-west lines, this 
project, which was the most expensive of the early Pahlavi period, remained a subject of 
constant discussions for the entire Reza Shah period not only in the press, but also in the 
classrooms, public bathhouses, bazaars, and streets. 
Yet, contemporary discussions of the Trans-Iranian Railway, including countless 
speeches and newspaper articles that praised the Shah, and to a much lesser extent the 
nation, concealed two salient features of the railway project. First, since they obsessively 
focused on legitimizing Pahlavi rule as the main vehicle of the rejuvenation of the Iranian 
nation, they paid extremely scant attention to how various groups of people experienced 
the coming of railways to Iran. The vague collective called “people” were relevant in 
these discussions only as consumers of such items as tea and sugar, which were heavily 
taxed by the Pahlavi state to fund the railway project. However, the railway project did 
not take place in an environment where power simply emanated from Reza Shah to the 
“people,” who passively accepted the Shah’s policy and paid taxes. Rather, the project 
                                                
5 For censorship in the Reza Shah period, see Karim Soleimani, “Press Censorship in the 
Reza Shah Era, 1925-41,” in Culture and Cultural Politics Under Reza Shah: The 
Pahlavi State, new Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran. eds. 
Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 181-
198. 
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was shaped and developed in a milieu consisting of a complex web of power relations 
amongst various state- and quasi-state apparatuses as well as heterogeneous segments of 
society, such as nationalist elites, landlords, tribal groups, the modern middle class, and 
railway workers, each of which had its internal divisions and tensions. How did the 
railway project, various apparatuses of the Pahlavi state, and these heterogeneous 
segments of society interact and impact each other?  
Second, since the project was conceived as the symbol of national rejuvenation 
undertaken by the Shah and his people, the role of connections that went beyond national 
borders were largely ignored. Contemporary discussions often stressed how Iran 
successfully built the Trans-Iranian Railway without being colonized, giving concessions 
to foreign nationals, or borrowing from foreign banking institutions, while limiting 
references to foreign presence only to high-echelon engineers and managers of 
Kampsax.6 Despite this negligence, transnational political, socioeconomic, and 
intellectual connections between Iran and other parts of the world played a significant 
role in germinating a distinctively Iranian experience with railways. In fact, the Trans-
Iranian Railway project hinged upon the border crossing of thousands of individuals, 
including Iranians who traveled and sojourned outside their homeland and the thousands 
of foreign workers who temporarily lived in remote areas of Iran to survive the Great 
Depression.7 How did these mobile populations impact the course of the project? How 
                                                
6 “Shahrivar,” 82. 
7 Southern Europe exported workers en masse to other parts of the Middle East before 
and during the Great Depression as well. See Joel Beinin and Zackary Lockman, Workers 
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can we situate the Trans-Iranian Railway project in a larger context in which the transport 
revolution worldwide had facilitated human movement on an unprecedented scale? 
With these two points in mind, this dissertation examines how various social 
groups in Iran, both Iranian and non-Iranian, experienced the imagining, planning, 
building, operating, and use of the Trans-Iranian Railway between the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. In doing so, it investigates how Iran’s 
social whole, including the state, was transformed by the intensified social interaction 
facilitated by the Trans-Iranian Railway. The railway project offers a great case study of 
Iran’s social and cultural transformations in the crucial periods between the second half 
of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century because of the 
exceptionally broad impact it had on individuals from different class, ethnic, national, 
religious, and gender backgrounds. In other words, this dissertation ties together diverse 
social groups that are usually studied separately and presents broader transformations of 
Iran’s social whole from 1850 to 1950. 
In the rest of this dissertation, I demonstrate that the railway project increased 
spatial and social mobility in Iran on local, national, and transnational levels, in both 
voluntary and compulsory manners. The increased level of mobility was conducive to 
interaction amongst various state institutions and social segments in both urban and rural 
Iran. Moreover, because the railway symbolized state presence, individuals’ multivalent 
understandings and uses of the railway, which were intimately linked to their 
                                                                                                                                            
on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-
1954 (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1998), 35-43. 
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understandings of the self in some cases, evolved discursively as their relationship with 
governing apparatuses evolved. Thus, the Pahlavi state’s project of extending its reach to 
broader segments of the population through the railway was only partially successful. 
State presence became more normalized in the lives of ordinary Iranians by the mid 
twentieth century than it had been at the beginning of Reza Shah’s rule, but this did not 
necessarily translate into effective control, since the population actively created meanings 
related to the railway that did not always conform to state’s intentions.  
In stressing the agency of social groups associated with new technologies, this 
dissertation moves away from the model of technological diffusion from metropoles to 
more peripheral regions in the early twentieth-century global technological hierarchy. 
Rather than being exported from one place to another without any critical 
reinterpretations, understandings and uses of the railway were locally constituted by 
active interpretations of those who encountered it. By “locally,” I do not mean Iran as a 
whole, but competing interpretations of the railway that evolved within Iran, or even on a 
smaller scale, such as province, city, and village. Therefore, for instance, the 
understanding and use of the railway by poor pilgrims from Tehran could have been 
radically different from those of railway repair factory workers in Tehran.  
At the same time, local, meaning Iranian, contexts delineated the range of 
possible options for how individuals interpreted the understandings and uses of railways. 
First, transnational political, socioeconomic, and intellectual connections mentioned 
earlier played a significant role precisely because Iran was a latecomer to the age of 
railways. Iranians witnessed existing models in other parts of the globe, which deeply 
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influenced their understandings and uses of railways. In fact, experiences of not only 
Europe but also neighboring empires and nations, such as Russia, the Caucasus, the 
Ottoman Empire, India, and Iraq played a pivotal role in shaping Iran’s experience with 
the Trans-Iranian Railway.  
Second, similar to other historical cases of railway booms, the construction of the 
Trans-Iranian Railway was concurrent with the process of state formation. Once the 
railway started to operate, however, the encounter of various communities with the 
railway was not necessarily in congruence with the process of state formation. The 
standard political narrative of Pahlavi Iran stresses the rupture between the abdication of 
Reza Shah in 1941 and the lack of central authority in the 1940s, which is often treated 
only as the prelude to the oil nationalization movement in the early 1950s under the 
leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq.8 Despite the scant attention paid to the 1940s 
beyond its political instability, the decade was a crucial period of sociocultural 
transformation, including the shaping of Iranians’ understandings and uses of the railway. 
For one thing, although the grip of Tehran over the provinces waned immediately after 
1941, various forms of interaction between railway-related institutions and local 
communities that had started under Reza Shah continued, and even intensified. The 
Railway Organization needed to restrict civilian traffic on the railway. The Allies 
bolstered surveillance of human and animal movement along railway routes. They also 
                                                
8 For political history of the period between 1941-53, see Fakhreddin Azimi, Iran: The 
Crisis of Democracy, 1941-1953 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) and James A. Bill 
and W. M. Louis eds., Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1988). 
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more than quadrupled the number of railway workers. Disgruntled yet silenced local 
communities under Reza Shah began to more freely voice their demands to state- and 
quasi-state institutions. All of these changes in post-Reza Shah Iran increased the 
interaction amongst state institutions and social groups in some ways, despite Iran’s 
rather anomalous situation in which the central state was severely weakened in the 
middle of the railway project. Thus, the 1940s was not simply a decade of interlude 
between Reza Shah and Mohammad Mosaddeq. Nor was it a lost decade in which the 
chaos of the pre-1921 period returned. Instead, social interaction that was facilitated by 
the Trans-Iranian Railway project in the Reza Shah period continued and modified its 
course to meet the new political context during the 1940s and resulted in the stronger 




It has been a while since historians first critiqued Iranian historiography for state-
centrism and clear-cut divide in analyzing state and society.9 The last two decades have 
witnessed an increase of contributions in social and cultural history of Iran that 
complicate our understanding of how sociocultural transformations occurred in modern 
Iran with close attention paid to the interaction amongst diverse state and non-state 
                                                
9 For a recent critique, see Cyrus Schayegh, “‘Seeing Like a State’: An Essay on the 
Historiography of Modern Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42, no. 1 
(February 2010): 37-61. 
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actors.10 However, when we look specifically at transportation in Iranian historiography, 
this shift has not yet occurred, despite the railway’s symbolic significance as the 
“epitome of modernity.”11 Certainly, the absence of the shift is partially due to the 
marginal position of transportation issues in Iranian historiography and the difficulty with 
locating sources that are scattered around the world. Nevertheless, the internalization of 
the state’s point of view by historians and the subsequent framing of questions in 
accordance with the Pahlavi narrative of the Trans-Iranian Railway have also hindered 
the development of a social and cultural history of the railway project. For instance, 
despite its praise for ordinary workers who build monumental architecture, the second 
volume of Tarikh-e Jameʾ-e Rah Ahan (A Comprehensive History of Railways), which 
focuses on the history of railways in Iran, does not discuss how Iranian society 
experienced railways at any length.12 Instead, for the most part, its concern rests on 
                                                
10 For examples of the nineteenth century, see Arash Khazeni, Tribes and Empire on the 
Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009) and 
Vanessa Martin, The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-
Century Persia (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005). For examples of the 
twentieth century, see Arang Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran: The Politics of the 
Tehran Marketplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Cyrus 
Schayegh, Who is Knowledgeable is Strong: Science, Class, and the Formation of 
Modern Iranian Society, 1900-1950 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2009). Other scholarship in Iranian historiography will be mentioned in specific 
discussions throughout this dissertation. 
11 An exception in Iranian historiography is a very brief discussion in a subsection of a 
chapter. See Bianca Devos, “Engineering a Modern Society?: Adoptions of New 
Technologies in Early Pahlavi Iran,” in Culture and Cultural Politics Under Reza Shah. 
eds. Devos and Werner, 266-287. 
12 Mohammad Kazem Mokmeli, Tarikh-e Jameʾ-e Rah Ahan, Jeld-e Dovvom: Rah 
Ahan-e Iran ta Enqelab-e Eslami (Tehran: Ravebet-e ʿOmumi-ye Rah Ahan-e Jomhuri-
ye Eslami, 2000), 127-9. See also Hoseyn Mahbubi-Ardakani, Tarikh-e Moʿassesat-e 
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visions of reformist intellectuals, state policies and relations between states, examined 
through discussions of various proposals and concessions in the Qajar era, most of which 
did not lead to actual construction, as well as a series of brief encyclopedic descriptions 
of short railways and tramways built primarily by foreign subjects. Likewise, analyses of 
the Trans-Iranian Railway center around political and military goals of the Pahlavi state 
to move troops speedily to volatile provinces, financial difficulties to cover the expenses 
for construction, and technological information, not around how diverse state and non-
state actors interacted to shape the outcomes of the Trans-Iranian Railway project. 
The two-volume history, written in cooperation with the Central Railway Library 
in Tehran, is representative of the existing approach to transportation in Iranian 
historiography that privileges political, and to a lesser extent, economic issues. Existing 
scholarship tends to be driven by a political narrative that progresses from the era of 
railway imperialism primarily in the Qajar era to the era of early Pahlavi-era nationalism 
that defied foreign domination. Thus, what characterizes the Reza Shah period is the 
tension between foreign interests and the nationalist regime’s desire to assert itself, and 
the question becomes how this tension impacted foreign interests, particularly railway 
syndicates.13 The political narrative is often supplemented by a macroeconomic narrative 
                                                                                                                                            
Tamaddoni-ye Jadid dar Iran, Jeld-e Dovvom (Tehran: Moʿasseseh-ye Entesharat va 
Chap-e Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1978). 
13 For imperialism, Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914 (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), idem., “Russian Imperialism and 
Persian Railways,” Harvard Slavic Studies 4 (1957): 355-373, John S. Galbraith, “British 
Policy on Railways in Persia, 1870-1900,” Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (1989): 480-
505, idem., “Britain and American Railway Promoters in Late Nineteenth Century 
Persia,” Albion 21, no. 2 (1989): 248-262, Paul J. Luft, “The Persian Railway Syndicate 
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that culminates in the formation of a national economy of the Reza Shah period, although 
the role of rail transport in this process was limited compared to other modes of transport 
and communication.14 This strong focus on political and economic issues has resulted in 
the accumulation of knowledge about intellectuals’ visions and political debates that 
involved a handful of intellectuals, the Shah, ministers, representatives of foreign 
governments, and Euro-American advisors and entrepreneurs.  
Yet, our knowledge of transportation in Iran is limited to this particular subject 
that involves planners of the railway system in a broader sense, which included only a 
small fraction of the population. Existing scholarship does not illuminate how political 
decisions in the capitals were implemented, modified, or abandoned, by examining the 
interplay between new state institutions, their bureaucracies, and local intermediaries of 
the state, and various social actors who had no formal ties to the state. It does not address 
other important questions such as how various social groups attempted to influence 
                                                                                                                                            
and British Railway Policy in Iran,” in R. L. Lawless ed. The Gulf in the Early Twentieth 
Century: Foreign Institutions and Local Responses, Durham Occasional Papers Series 
31 (Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, 1986): 158-215, and idem, “The USA 
and the Trans-Iranian Railway,” in Markus Ritter, Ralph Kauz, and Birgitt Hoffmann 
eds., Iran und iranisch geprägte Kulturen (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2008), 120-132. Steen 
Andersen deals with the tension between Kampsax and the nationalist regime of Reza 
Shah from a business history perspective. Steen Andersen, “Building for the Shah: 
Market Entry, Political Reality and Risks on the Iranian Market, 1933-1939,” Enterprise 
and Society (June 2008): 1-33. For the Trans-Iranian Railway in the context of Danes and 
Orientalism, see Jonas Kauffeldt, Danes, Orientalism, and the Modern Middle East: 
Perspectives from the Nordic Periphery (PhD diss. Florida State University, 2006). For a 
brief discussion of  Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, 1926-1979 
(New York: New York University Press, 1981), 115-6. 
14 For the role of transportation in creating a national economy, see Patrick Clawson, 
“Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920-1941,” Iranian Studies 26 
(1993): 235-250. 
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political decisions, how they struggled to gain from railway construction in various ways, 
how and why they used the railway system (or did not use it), and how the social whole 
transformed itself through these processes. Instead, by its complete absence in existing 
accounts, it seems as if social groups lacked agency, either enjoying or suffering from the 
consequences of state policies passively. Furthermore, the absence of social groups 
creates a picture of late Qajar and early Pahlavi Iran in which the state was entirely 
external to society, not constituting a component of the social whole with connections to 
other social forms through various networks. 
As noted earlier, in congruence with recent scholarship in other historical 
contexts,15 the growth of social and cultural history of Iran in the last few decades has 
challenged such portrayals of society. The bulk of scholarship in Iranian historiography 
deals primarily with modern middle class men and women to demonstrate the complex 
interplay within the social whole. By rereading documents mainly in European archives, 
however, some historians have started to examine individuals and groups that lived in the 
social peripheries and who have rarely left written records of their own.16 For instance, 
                                                
15 For a critique of the historiography of state and society in the Soviet context, see Mark 
Edele, “Soviet Society, Social Structure, and Everyday Life: Major Frameworks 
Reconsidered,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no. 2 (Spring 
2007): 349-73. Edele suggests that the Stalinist state comprised an integrative part of the 
social whole and was reproduced through everyday practices of individuals. For a case in 
nineteenth-century Egypt, see Liat Kozma, Policing Egyptian Women: Sex, Law, and 
Medicine in Khedival Egypt (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011). 
16 For instance, see Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests: Iranian Subaltern on the 
Margins of the Tsarist Empire,” International Review of Social History 48 (2003): 401-
426, idem, ed. The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in 
Turkey and Iran (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2007), Stephanie Cronin, Tribal 
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Stephanie Cronin’s recent monographs write Iranian history “from below” and discuss 
how the “subaltern groups” such as oil workers, junior tribal khans, and urban crowds 
contested the power of the Pahlavi state. Importantly, while Pahlavi historiography 
vilified social groups that ultimately opposed the new regime as reactionary and 
backward, Cronin’s accounts demonstrate the contingent nature of responses of 
“subalterns,” who “neither received [Reza Shah’s policies] passively, nor opposed 
blindly.”17 Her discussions also illuminate how heterogeneous modes of expressing 
discontentment coexisted among oppositions, such as filing petitions, taking refuge in 
mosques, closing of the bazaars, union-led strikes, and even banditry. Many of these 
modes of protest were salient features in expressions of discontentment related to the 
railway project. 
Similar to these new studies, this dissertation examines how the expanding central 
state interacted with those in the social peripheries, but with a different focus. Historians 
like Cronin explicate the complex interplay between the central state, its local 
intermediaries, and stratified members of rural societies primarily through moments of 
dramatic confrontation. Discussions of social structures serve to contextualize well-
known events in broader political changes, most notably the 1929 Abadan oil refinery 
strike and the 1929 tribal rebellion. This dissertation shifts the focus further to everyday 
interactions, in order to illuminate various ways in which ordinary people attempted to 
                                                                                                                                            
Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921-1941 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2007), and idem., Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest 
and Revolt, 1921-1941 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
17 Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran, 161, and Tribal Politics in Iran, 3-4. 
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evade state control through quotidian daily practices, which had a major impact on the 
way they perceived themselves vis-à-vis the central state and other groups within the 
social whole. The shift is particularly important because everyday practices of evading 
state control, if not outright rebellions, continued well into the 1930s, by which dramatic 
moments of confrontation between the Pahlavi state and its opponents radically 
decreased. This dissertation shows that various social groups continued to engage with 
the multilayered state during the decade of the consolidation of power for the Pahlavi 
state.  
 
New Railway History and Its Theoretical Underpinnings 
Until a few decades ago, the main fields of inquiry in railway history were predominantly 
economic/business history, and to a lesser extent, labor history. Considering the 
availability of sources left by railway companies, and the survival of many railway 
companies today, the focus on such issues as finance, management, and labor is not 
surprising. In colonial contexts in particular, scholarship generally stressed the process of 
technological diffusion from the metropole to colonies, assuming that technological 
innovations were uncritically accepted or rejected by colonial subjects. These approaches 
focused on “producers” of the railway technology in imperial capitals, and thus provided 
insights into how railways were planned by European imperialists, and how the 
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construction and operation of railways contributed to the formation of a global capitalist 
system with Europe occupying a dominant position.18  
Reflecting the cultural turn in the broader discipline of history, recent 
historiography on railways in other contexts of the globe has expanded in multiple 
directions and has intersected with new fields. New scholarship in social history of 
railways illuminates how the process of class formation occurred through social 
engineering and how railways were constructed with significant deviations from utopian 
plans, resulting in both intended and unintended consequences on national or colonial 
social structures.19  
Moreover, railway history has intersected with studies of technology and culture 
and mobility studies. The intersection between technology and culture has become a 
major area of scholarly inquiry as the focus of analysis shifted from production to 
consumption of technology. This shift has allowed historians to investigate how 
“consumers” or users of the railway technology, particularly railway passengers, 
experienced railway journeys. Because of the spatial mobility involved in railway 
journeys, scholarship that investigated the ways in which the spatial mobility impacted 
                                                
18 For classic studies of technological diffusion, see Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of 
Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) and idem., The Tentacles of Progress: 
Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988). 
19 In particular, the case of both imperial and Soviet Russian railway projects to Siberia 
and Central Asia shares some features with the Iranian case. The similarities include: the 
crucial role of the central state as opposed to private companies compared to Europe and 
India; the civilizing mission envisaged by elites in the capital to transform the 
peripheries; the large-scale employment of tribal elements. 
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perceptions and representations of time and space grew significantly in the last few 
decades.20  
 More important for this dissertation are theories of the practice of users operating 
in asymmetrical power relations. In his study of everyday practices of users, who are 
“commonly assumed to be passive and guided by established rules,”21 Michel de Certeau 
discusses the ways in which users invent new meanings and practices that are unintended 
by producers. Critiquing Michel Foucault’s “microphysics of power” for privileging 
producers of discipline, de Certeau theorizes the ways in which the mechanisms of 
discipline are manipulated and proposes a critical distinction between strategies and 
tactics.22 A strategy is a method of control employed by “a subject with will and power (a 
business, an army, a city, a scientific institution),”23 who assumes “a place that can be 
circumscribed as proper (propre) and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with 
an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, “clienteles,” “targets,” or “objects” 
                                                
20 Following the pioneering scholarship of Wolfgang Schivelbusch, a number of scholars 
have examined literary and other sources to explain the practice of the railway journey, 
especially in British contexts. See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey 
(Tetsudo Ryoko no Rekishi), trans. Jiro Kato (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 1982 
[1977]), Ian Carter, Railways and Culture in Britain: The Epitome of Modernity (New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2001), and Michael Freeman, Railways and the 
Victorian Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). In Chapter Six, I will 
refer to scholarship that focus more on the everyday practice of traveling by train in 
relation to the notion of communities and the self within historical contexts that are more 
comparable to Iran, such as India, Russia and Mexico.  
21 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), xi.  
22 Ibid., xiv, and Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: 
Pantheon, 1977). 
23 Ibid., 35-6. 
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of research).”24 In contrast, a tactic is “a calculated action” without a “ ‘proper’ (a spatial 
or institutional localization)” used by the people who are embedded in the institutional 
framework of strategies.25 As such, whereas a strategy operates in its space, a tactic 
operates in the space of the other, and thus attempts to score ephemeral victories that 
depend on time. Significantly, the relationship between a strategy and a tactic is not 
oppositional. While the exercise of power by “a subject with will and power” is limited 
by the space that it controls, those who use tactics can exercise their power everywhere. 
Thus, the presence of a strategy necessarily invites a tactic, creating a mutually 
constitutive relationship between the two.26 
 In this dissertation, while paying attention to the ways in which the Pahlavi 
regime attempted to discipline the population, I shift the focus to “users” or “consumers” 
of railway technology. Thus, I consider how strategies and tactics evolved dialectically as 
the strategies that new state apparatuses attempted to impose on users/consumers were 
met with various tactics. I define “users” or “consumers” of the railway technology more 
broadly than railway passengers, because “using” or “consuming” railways does not 
necessarily have to mean traveling by train. Using/consuming the railway technology in 
everyday life can simply mean becoming aware of the existence of the technology, 
associating it with a particular mode of life, imagining how it can change one’s 
                                                
24 Ibid., xix. 
25 Ibid., xix and 37. 
26 Ian Buchanan, “Writing the Wrongs of History: de Certeau and Post-Colonialism,” 
Span: The South Pacific Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies 
33 (1992): 39-46. 
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surroundings, and taking advantage of the socioeconomic opportunities that railways 
might create in one way or another.27 For instance, construction workers encountered the 
railway technology before passengers did, as they built the track using construction 
material transported by service trains, consumed food and water transported by service 
trains, and moved from one site to another along the route in service trains. Likewise, 
local populations near Sari encountered the railway technology before the opening of 
passenger traffic when they came to see the new station building and became mesmerized 
by the bathrooms of first-class cabins.28 Thus, even if many Iranians did not travel by 
train, they “used” the railway technology in that they encountered it in some way and 
constructed a technological imaginary that shaped their broader worldview and their 
place in it.29  
 Expanding the definition of users/consumers beyond railway passengers also 
allows one to think about mobility in a broader sense. Mobility in today’s academic 
nomenclature has two main meanings that are typically used in two separate scholarly 
                                                
27 In a recent overview of everyday technology in South and Southeast Asia, David 
Arnold defined the “everyday” to include “merely knowing about cars, trains, and 
airplanes existed, recognizing them as familiar emblems of modern life on street 
hoardings, cigarette packets, and matchbox labels, in newspapers, magazines, radio 
programmes, and films” as well as “incorporating them into conversations, dreams, life-
stories, employing them in a technological imaginary that ranged far beyond the practical 
possibilities of individual possession.” David Arnold and Erich DeWald, “Everyday 
Technology in South and Southeast Asia: An Introduction,” in Modern Asian Studies 46, 
Special Issue 1 (January 2012), 10. 
28 IOR/L/PS/12/3409, “Persia: Memorandum of the Commercial Secretary of the 
Northern Section of the Trans-Iranian Railway,” May 16, 1931. 
29 For a case of the telegraph in the Ottoman Empire, see Yakup Bektas, “The Sultan’s 
Messenger: Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880,” Technology and 
Culture 41, no. 4 (2000): 669-696. 
 21 
fields of inquiry. The first meaning is social mobility used particularly in sociology, and 
the second is spatial mobility, a notion more prevalently used in transportation studies 
across disciplines.30 Despite the separation, the two kinds of mobility are in fact 
intertwined. In contradistinction with fluidity, which is a “movement having no particular 
effect on the individual,” mobility is an “event-based movement characterized by the fact 
that it leaves its mark on the life history, identity, or social position of the individual in 
question.”31 Thus, by recombining the spatial notion of mobility with social mobility, this 
dissertation seeks to present a case in which the two were correlated. The concept of 
mobility does not lose its utility as an analytical tool by employing two different 
meanings that have different scholarly pedigrees. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate that 
the seemingly unrelated impacts of the railway system on different social groups in Iran 
can be explained by its destabilizing effect that often accompanied spatial and social 
mobility. 
 Defining both users/consumers and mobility broadly has several additional 
benefits. First, it allows this dissertation to take a holistic approach to the history of 
railways in Iran, which remains a largely unexplored subject. Unlike other historical 
contexts such as the United States, Britain and India, where the richness of historiography 
allows historians to specialize in a specific subject within railway history, Iranian 
historiography needs a broader study of railways that will invite further studies. Second, 
                                                
30 Vincent Kaufmann, “Mobility: Trajectory of a Concept in the Social Sciences,” in 
Gijs Mom, Gordon Pirie, and Laurent Tissot eds. Mobility in History: The State of the Art 
in the History of Transport, Traffic and Mobility (2009): 42-3. 
31 Ibid., 58-9. 
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examining various kinds of encounters with railway technology enables a holistic 
approach to the specific period under question, especially the second quarter of the 
twentieth century, when railway construction started. By investigating such diverse 
groups as the nationalist elite, tribes along the railway route, modern middle class 
vacationers, pilgrims, and railway workers through the case of railways, this dissertation 
provides a broader picture of social transformations at a particular historical juncture in 
Iranian history.  
 
Sources 
This dissertation draws on archival material, the press, memoirs, travelogues, visual 
evidence, and to a lesser extent, interviews. The archival material comes primarily from 
Iran, the United Kingdom, and Denmark. Some of these archival sources are now readily 
available for researchers outside Iran, such as the digitized proceedings of the Majles and 
thematically organized collections of archival documents that have been published in the 
post-revolutionary period. In addition to these sources, I use unpublished Iranian archival 
sources from the Majles Library (ketabkhaneh-ye majles) and the National Archival 
Center (sazman-e asnad-e melli). In particular, I extensively use Majles documents, 
which contain petitions submitted by various groups of people, including landowners, 
peasants, construction workers and their families.  
Petitions can function as extremely useful evidence in studying the social history 
of modern Iran, where court records that historians of the Ottoman Empire often employ 
are either missing or are mostly inaccessible. Petitions can provide a wide range of 
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information, including local social structures, how diverse layers of the population 
perceived the ruler, the state, and their relationship to the state, and how the population 
tried to manipulate the powerful in their favor. As the case of nineteenth century Egypt 
suggests, the population (peasants in this case) could turn the ruler against oppressive 
local intermediaries by representing themselves as oppressed loyal subjects of the just 
ruler.32 Similar calculations by the population that indicate a complex relationship 
between the central state and rural societies appear in other historical context, too.33 
Although studies that use petitions in Iranian historiography generally focus on the Qajar 
era,34 by using petitions stored at the Majles Library and those published in the press, this 
dissertation considers the role of petitioning in the Pahlavi era, not simply as a sign of 
lingering traditions but as a constantly evolving institution.  
Archival documents from the United Kingdom are British Foreign Office 
correspondence. In addition to informing my discussion of railway imperialism from the 
late nineteenth century, these documents give insights into how the Trans-Iranian 
Railway impacted tribal groups along the railway routes. Compared to the oil-producing 
Persian Gulf province of Khuzestan, which also had Iran’s major ports, the British were 
less interested in Lorestan despite its being on the route from the Persian Gulf to Tehran. 
                                                
32 John Chalcraft, “Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt on the Eve of 
Colonial Rule,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 3 (August, 2005): 
303-325. 
33 Lex Heerma Van Voss, “Introduction,” International Review of Social History 46 
(2001), Supplement: 1-10. 
34 For instance, see Irene Schneider, The Petitioning System in Iran: State, Society and 
Power Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 
2006). 
 24 
Nevertheless, their perception of Lorestan as a lawless land perhaps urged British officers 
to leave relatively detailed records of tribal politics and their changing relations with the 
state, which this dissertation takes advantage of.  
 The COWI Archives in Copenhagen, which possesses documents of Kampsax, 
the Danish-Swedish consortium that supervised the construction of the Trans-Iranian 
Railway from 1933-1938, turns out to be extremely useful for this dissertation. Some of 
the unpublished memoirs of Scandinavian engineers who lived in workers’ camps in 
Lorestan provide us with fragmented yet vivid details of daily lives, including the 
difficulties that managers and engineers had to go through on construction sites, divisions 
among laborers, and how limited their direct interaction with native workers was. 
Furthermore, the photographs they took give us a glimpse of life on railway construction 
sites by showing what laborers’ tents looked like, who exactly the laborers were, and how 
railway construction changed the landscape of rural Iran. 
 Among published sources, the Iranian press comprises the most important 
material for this dissertation. I use various hitherto unused newspapers and journals such 
as the nationalist newspaper Nahid, The Ministry of Roads’ journal Nameh-ye Rah, and 
the Railway Organization’s newspaper Mardan-e Ruz. Historians have pointed out the 
role of the Iranian press as a public forum.35 Since each newspaper had a readership with 
a particular economic status and sociocultural orientation, historians can look into various 
publications to contextualize what was discussed in one publication in the broader public 
                                                
35 For instance, Camron Michael Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: 
Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865-1946 (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2002), 9. 
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opinion. For instance, known for its satirical cartoons that mocked Iran’s “traditional” 
culture, Nahid provides visual evidence on the perspective of the modern middle class 
that initially supported the rise of Reza Khan, while Mardan-e Ruz, offers an insight into 
issues that were highly relevant to railway workers. It is important to note that the Iranian 
press incorporated various genres of writings, including newspaper serialized novels, 
travelogues, and even reprinted petitions in the case of Mardan-e Ruz, which informed 
readers of similar problems that other railway workers and their families were facing. 
Admittedly, the novels and travelogues were not written by literary luminaries such as 
Sadeq Hedayat, yet their impact was arguably greater on the target audience of each 
newspaper. They were often written in simple prose and dealt with issues that were 
directly relevant to readers (such as a story of a modern middle class man being stuck in a 
carriage with an ignorant passenger and a nonfiction story about an embezzler in the 
Railway Organization). Particularly in the case of Mardan-e Ruz, since they were placed 
in libraries and salons of various railway clubs across the country, employees of the 




This dissertation combines thematic and chronological organizations. The next two 
chapters take a more top-down approach than the ensuing three chapters. They discuss 
the periods prior to the beginning of railway construction in 1927 to investigate the 
perspectives of officials and entrepreneurs of great powers as well as Iranian travelers 
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and nationalists. By doing so, these two chapters explore how the imagined mobility that 
railways would produce for their users became embedded in the discourse of the Trans-
Iranian Railway prior to its construction. Chapter Two “Penetrating Qajar Dominion” 
revisits the issue of how imperial rivalries played out over railway construction. It shows 
how the belief in the transformative power of railways intensified mutual fear among 
British and Russian policymakers, leading to the thwarting of any trans-Iranian railway 
projects to secure imperial interests prior to World War I. The belief remained largely 
intact after the war, but it was the regime change in Iran that ultimately forced imperial 
powers, particularly the British, to abandon its versions of a trans-Iranian railway and 
accept a secondary role in the Iranian state-led project of the Trans-Iranian Railway. This 
chapter also demonstrates that imperial railway projects were attempts at carving up 
strategic and commercial spheres of influence from Iran’s frontiers into interior Iran. 
What the main historical actors in Chapter Three “Imagining a Trans-Iranian 
Railway” envisaged was the opposite of penetrating Iran from outside. This chapter 
traces how Iranians gradually shaped their perceptions of the transformative power of 
railways to create a nation with Tehran at its center, from which power would emanate to 
the provinces. Concurrent with the enhanced mobility of travelers thanks to such 
innovations as steamships and railways, the nineteenth century witnessed the surge of 
travelogues as a genre in Persian literature. Travelers who visited various parts of the 
globe outside Iran selectively witnessed how railway systems transformed the landscapes, 
not only in Europe but also in India, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the 
privileged mobility of mostly elite Iranians and their experience in neighboring empires 
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played a significant role in shaping the initial perceptions about what a railway would 
bring to Iran. By the 1921 coup that brought Reza Khan to power, modernists shared the 
assumption that a trans-Iranian railway would rejuvenate the Iranian nation economically 
and culturally, although the advent of automobiles had led some to cast doubt on the 
priority on railways placed by the new regime.  
Each of the last three chapters of the dissertation focuses on a particular kind of 
experience of the Trans-Iranian Railway from the beginning of its construction in 1927 to 
the mid twentieth century. Chapter Four “Living Along the Railway Route” considers 
how local communities along the railway route responded to the changing political, 
economic, and social circumstances created by the project while attempting to shape the 
new circumstances in their favor. In particular, this chapter investigates the experiences 
of two different groups that were deeply affected by the Trans-Iranian Railway: 
landowners near Tehran and tribes in Lorestan. Both groups experienced an upheaval in 
relation to railway construction. Landowners near Tehran had their lands confiscated 
because of the need to build railway facilities, including Tehran Station, which lay 
outside the city at the time of construction. In the general context of Pahlavi efforts to 
strengthen central authority, tribal areas of Lorestan were penetrated by the railway, 
which consequently led to the influx of thousands of European workers and engineers 
and the employment of many Lors as construction workers in the 1930s. In both cases, 
the mobility that landowners and tribes acquired due to the project was involuntary in the 
sense that they had no other option. Yet, the experience of displacement did not 
immediately mean their resistance to the state. It was their attempts at engaging the state 
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that characterized the attitude of local communities, however limited they knew the 
outcome of the engagement would be. By engaging various state- and quasi-state entities 
through petitioning, they attempted to influence the outcome of the increased state 
presence, which in turn created a sense of normalcy in the presence of the state in their 
lives. 
Chapter Five “Mobilizing Railway Workers” traces the formation of railway 
workers, especially those at factories and stations, prior to 1948, when railway workers’ 
contribution to World War II was canonized in the official history of the Railway 
Organization. It makes two major points. First, the Trans-Iranian Railway project 
augmented the geographical and socioeconomic mobility of diverse groups of Iranians, 
who came to form the railway workforce. In particular, the flow of labor in Iran’s frontier 
provinces and their immediate surrounding world such as Russia, the Caucasus, Turkey, 
India, and Iraq played a significant role in the early formation of railway workers. Thus, 
the symbolic nation-building project was built upon transnational connections of mostly 
non-state actors. Second, it shows how the discursive process of workers’ socialization 
occurred in the specific context of post-Reza Shah Iran. Increased activities among 
workers after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 fostered workers’ interaction not only 
among themselves but also with various levels of state- and quasi-state institutions, to 
which workers made demands based on their contribution to the Allied war effort. In 
response, the Railway Organization attempted to mold workers into loyal employees by 
monopolizing the sites of socialization and occasionally placating workers.  
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Chapter Six “Traveling Citizens” examines how Iranian railway travelers 
interpreted and experienced the new railway space in the specific political and cultural 
context of the early Pahlavi period and the Allied occupation. Despite the utopian 
imaginations of the Pahlavi state and Iranian modernists to create a replica of idealized 
European railway journeys, various types of local passengers developed their own 
understandings and uses of the railway that were rooted in their specific needs, 
particularly during and after the Allied occupation. Importantly, rather than displaying a 
homogeneously Europeanized nation, the railway space in Iran came to embody various 
divisions among various segments of Iranian society, who were forced to face one 
another in a confined space. The interaction among them was conducive to the shaping of 














Chapter 2: Penetrating Qajar Dominion 
 
 
(Figure 2.1) Map of Iran at the beginning of the twenty-first century. CIA Maps, Iran.36 
 
                                                
36 For the map, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/Iran.html 




This chapter traces how strategic and commercial considerations of competing empires 
resulted in the absence of a major railway in Qajar Iran. Despite the railway frenzy that 
hit Iran like most other parts of the world from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
railway projects conceived by European (including Russian) and American officials and 
investors did not materialize in Iran, with a few minor exceptions. The absence of 
railways in Qajar Iran does not, however, indicate their lack of importance to competing 
empires. On the contrary, railway projects did not materialize precisely because European 
and American officials and investors shared an understanding of the tremendous impact 
of railways in shaping political and economic networks of the broader region that 
surrounded Iran. For them, because railways represented “tentacles of progress,” the 
routes of the railways had to be carefully controlled in order not to benefit their rival 
empires.37 
 As I mentioned in Introduction, scholars have examined extensively the politics of 
railway concessions in the Naseri period onwards. I will not provide a detailed account of 
all railway projects that involved the Iranian government, concessionaires, and various 
state institutions of imperial powers. Rather, in discussing the shared understanding of the 
                                                
37 I borrow the term from Daniel R. Headrick’s classic work The Tentacles of Progress: 
Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988). As the title suggests, Headrick focuses on the “transfer” of technology from 
Europe to Asia and Africa rather than the process of technological translation. The idea 
of technological diffusion is in congruent with the way European and American officials 
and investors understood the impact of their railway projects in Qajar Iran. 
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railway as a crucial technology to reshape imperial maps, I will highlight two related 
features of the politics of railway concessions in Qajar Iran. Firstly, imperial powers 
envisaged railway construction as a means to strengthen the broader regional and global 
networks of their respective empires. Thus, for them, railways in Iran did not have to be 
trans-Iranian railways that would run between Tehran and the provinces. Secondly, the 
flow of goods and troops that European and American officials and investors envisioned 
as the expected consequence of building a railway in Iran was primarily from outside of 
Iran to the interior of Iran. Although exploiting Iranian mines and exporting minerals out 
of Iran comprised one of the major incentives for investing in railway projects, most 
discussions centered around how to penetrate into Iran and how not to allow penetration 
by rival empires.38 As I will discuss in Chapter Three, this assumption stood in stark 
contrast to how the Qajar political elite envisioned a railway in Iran with Tehran at its 
center as the best way to distribute goods within Iran and export them from Iran to 
foreign countries.  
 
The Great Game and Qajar Iran 
From the early nineteenth century, Iran faced the expansion of British and Russian 
Empires that threatened Qajar dominion. The Russian Empire defeated the Qajars twice 
in 1813 and 1828, which resulted in Iran’s loss of the Caucasus to Russia. In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire expanded into Central Asia, notably 
                                                
38 For a discussion of the concession craze and the eclipsing of the economic frontier, 
see Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 75-80. 
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the capture of Tashkent in 1865 and the incorporation of Bukhara and Khiva as Russian 
protectorates in 1868 and 1873 respectively. At the same time, the British attempted to 
expand its influence into India’s northwestern frontiers to bolster the defense of India 
against Russia. By the mid-nineteenth century, these efforts resulted in the placement of 
the Khanate of Qalat under British protection and the occupation of Sind and Punjab. 
Also, as a result of the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-57, the British succeeded in forcing 
Naser al-Din Shah to relinquish Iran’s territorial claim over Herat.39 As the two empires 
expanded in the north and south, Qajar Iran became increasingly caught in the Anglo-
Russian rivalry in the late nineteenth century as a buffer state, which manifested itself 
prominently in the politics of railway concessions. 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, Asian railway networks of the British and Russian 
Empires started to expand in order to facilitate the movement of troops to frontiers and 
the flow of goods between the hinterlands and political, military, or commercial centers 
such as Baku, Tashkent, Quetta, and Bombay. In the Russian Empire, railways extended 
to both the western and eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, namely the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. In the Caucasus, the first section of the Trans-Caucasus Railway opened in 
1865 from the Black Sea port city of Poti, but by the early 1880s, other major cities such 
as Tiflis, Baku, and Batum were connected by rail. On the eastern shore of the Caspian 
Sea, the Trans-Caspian Railway connected the coast to ʿAshqabad (Ashgabat) in 1885, 
                                                
39 For the Anglo-Russian conflict in Central Asia, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and 
Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, Chapter One. For an example of the increasing British 
presence, see Soli Shahvar, “Communications, Qajar Irredentism, and the Strategies of 
British India: The Makran Coast Telegraph and British Policy of Containing Persia in the 
East (Baluchistan),” Iranian Studies 39, nos. 3 and 4 (2006): 329-351 and 569-596. 
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connecting Mashhad by a carriage road only 150 miles away. Furthermore, in 1898, 
Russia decided to extend the railway that had reached Merv by then to Kushk, only fifty 
miles away from Herat.40 
 Perceiving the threat of the Russian move southward to Afghanistan, the British 
constructed railways as well. Generally speaking, institutions within the British Empire 
shared an understanding that European and Indian rail systems should not be linked if 
possible in order not to provide Russia with easy access to India. At the same time, 
however, the British Empire needed to safeguard British political and commercial 
dominance in the Persian Gulf region and its surrounding areas, whose cities were often 
land and sea transportation centers leading to India. For instance, in response to the 
Russian advancement toward Afghanistan, the British Raj constructed railways that 
ultimately connected Karachi and the garrison town of Quetta by 1887 via Sibi. Another 
line to connect Quetta with Nushki in interior Baluchistan was built by 1905.41 Moreover, 
the line was extended along interior Baluchistan to Dozdab (present-day Zahedan) in 
Iranian Baluchistan during World War One to facilitate the transport of troops and war 
materials.  
 In this context of the Great Game in Asia, Iranian trade with Britain and Russia 
increased rapidly in the nineteenth century and shifted the direction of Iran’s foreign 
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trade away from regional commerce with the Ottoman Empire, India, and Central Asia. 
Although the economic penetration of Qajar Iran by Europe was not as intensive as it was 
in other places such as India, the Ottoman Empire, and Egypt, Iran’s process of being 
integrated into the global economic system as a provider of raw materials accelerated 
during this period.42 Charles Issawi estimates that trade with Britain by land and sea 
routes of the Persian Gulf accounted for at least half of Iran’s total trade in the 1850s and 
1860s, while trade with Russia increased especially from the 1880s, and accounted for 
about two-thirds of Iran’s total trade by World War One.43 Thus, by the late nineteenth 
century, Russia’s commercial priority was to consolidate its dominance in northern Iran 
by eliminating the possibilities of competition with British and other European goods, 
while Britain attempted to link southern Iran with its trading network in the Persian Gulf 
region to maintain British dominance. As will be discussed later, the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement of 1907 formalized the Russian and British spheres of influence in northern 
and southeastern Iran respectively. 
Infrastructural development was at the heart of the process of integrating Iran into 
the global economy as a peripheral state. It was thanks to such innovations as the 
telegraph, steamships, and railways that empires could communicate swiftly and transport 
goods and people speedily between distant places, which greatly facilitated the 
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intensification of global trade. For instance, recognizing the importance of connecting 
London and India after the 1857 Mutiny, the Indo-European Telegraph Department 
started to handle telegraphic messages between London and India in 1865.44 Similarly, 
the British succeeded in strengthening their position in southern Iran through the 1888 
opening of the Karun River to international navigation up to Ahvaz and the 1899 opening 
of the Bakhtiyari Road (also known as the Lynch Road) that connected the river with 
Isfahan through the Bakhtiyari territory.45 Russia also received numerous concessions for 
road construction in northern Iran and built nearly 500 miles of roads (Tehran – Anzali, 
Tabriz – Jolfa, and Qazvin – Hamadan) between 1893 and 1914.46  
Despite the general infrastructural development primarily by European 
entrepreneurs, most railway concessions in Qajar Iran ultimately failed. I will explain the 
reasons for these failures by dividing the period into three phases. The first phase is the 
period from the 1860s up to 1890, covering the intensifying competition between Russia 
and Britain that culminated in the Russo-Iranian agreement on the moratorium on railway 
construction in Iran, making railway construction impossible within Qajar dominion until 
1910. The second phase is from 1890 to 1918, a period that witnessed the rise of 
Germany, which forced Russia and Britain to change their railway policy in Iran. 
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Although imperial powers discussed several serious railway projects, the beginning of 
World War One postponed further developments. The last phase covers 1918 to 1927, 
when the Majles ratified the bill for the Trans-Iranian Railway, an Iranian state project 
undertaken by the German-American consortium. 
 
Phase 1: The 1850s-1890 
Since the 1850s, almost simultaneous with the expansion of rail networks in Europe, 
railways began to develop in Iran’s surrounding world such as India, Egypt, and the 
Ottoman Empire, where the first railways opened in 1853, 1856, and 1866 respectively. 
The railway frenzy spread to Iran, too. From the mid-1860s, European investors and 
merchants began to envision railway projects in the Qajar domain. Also, Iranian 
diplomats, among whom were Mirza Mohsen Khan Moʾin al-Molk, the Iranian 
Ambassador to London and an ally of the reformist prime minister Mirza Hosayn Khan 
Moshir al-Dowleh, approached European entrepreneurs from such countries as France, 
Prussia, and Britain and delivered a sales pitch.47 Thus, the Iranian reformist circle was 
involved in attracting European investment in railway projects in Qajar dominion from 
the beginning of the railway frenzy in Iran. 
Despite their efforts, before the 1870s, most European investors were cautious 
about taking a risk in a railway project in Iran due to the small size of the Iranian market 
and the mountainous terrain of Iran that would drive up the construction costs. For 
instance, being aware of the riskiness of investment in Iran and his government’s 
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unwillingness to back his investment officially, the British railway mogul Edward W. 
Watkin declined an offer from Mirza Mohsen Khan to invest in a railway project in 
Iran.48  
 When approaching established capitalists turned out to be unsuccessful, Mirza 
Mohsen Khan attempted to convince a less reputable investor, Baron Julius de Reuter, a 
naturalized British citizen. Despite the warnings Reuter received with regard to the 
riskiness of involving himself with a railway project in Iran, he enthusiastically reacted to 
the prospect of great profits predicted by prominent figures within the Iranian reformist 
circle. In addition to Mirza Mohsen Khan and Mirza Hosayn Khan, these figures included 
Mirza Malkom Khan, who believed that attracting British capital was the surest way of 
achieving railway construction, and having a railway was believed to ensure economic 
development in Iran. Consequently, on July 25, 1872, Naser al-Din Shah granted Reuter a 
concession that Lord Curzon famously characterized as “the most complete and 
extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign 
hands.”49 In addition to the exclusive rights to build tramways and railways, including a 
railway from Rasht on the Caspian coast to Bushehr on the Persian Gulf coast via Tehran, 
the concession conferred to Reuter the rights for exploiting such natural resources as 
minerals and forests as well as for developing industry and infrastructure such as roads 
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and telegraph lines. Furthermore, Reuter acquired the rights for the first option if a 
national bank was to be established in the future.50 Importantly, unlike many other 
concessions to come in the 1880s onwards, Naser al-Din Shah granted the Reuter 
Concession without pressure from any of the imperial powers. While the shah and his 
ministers may have been convinced of the benefits of the concession because of the gifts 
they received, the idea of having Reuter develop infrastructure in the Qajar domain was 
probably attractive, given the financial weakness of the Qajar state and Iranian 
merchants. In fact, when the shah asked for ministers’ opinions about the concession 
prior to signing it, they replied, “Should you sign your blessed August name to this 
concession, one stroke of your pen will bestow upon the land and the people more good 
and truer existence than have been given them by all the Kings of Iran over thousands of 
years.”51 
 The Reuter Concession encountered opposition, both domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, rivals and opponents of Mirza Hosayn Khan and some 
members of the ulama criticized the plan. For instance, Hajji Molla Ali Kani instigated 
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fear by claiming, “With the onrush of Europeans into Iran, no mujtahid would survive. 
Even if some ulama did survive, what guarantee do we have that Mirza Malkam Khan or 
the company, with all the wealth it can amass, and all the men it can bring into the 
country, would not surround us with their troops and weapons?”52 The fear that 
Europeans would come to Iran en masse and the ulama would be eradicated was directly 
connected to the railway clause of the Reuter Concession. He argued that the concession 
would give “a foreign company with the right to purchase land, which could lead to the 
invasion of the country by Europeans under the pretext of building railways.”53 
Therefore, the railway symbolically captured the fear of the increased spatial mobility of 
Europeans and the consequent penetration of European power into Iran.  
Russia also opposed the concession granted to a British citizen vehemently, using 
the term of a failed concession from 1864.54 Thus, while Naser al-Din Shah stayed in St. 
Petersburg in the spring of 1873 during his first journey to Europe, Russia pressured the 
shah to cancel the concession.55 Facing fierce opposition, the concession was ultimately 
cancelled by arguing that Reuter failed to begin railway construction within the specified 
time, and thus the concession should be nullified. The British Foreign Office considered 
the concession ill-conceived and declined to support him from the beginning. After the 
concession was cancelled, too, it continued to show little interest in the fate of the caution 
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money of £40,000 that Reuter had paid the Qajar government as a sign of his intention to 
proceed with railway construction in a timely manner. Yet, at the insistence of the 
Secretary of State for India, the Foreign Office agreed to support Reuter’s demand vis-à-
vis the Qajar government to get the caution money back as a potential weapon to use 
against future Russian railway plans by citing that Reuter theoretically maintained his 
exclusive rights for railway construction.56  
Once the Reuter Concession was cancelled, it was Russia’s turn to make a move. 
During Naser al-Din Shah’s visit to Russia in 1873, he met with Prince A. M. Gorchakov, 
Russia’s Chancellor. In response to Gorchakov’s opposition to the Reuter Concession, 
the shah stressed Iran’s need to have railways, which would require assistance from 
another company should Reuter fail to meet the conditions of the concession. The 
Russian Foreign Ministry immediately found that company in a retired Major-General of 
the Russian Army, Baron von Falkenhagen.57 Unlike the British Foreign Office that 
remained uninvolved with the Reuter Concession, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
encouraged Falkenhagen to pressure the Iranian government. With tacit state support, 
Falkenhagen sought a concession for a railway from Jolfa, which was soon to be 
connected to Tiflis by rail, to Tabriz, along with mining rights along the route. Thus, the 
railway was conceived to strengthen Russia’s position in the crucial province of 
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Azarbaijan. The Falkenhagen Concession in 1874, however, included a clause that 
required the Qajar state to give up the customs of Tabriz for the duration of the 
concession, which raised a serious concern for Mirza Hosayn Khan. After failing to stall 
the deal, he, along with the Iranian Minister in London, Malkom Khan, attempted to 
bring the British in. Fearing the expansion of Russian influence in Azarbaijan, the British 
used the nullified terms of the Reuter Concession that gave Baron Reuter the exclusive 
rights for railway construction as a pretext to object to the Falkenhagen Concession. 
Since Russia preferred not to antagonize the British over the matter, the Russian 
government-backed Falkenhagen Concession was cancelled in 1875.58 
After 1875, numerous attempts to gain a railway concession, undertaken by 
different groups of the British, Russians, Americans, the French, and Belgians, failed. 
Importantly, Naser al-Din Shah actively advocated some of the potential concessionaires 
and their railway projects, including Tholozan, his French physician. The shah met with 
interested investors in Paris during his second trip to Europe in 1878, and on different 
occasions, spoke favorably about the immediate granting of a concession to have a 
railway built in his dominion as soon as possible. Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian objections 
led to the failure of these attempts. In particular, in the case of the Tholozan project, the 
fear of the French obtaining the rights for railway construction in southwestern Iran, 
accompanied by the rights for cultivation of land from Ahvaz down to the Persian Gulf, 
alarmed the British. In another case, in which a Frenchman attempted to gain a 
concession to build a railway from Anzali to Tehran, Russia objected to the plan for fear 
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of having competition with its own railway development in the Caucasus, while Britain 
objected for fear of losing its market in Tehran and central Iran.59 The two imperial 
powers effectively blocked the concession by pressuring Iran. Thus, as the first few 
decades of the politics of railway concessions illustrate, in the cancellation of railway 
concessions, the fear of the railway’s transformative power in reshaping the balance of 
power played an important role. The ulama, Russians, and the British feared the increased 
influence of their rivals along the railway route and objected to railway projects in the 
Qajar domain.  
An exception among attempts at obtaining a railway concession was the 
concession granted to a Belgian company, which ultimately led to the 1888 opening of an 
eight-kilometer tramway from Tehran to the nearby shrine of Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim. The 
successful completion of the tramway resulted partially from efforts of the Qajar court to 
bring in a third power other than Russia and Britain, which aggressively pursued the 
promotion of British commercial activities since the mid-1880s under the new 
Conservative government, with Henry Drummond Wolff as the minister in Tehran. 
Among the newcomers to commercial endeavors in Iran were American companies, 
whose government opened a legation in Tehran in 1882.60 American plans for railway 
construction, including the 1886 plan to connect Mohammareh (present-day 
Khorramshahr) and Tehran and Clergue’s 1889 plan to connect Alexandretta (present-day 
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İskenderun) and India, were blocked by Britain and Russia.61 As was the case with 
previous railway projects, Britain needed to keep the virtual monopoly in political and 
commercial influence in the Persian Gulf, and Russia feared that connecting the Persian 
Gulf with Tehran could facilitate the entry of European goods into interior Iran and pose 
threat to the Russian dominance in central and northern Iran. While American plans fell 
through, Iran’s efforts to attract investment from countries other than Britain and Russia 
succeeded when a French concessionaire Fabius Boital acquired the concession to build a 
tramway from Tehran to Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim in late 1886. Possibly due to the lack of 
capital, however, Boital sold the concession to a Belgian company, which included the 
rights to build a railway from Qazvin to Qom via Tehran and Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim.62 The 
Belgian company constructed the Tehran-Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim tramway first and opened 
it in 1888. Furthermore, the Belgian company made a proposal to the shah to build a 
railway from the Caspian Sea to Tehran, although this proposal was retracted due to 
fierce British and Russian opposition. 
While railway projects within Qajar dominion mostly fell apart, the British and 
Russian Empires had extended railways to the frontiers of Iran by the mid-1880s. As 
mentioned earlier, it was in the 1880s that the Russian rail network was extended to 
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ʿAshqabad (1885), and the Indian rail network to Quetta (1887). Combined with the 
attempts by the French, Belgians, and Americans to obtain concessions and the rapid 
growth of Russian trade with Iran, there was a heightened sense of competition among 
various contenders. Particularly worrisome to Iran was the increased Russian presence in 
the crucial province of Khorasan due to the 1885 railway extension to ʿAshqabad as well 
as the 1888 Muscovite capitalists’ plan to construct a trans-Iranian railway from the 
Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. The perceived threat of Russia convinced Naser al-Din 
Shah to get closer to the British.  
In pursuit of a major commercial gain for the British, Wolff claimed that the 
Belgian concession violated Reuter’s rights from the 1872 concession and demanded 
some form of compensation.63 The result was the 1888 secret agreement with the British 
issued by Naser al-Din Shah that promised the British preferential rights in a railway 
project from Tehran southwards. Also, it was guaranteed that if a non-British company 
acquired a railway concession for northern Iran, a British company would gain a 
concession for a Tehran-Shushtar railway.64 Furthermore, within a month from this 
agreement, the opening of the Karun River to international traffic from the Persian Gulf 
up to Ahvaz was proclaimed in October of 1888. The opening of the Karun River was a 
major victory for Britain, as it would enable Britain to strengthen its influence in 
southwestern Iran and its interior lands. Moreover, the concession for the establishment 
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of the Imperial Bank of Persia was granted to Baron Reuter at the beginning of 1889. The 
establishment of the bank was meant to pave the way for other projects in mining and 
railway construction.  
As a railway enthusiast, Wolff was especially interested in railway concessions in 
Iran. Along with other concessions, he dreamed of building an extensive railway system 
in Iran and, in the hope of striking a railway concession, arranged for Naser al-Din Shah 
to meet with the business community of London during his stay in the summer of 1889. 
Unlike many of his colleagues, Wolff believed that giving Russia access to the Persian 
Gulf through railway construction, especially an Anzali-Tehran-Mohammareh railway 
with British and Russian capital, would lead to an Anglo-Russian détente through a 
practical economic partition of Iran and result in protecting British interests.65 Wolff’s 
advocacy of railway construction in Iran was not limited to the Caspian Sea-Persian Gulf 
route. He also argued for a Quetta-Sistan railway via Nushki (in today’s Pakistani 
province of Baluchistan) in conjunction with a concession to a British citizen, possibly 
Reuter, for irrigation in Sistan. In making a case for the project to the Government of 
India and Lord Salisbury, Wolff claimed that the railway would counter the Russian 
Trans-Caspian Railway and also make transporting troops from India easy and speedy in 
case of a Russian military move toward India.66 Neither the Government of India nor 
Lord Salisbury were enthusiastic about Wolff’s idea of the Quetta-Sistan railway at this 
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point, and Wolff’s imagination, which was characterized as “suffused with halcyon 
dreams of a regeneration of Persia by universal railways,” did not materialize.67  
Wolff’s dream of a trans-Iranian railway also did not materialize. In response to 
the opening of the Karun River, Russia was going to demand comparable concessions to 
balance out the advantage that the British had won in southern Iran. Yet, Russia 
ultimately decided to stop any railway construction in Iran, which would maintain the 
status quo and allow Russia to postpone difficult decisions. In a ministerial meeting of 
early 1890, while the Minister of Ways of Communication supported Muscovite 
capitalists and claimed that delaying railway construction would benefit the British, the 
Minister of War disagreed. He argued that the first railway to be built should connect the 
Caucasus with Tabriz in order to strengthen Russia’s strategic position. Furthermore, the 
Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs both opposed building railways in Iran, 
believing that railways in Iran would allow the entry of European goods into the Russian 
stronghold of the Iranian market. Ivan Alekseevich Zinov’ev, the Russian Minister in 
Tehran, made several arguments against railway construction in Iran. He pointed out the 
financial unviability of a trans-Iranian railway that depended on the expected Indo-
European trade volume, because the existing Suez Canal route would be faster and 
cheaper for Britain, the main trading partner with India that would avoid the route going 
through Russia anyway. Furthermore, without a naval station on the Persian Gulf, Russia 
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would not be able to protect the southern part of a trans-Iranian railway.68 Later in the 
same year, in November of 1890, the new Russian Minister in Tehran and Amin al-
Soltan, the Iranian Prime Minister, signed an agreement that included a clause that 
banned any railway construction in Iran for the next ten years, which was later extended 
for another ten years until 1910.69 
Thus, the intensification of Anglo-Russian rivalries over railway construction 
during the 1880s culminated in the imposition of the moratorium period. For Naser al-
Din Shah, this moratorium saved him from having to give out a series of compensating 
concessions in order to satisfy both the British and the Russians. Furthermore, although 
the agreement disappointed competing capitalists, it served the purpose of maintaining 
the status quo for both British and Russian governments. Despite the existence of 
diverging opinions within both imperial governments, as is indicated by Wolff’s 
advocacy for railways in Iran, for both imperial governments, it was far more desirable to 
keep Iran difficult to access for all parties than to improve access to Iran and potentially 
benefit their imperial rivals. Therefore, both the British and the Russians chose to 
maintain the status quo in which Iran was without railways as long as possible. 
Nevertheless, it was not a fundamental solution to the question of how the British and the 
Russians could reach an agreement over Iran. As Lord Curzon noted, “[t]hat a country 
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affecting a high civilisation can permanently resist civilisation’s choicest agency and 
most powerful means of influence is out of the question.”70 
 
Phase 2: 1890-1918 
In February 1911, Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, the former consul in Muscat, gave a 
lecture at the Central Asian Society in London. His lecture revolved around a trans-
Iranian railway project, a topic that had been rekindled recently in response to a visit to 
London by a Russian railway promoter who proposed the establishment of an 
international company to undertake the project with equal Anglo-Russian participation.71 
The trans-Iranian railway scheme had an endorsement from Russian bankers, business 
interests in railway and construction industries, and members of the Duma, the Russian 
Parliament. Also, it had already secured support from French bankers and would lead to 
the foundation of the Société d'Etudes du Chemin de Fer Transpersan in 1912, endorsed 
by the governments of France, Russia, and Britain.72 Yet, it did not materialize due to a 
familiar set of problems such as opposition from British government authorities such as 
the Government of India and the War Office, the difficulty of financing the project, and 
shifting priorities within the Russian government. Furthermore, the outbreak of World 
War One and the 1917 Russian Revolution put a final stop to the project. 
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 Unlike elements within the British Empire who expressed concerns with the trans-
Iranian railway scheme on the grounds that it would give Russia direct access to India, 
Yate saw the project as beneficial to the British Empire. The trans-Iranian railway that 
Russians proposed was to enter Iran from Baku along the Caspian Sea, and continue to 
India via Rasht, Qazvin, Tehran, Yazd, and Kerman, with a branch line to Khaneqin, the 
Irano-Ottoman border town in present-day Iraq, via Kermanshah. Therefore, it would 
connect Calais in France all the way to Calcutta, making the trans-Iranian railway the 
bridge between “East and West.”73 Yate continued: 
 
In the carrying out of this scheme Persia may be no more for the moment than the 
instrument of the ambitions of greater powers; but none the less the prospect is 
full of promise for her, and if ever she has the opportunity of reviving the past 
glories of Naushirwan and Shah Abbas, this is it.74 
 
Yate believed that the past glories of Iran stemmed from its role as the passageway 
between Europe and Asia, and thus reviving that role would bring prosperity back to Iran, 
especially to Sistan and Khorasan, where Britain needed to commercially compete with 
Russia. He went on to argue that strategic calculations should be overruled in the face of 
Britain’s responsibility to “open up” Iran and bring “civilization” to it, as it had been 
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doing for over a century in such enterprises as the navigation of the Karun River.75 
Therefore, his vision of a railway project in Iran assumed several points. First, Iran would 
regain prosperity thanks to the passing of the trans-Iranian railway. Second, even though 
the railway would go through Tehran partly to make the project more acceptable to the 
newly-established Majles, Iran was not important as a destination of its own. It simply lay 
en route to India from Europe. Third, the goal was to “open up” Iran from outside. Rather 
than creating a web of infrastructure emanating from Tehran as Iranian modernists 
imagined (see Chapter Three), Yate imagined that the railway would allow Europeans to 
penetrate the Iranian market. 
As the failed project of the trans-Iranian railway illustrated, debates about railway 
construction in Iran came back to center stage when the expiration of the moratorium in 
1910 approached. At the same time, changes in the international context forced both the 
British and Russian governments to change their policies in Iran. Russia’s defeat in the 
Russo-Japanese war and the revolution of 1905 temporarily destabilized the Russian 
Empire, making it more susceptible to negotiations with the British over Asian issues, so 
that it could concentrate on European matters. In the meantime, German influence in the 
Middle East was rapidly growing. In particular, the German government was heavily 
involved in railway projects in the Ottoman Empire, including the Baghdad Railway, 
which, once completed, would connect Berlin with Basra via Istanbul, Aleppo, and 
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Baghdad.76 The Baghdad Railway project, whose construction started in 1903, threatened 
British dominance in the Persian Gulf. It would divert at least some traffic from the Suez 
Canal route and give Germany direct access to the Persian Gulf. For Russia, too, the 
Baghdad Railway could compromise the Russian advantage in the northern Iranian 
market, particularly if Germany extended a branch line from Khaneqin on the Baghdad 
Railway to Tehran. 
The result of these circumstances was the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, which 
formalized Anglo-Russian relations over Tibet, Afghanistan, and Iran and thus allowed 
Britain and Russia to face the rise of Germany.77 Based on the agreement, despite the lip 
service paid to Iran’s integrity and independence, Iran was divided into de facto spheres 
of influence. The Russian sphere of influence was defined as north of the line connecting 
Qasr-e Shirin, Isfahan, Yazd, and the meeting point of the Afghan and Russian borders. 
The British sphere of influence was in southeastern Iran from the Afghan border, Birjand, 
Kerman, and Bandar Abbas. The area in between was the neutral sphere. While the 
agreement granted Russia exclusive access to concessions in the north, Britain got the 
same in the southeast, and both states attempted to exclude German enterprises from their 
respective spheres of influence.  
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After the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, in order to diminish the significance of 
the Baghdad Railway, Britain and Russia engaged in some discussions about possible 
joint ventures in commence after the end of the moratorium, such as the British-built 
southern line from Mohammareh to Khorramabad in the neutral zone and the Russian-
built northern line from Khorramabad to Jolfa via Soltanabad, Tehran, and Tabriz. 
Correspondence between the Consul in Ahvaz and the Political Resident in Bushehr 
mentioned preliminary discussions for the project, including the plan to calculate the cost 
of local labor, land acquisition, irrigation, and the need to ensure security through Shaykh 
Khazʾal, the local ruler of Mohammareh.78 At this point, the British priority was clearly 
on the line from Mohammareh northwards, ideally to Tehran, in order to bring central 
Iranian cities closer to the British stronghold of the Persian Gulf, while another large 
central Iranian market of Isfahan was served by the British enterprise of the Bakhtiyari 
Road from Ahvaz.  
While cooperating with the British, Russia also needed to placate Germany. 
Germany had attempted unsuccessfully to forestall the Anglo-Russian Agreement by 
proposing that Germany would restrict itself to pursue only commercial interests in Iran 
and refrain from railway construction in northern Iran if Russia built a branch line from 
Khaneqin to Tehran. Although Russia preferred that no railway be built in Iran, it needed 
to improve relations with the growing German Empire, which had other issues with 
Russia such as the Balkan problem. Thus, Russia reached an agreement with Germany in 
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Potsdam in 1911, in which Germany acknowledged Russia’s special interests in Iran and 
agreed not to pursue concessions in northern Iran. In return, Russia agreed to build the 
Khaneqin-Tehran Railway that would be linked to the Baghdad Railway.79 Russia’s 
strategy behind the agreement was to delay as much as possible undertaking the railway 
construction and hope that the international situation would change and let Russia off the 
hook, since the railway would allow the penetration of German goods into northern Iran 
and threaten Russia’s commercial position. Given that it would take at least another 
decade or more to complete the Baghdad Railway, that seemed to be the least undesirable 
option.  
Unaware of Russia’s intent, Britain was alarmed by the agreement and attempted 
to obtain a concession independently for a railway from Mohammareh to Khorramabad, 
which lay just south of the demarcation line of the neutral zone and the Russian sphere of 
influence. The railway would make the Russo-German plan of the Tehran-Khaneqin 
Railway meaningless by linking central Iranian cities as far as Hamadan and Kermanshah 
to the Persian Gulf by the railway and roads, thereby turning them into solid markets for 
British cotton goods.80 In order to obtain a concession for this railway, various British 
enterprises, including representatives of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Imperial 
Bank of Persia, the British India Steam Navigation Company, and the Euphrates and 
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Tigris Steam Navigation Company, established the Persian Railway Syndicate in 1911.81 
In the same year, the syndicate composed a draft of the application for the concession, 
which included railway lines from Mohammareh or Khormusa (later renamed Bandar-e 
Shahpur) to Khorramabad or Borujerd, Bandar Abbas to Kerman, Bandar Abbas to 
Shiraz, and Bandar Abbas to Mohammareh.82 In 1913, the syndicate obtained the option 
for the Mohammareh-Khorramabad Railway, which would follow the Iranian 
government’s final decision based on a preliminary survey that the syndicate was to 
undertake.83  
While the British proceeded with the Mohammareh-Khorramabad Railway, 
Russia shifted its priority to the Jolfa-Tabriz Railway, which did not face British 
opposition since the line remained within the Russian sphere of influence. Moreover, the 
line was much easier to finance than the trans-Iranian railway, which was later 
characterized as “chimerical” by C. P. Skrine, the British Consul for Sistan and Qaʾen in 
the 1920s.84 After obtaining the concession, Russia constructed the Tabriz-Jolfa Railway 
and completed it in 1916 in the midst of World War One.  
While the Tabriz-Jolfa Railway was completed despite the outbreak of World 
War One, other projects such as the Mohammareh-Khorramabad Railway came to a halt, 
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as the central government in Tehran collapsed and Lorestan plunged into chaos. World 
War One gave rise to other railway projects, however. Despite Iran’s declaration of 
neutrality, Iran became a battlefield for both the Allies and the Central Powers because of 
its crucial strategic location on the way to India from Anatolia and Mesopotamia. To 
transport troops and war materials, both the Russians and the British planned railways 
from frontier cities to penetrate into the interior of Iran. For instance, on the eve of the 
1917 Revolution, Imperial Russia was preparing to apply for railway concessions from 
ʿAshqabad to Mashhad and the Russo-Iranian border town of Astara on the western shore 
of the Caspian Sea to Tehran, in conjunction with concessions for mining rights.85 Thus, 
at the beginning of 1917, Russian railway construction from the northern borders into 
Iran seemed inevitable to the British, who were prepared not to raise opposition so long 
as Russia promised a reciprocal attitude to British railway projects in southern Iran.86 
Whereas Russian projects were abandoned after the 1917 Revolution, similar 
British projects in the south led to the construction of short railways that transported 
troops and war materials to the interior of Iran. In order to supply the newly-established 
South Persia Rifles, a British-trained military force that operated during World War One 
to counter the presence of the Central Powers in Iran, the British considered the 
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construction of the Bandar Abbas-Kerman Railway.87 Yet, it ultimately constructed a 
much shorter forty-mile light railway from Bushehr to Borazjan in 1918, although the 
line was abandoned soon after the war.88 Likewise, without notifying the Iranian 
government, the British extended a railway from Nushki in Indian Baluchistan to the 
hamlet of Dozdab (present-day Zahedan) on the Iranian side of Baluchistan to supply 
troops. The line continued to operate until 1931, contributing to the early development of 
Zahedan.  
By the end of World War One in 1918, Iran still did not have an extensive railway 
system. The few railway lines in the frontiers were meant to increase the presence of 
Russia and Britain militarily and commercially, and they functioned as such. For 
instance, the emerging border town of Dozdab existed as the railway terminus, where 
merchandise from India was reloaded from freight trains to trucks, often operated by 
Indian drivers, and was distributed to eastern Iranian cities such as Mashhad, Birjand, 
Kerman, and even as far as Yazd. Consequently, by the mid-1920s, out of approximately 
five thousand residents in Dozdab, three thousand were estimated to be foreign subjects, 
mostly from India. In fact, Dozdab became an important commercial center for both 
Indian merchants and Punjabi Sikh revolutionaries and raised security concerns among 
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British officers.89 Thus, railways on the frontiers of Qajar dominion radically increased 
foreign presence not only militarily but also commercially. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Three, it was in response to the fear of frontiers being pulled away from the 
nation that Iranian modernists imagined a trans-Iranian railway to create a Tehran-
centered national economy. 
 
Phase 3: 1918-1927 
By the end of World War One, due to the ongoing Revolution in Russia and the defeat of 
Germany, Britain became the sole dominant power in Iran. For Britain, Iran’s importance 
increased for two main reasons: 1) the need to protect not only India but also Iraq; 2) the 
British naval reliance on oil. Thus, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, aimed to 
create a stable, pro-British government in Iran by striking an agreement with Prime 
Minister Vosuq al-Dowleh, along with Sarem al-Dowleh and Firuz Mirza Nosrat al-
Dowleh. The outcome of the secretive negotiations was the 1919 Anglo-Persian 
Agreement, which was supposed to increase British participation in Iran’s financial, 
military, and other affairs of the state. The agreement also stipulated Anglo-Iranian 
cooperation to encourage the development of transportation infrastructure, including 
railways.90  
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 Simultaneously, the Persian Railway Syndicate attempted to continue negotiations 
for railway projects in southern Iran. Iran considered the 1913 option for the 
Mohammareh-Khorramabad Railway from the prewar period invalid because it had no 
approval from the Majles, which had been closed after Russia bombarded it in 1911.91 As 
negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Firuz Mirza Nosrat al-Dowleh started 
after the announcement of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, the Khaneqin-Tehran Railway 
via Kermanshah and Hamadan became a higher priority.92 Considering Britain’s 
seemingly secure dominance in both Iran and Iraq, the line seemed to benefit Britain 
more than the Mohammareh-Khorramabad Railway that had to go through the still 
volatile province of Lorestan. Therefore, in January 1920, the Syndicate obtained the 
option for building the Khaneqin-Tehran Railway with branch lines from Qazvin to 
Anzali and from Hamadan to Mohammareh, and thus recognized the 1913 option that the 
Syndicate had obtained.93 
 Nevertheless, the option became null once again. The Anglo-Persian Agreement, 
which faced dissent from various British government authorities from the outset, invited 
international criticism, especially from revolutionary Russia, which denounced the 
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British Empire for enslaving Iran. Furthermore, domestic opposition within Iran 
pressured Vosuq al-Dowleh’s cabinet. Shaykh Mohammad Khiyabani’s revolt in 
Azarbaijan in particular cited the Anglo-Persian Agreement as one of the reasons for his 
uprising.94 Moreover, the agreement had a constitutional problem, because Article 24 of 
the Iranian constitution stated that international agreements had to be signed by the 
Majles. In this mood of nationalist opposition against the first postwar manifestation of 
British imperialism, Vosuq al-Dowleh resigned and the Anglo-Persian Agreement was 
voided. Tainted by the rise of anti-British sentiment, the option was also abandoned, 
although the Syndicate continued to demand compensations from the Iranian 
government. 
 In the aftermath of the fiasco of the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement and its 
nullification, Britain needed to rethink its railway policy. Lord Reading, Viceroy of India 
at the time, acknowledged, “the time has passed when British capital and enterprise could 
hope to secure a privileged position in Persia, and to carry out schemes of railway 
development singlehandedly.”95 The Majles strongly opposed giving concessions to the 
British, including the Persian Railway Syndicate, and feared repeating the vicious cycle 
of British demands and Russian counter-demands that characterized the concession craze 
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of the late Naseri period.96 Thus, by the beginning of 1922, the British sought American 
cooperation in railway construction.  
 By this time, the desirable route for the British had changed. Before World War 
One, various British government authorities advocated the Mohammareh-Khorramabad 
Railway in order to sabotage the German project of the Baghdad Railway. In the postwar 
period, especially by the mid-1920s, they preferred the East-West route, as exemplified 
by their preference for the Khaneqin-Tehran Railway. They objected to the route that 
would connect Tehran with the north, as the Soviet Union gradually consolidated power 
in the north, recovered commercially, and established connections with Indian 
revolutionaries such as the Ghadar Party.97 As Percy Loraine, the Minister in Tehran, 
reiterated, objectives of a railway system in Iran included: 1) to create a direct rail link 
with India; 2) to counter the impact of the Trans-Siberian and the Trans-Caspian 
Railways; 3) to create a barrier against Russian penetration; 4) to enable Iran to fulfill its 
historical role as a link between East and West and keep it out of the Russian orbit; 5) to 
become a stabilizing factor in the region; 6) to encourage economic development.98 
According to Loraine, the route that would fulfill these objectives was an East-West route 
of Khaneqin – Kermanshah – Hamadan - Soltanabad (present-day Arak) – Isfahan – 
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Yazd – Kerman - Dozdab, although a branch line from Hamadan to Tehran, along with 
other branch lines, would be acceptable “as long as it did not divert the main axis of the 
future trunk line.”99  
 Unsurprisingly, Reza Khan, Iran’s Prime Minister at the time, was dissatisfied 
that Loraine’s preferred trunk line did not go through Tehran. He repeatedly expressed 
his preference for the Mohammareh-Tehran Railway via Khorramabad, Borujerd, and 
Soltanabad, with an extension to Bandar-e Gaz, followed by the line from Tehran to 
Tabriz via Qazvin.100 Other lines in which he showed interest included the Tehran-
Khaneqin Line, the Tehran-Dozdab Line via Isfahan, Yazd, and Kerman, and the Tehran-
Mashhad Line.101 Even more frustrating for the British was Reza Khan’s inclination by 
the beginning of 1924 to offer the railway project to American companies although he 
allowed British participation “provided that the company was American in name” given 
the anti-British atmosphere within Iran.102 Believing that the British generously brought 
Americans into the Iranian railway scheme and that the 1920 option that the Syndicate 
obtained should be valid, Loraine complained that Americans were “now to snatch 
Mohammerah-Khoremabad-Tehran line under our noses for themselves.”103 Despite the 
protest of the British Legation for a railway concession given to any group other than the 
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Persian Railway Syndicate, the German-American consortium signed the contract to 
build the Trans-Iranian Railway, forcing the British to modify their policy once again to 
find a way of some form of Anglo-American cooperation in the construction.104 
 
From Frontiers to Interiors 
 
Various imperial railway projects from the three phases examined above illustrate that 
imperial railway projects aimed to carve up imperial spheres out of Qajar dominion. 
Imperial railway projects did not hinge upon the notion that the railways had to go 
through Tehran, the Qajar capital of Iran. Iran was not even a destination on its own. 
Rather, it was on the way to the destination (India), and thus needed to be maintained and 
divided as such. As illustrated by such plans as the Jolfa-Tabriz railway, the Quetta-
Sistan railway, and the Baghdad-Karachi railway, the goal of imperial railway projects 
was to advance imperial strategic or commercial interests from outside of Qajar dominion 
into Iran’s frontiers. By planning the extension of a railway from ʿAshqabad to Mashhad, 
the center of eastern Iran, Russia in the 1910s attempted to solidify the status of Khorasan 
and eastern Iran as a market for Russian products. Likewise, Germany valued the 
Khaneqin-Tehran branch line to the Baghdad Railway because it would penetrate 
German goods into interior Iran from outside. Thus, imperial projects shared the 
assumption that railways would expand the reach of their goods into the interior market 
of Iran like tentacles. Individuals such as Yate even believed that railways would bring 
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“civilization” in general to Iran. These grandiose expectations also caused fear when rival 
empires and their entrepreneurs proposed railway projects, leading to frequent 
oppositions and the absence of a major railway system in Qajar Iran. 
This situation was similar to that found in Siam, which was a buffer state between 
the British and French Empires in Southeast Asia. While the British planned railways to 
reach Yunnan in China through Burma and northwestern Siam, the French attempted to 
reach Yunnan through Saigon and eastern Siam, threatening the Siamese vision of a 
Bangkok-centered economy.105 Thus, as was the case with the Siamese state railway 
project, the Iranian state railway project emerged among the Qajar political elite in the 
context of competing imperial railway projects that did not heed Iran’s territorial integrity 
and independence. The next chapter will discuss how Iranians, mainly the Qajar political 
elite, imagined a railway project in Iran as a way to create a national economy when 
British, Russian, German, and other foreign railway planners were trying to carve up their 
imperial strategic and commercial spheres out of Qajar dominion. 
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Chapter 3: Imagining a Trans-Iranian Railway 
 
Introduction 
In 1860, a young cleric Mohammad Ali left the central Iranian village of Mahallat and 
began an eighteen-year journey that would take him to lands both near and far, including 
the Hejaz, Russia, Europe, India, China, Japan, and the United States, where he became 
the first Iranian to be a naturalized citizen of the country. He later acquired the epithet 
Hajj Sayyah (traveler) and wrote a memoir of his travel. The memoir makes it clear that 
at least in Europe, he spent a significant amount of time on trains (kaleskeh-ye rah ahan). 
In Pest, Vienna, Milan, Paris, and other European cities, he took advantage of the rapidly 
expanding railway networks to move speedily from one city to another, crossing iron 
bridges and long tunnels that penetrated through prosperously cultivated lands of Europe, 
the details of which he recorded numerous times.106 
 During one of the railway journeys, Hajj Sayyah had an encounter with a French 
peasant, whose knowledge of the world impressed him. The peasant asked, “Is our 
railway better or yours?” Hajj Sayyah responded, “In our land, there is not a railway yet.” 
The peasant seemed perplexed and asked, “Why?” Not knowing how to respond, the 
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Iranian traveler simply said, “I don’t know,” and changed the subject. The experience 
embarrassed him to the extent that he sat quietly for the remainder of the journey.107  
 Hajj Sayyah’s experience exemplifies Iranian travelers’ early encounters with 
railway technology outside of Qajar dominion by the 1860s.108 Facilitated by the 
nineteenth-century transport revolution, travelers from Iran like Hajj Sayyah started to 
experience railway journeys abroad more frequently in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Their descriptions of railway journeys in travelogues sometimes included basic 
information on railway travel such as how to get on the train, where to get food during 
the journey, and how it felt to travel by rail, in order to introduce the new technology to 
Iranian readers and serve as a guide for future travelers.109 Importantly, as noted in 
Chapter Two, the railway boom hit much of Europe and the colonized parts of Asia and 
the Middle East almost simultaneously, allowing Iranian travelers to witness railways not 
only in Europe but also in Iran’s surrounding regions such as India, Egypt, the Ottoman 
Empire, and a few decades later, in the Caucasus. 
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This chapter examines Iranians’ initial encounters with railway technology from 
the mid-nineteenth century to the ratification of the Railway Act in 1927, which paved 
the way for the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway. By tracing the developments 
of various imaginations of railways among the Iranian political elite, it explains their 
attempts at translating railway technology that they witnessed outside of Iran as a 
possibility in the specific context of Iran. In doing so, it stresses contingent factors in the 
evolution of Iranians’ understandings of an Iranian railway project. Although official 
publications often present the Trans-Iranian Railway as the embodiment of the 
unchanging “longtime dream of Iranian patriots” of over seventy years,110 Iranian 
imaginations of an Iranian railway project shifted considerably in a number of ways. Who 
should undertake the project? Who should fund it? What should its route be like? What is 
its relationship with animal-powered transport? What should its ultimate outcomes 
comprise? Answers to these questions differed among the Iranian political elite at any 
given time, but more importantly, the shared assumptions of the time changed 
significantly between the 1860s and 1927. 
In discussing the shifts, this chapter stresses Iran’s global connections, 
particularly Iran’s surrounding world. While scholars often emphasize Iran’s encounters 
with the “West” to explain Iranians’ technological aspirations, these aspirations evolved 
in the context of encounters between Iran and its surrounding world, which forced 
modernists to situate Iran in the global technological order. Thus, similar to the cases of 
other ideas and institutions of foreign origins, Iranians saw various possibilities for Iran 
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in a broader global context.111 Furthermore, as more members of the Qajar political elite 
began to record the details of their journeys in travelogues (safarnameh), which became 
increasingly more institutionalized during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, not only 
travelers but also readers of travelogues deepened their understandings of railway 
technology on a global level.112 Iranian modernists’ imagination of a trans-Iranian 
railway as a state initiative to create a national economy evolved in connection with these 
factors since the Naseri period.  
 
Naseri-Period Travelogues and Encounters with Railways 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in the 1860s, a small circle of Iranian modernists with 
experience abroad started to encourage foreign investment, particularly British, in railway 
projects within Qajar dominion. A leading figure in this circle was Mirza Hoseyn Khan 
Moshir al-Dowleh, who had prior diplomatic experience in India, the Caucasus, and the 
Ottoman Empire before becoming the premier and working to grant a comprehensive 
concession to Baron Julius de Reuter. The failure of the 1872 Reuter Concession did not 
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deter him from promoting railway construction. In 1875, for instance, the official gazette 
Iran, which heavily reflected his opinions, ran a series of articles by Baron de Norman, 
whom Mirza Hoseyn Khan invited to Iran to establish the first European-language 
newspaper. The articles discussed how railways transformed industry, agriculture, trade, 
mining, and forestry elsewhere and advocated a similar railway project in Iran.113 
 Already aware of the practice of royal journeys to Europe in the Ottoman and 
Japanese Empires, Mirza Hoseyn Khan also encouraged Naser al-Din Shah’s 1873 travel 
to Europe, hoping that the Shah and his retinue would witness various manifestations of 
progress in Europe, including its extensive railway systems.114 In addition, Naser al-Din 
Shah hoped to foster stronger relations with European countries, particularly with Britain, 
probably because presenting an image of normalcy and stability in diplomatic relations 
could buttress the stability of his rule since the Second Anglo-Persian War of 1856-
1857.115 Naser al-Din Shah extensively recorded his journey to Europe in 1873, just as he 
did during his previous trips to such places as Gilan, Khorasan, and the ʿAtabat. His 1873 
travelogue introduced to the reader back in Iran what railway journeys would be like and 
how railways transformed wherever they passed. 
After traveling on horseback in Iran, crossing the Caspian Sea from Anzali to 
Astrakhan, and sailing down the Volga River, his first encounter with the railway took 
place in Tsaritsin (present-day Volgograd). He described his first railway journey in 
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detail, starting with the spaciousness and luxuriousness of the royal carriage. Once the 
train departed the station, he immediately noticed the prosperity of agricultural lands 
along the railway route: “whichever way we looked out over the land, we saw green 
fields, meadows, flowers, grass, tented tribes, mares, sheep, swine, &c. [sic], and every 
two or three leagues a handsome, populous village.”116 In his mind, the prosperity owed 
much to the presence of the railway stations that existed about every few leagues and 
connected the villages to their hinterlands through horse carriages, which stood in front of 
each station to transport passengers and merchandize.117 Thus, in Naser al-Din Shah’s 
mind, animal-powered transport was an integral part of the transport system that 
contributed greatly to connecting distant lands rather than a symbol of backwardness, as 
Iranian modernists of the early twentieth century would perceive. This understanding was 
hardly surprising, because throughout his journey from Iran to Europe and then back to 
Iran, the shah continued to use the horse carriage for short-distance travel, as it connected 
not only railway stations in villages with their hinterlands but also stations to various 
urban neighborhoods. In other words, the existence of animal-powered transport did not 
necessarily differentiate Iran from elsewhere. In 1873, animal-powered transport, in 
particular the horse carriage, supplemented railways in Europe. Therefore, the sense of 
shame associated with animal-powered transport that would become more evident by the 
turn of the twentieth century had not emerged at this point. 
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In addition to the impact of railways on European agriculture and general 
economic conditions, Naser al-Din Shah described various aspects of his experience on 
the train, including train facilities and the discomfort of darkness, smoke, and noise in 
tunnels. Among these aspects of the railway journey, the shah was particularly interested 
in its speed. For instance, in his trip from Tsaritsin to Moscow, he noted that the train 
traveled five leagues per hour and described the scenery outside the window: “The pace 
of the train was such that we overtook the flying crows, passed them, and left them 
behind.”118 While he was fascinated by the rapidity of the railway journey that enabled 
him to visit distant places in a short period of time, he also expressed dissatisfaction with 
the problems that high speed caused. In Germany, he complained that he did not even 
have time to fall asleep because the train carried him from one city to another too 
quickly, forcing him to get prepared to descend and greet local officials.119 Likewise, in 
England, the rapidity of the train made it “impossible for one to distinguish any place,” 
and even worse, almost caused a catastrophe when the spark on the wheels lit fire on a 
train car.120 Despite the potential discomfort and danger of the speed, he traveled by train 
for intercity movements, especially in Europe, including the train rides from Russia to 
Germany, from Germany to Belgium, from France to Italy, in England, and in the 
Caucasus, before returning to Iran. The extensive use of railways in the shah’s journey 
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was indicative of how the nineteenth-century transport revolution impacted the way in 
which travelers moved a long distance in a relatively short period of time.  
 In 1886, a little over a decade after Naser al-Din Shah’s travel, another traveler 
left Iran. His name was Hajji Mohammad Ali Pirzadeh, a dervish who had enjoyed the 
patronage of Mirza Hoseyn Khan Moshir al-Dowleh.121 Possibly because of his previous 
experience of traveling across Europe in 1860, about which we have no record, he was 
requested to accompany Moʿayyed al-Molk, a prominent official in the Province of Fars 
in need of medical treatment. His three-year journey took him to Muscat, India, and 
Egypt before entering Europe across the Mediterranean. Thus, after traveling in Iran on 
caravan trade routes, his first encounter with railways in this journey happened in India, 
first in Karachi, and then in Bombay.  
The dervish was deeply impressed with the new quarters of the growing port city 
of Karachi. While the old city of Karachi looked similar to Iranian cities with “narrow 
alleys, lowly buildings, and dirty shops,” the new quarters built by the British boasted 
impressive “stone buildings like European buildings,”122 including the railway station. 
Hajji Pirzadeh attributed Karachi’s prosperity to its role as the transportation hub of the 
Indian subcontinent. The port connected Karachi to London, Paris, Egypt, Iran, and all 
over India. Moreover, the extensive railway network connected the city to all parts of 
India, in particular Peshawar and Sind. Therefore, Karachi enabled him to envision Iran’s 
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future with a railway that would connect Iran with the global economy, juxtaposed with 
the old quarters that had not yet benefited from the railway system just like Iran. 
After leaving Karachi, he witnessed railways again in Bombay. Impressed by the 
extensive railway network, he noted, “in Bombay and the rest of Indian provinces, there 
is no high price, famine, or poverty among local populations because railways always 
carry goods and grain, and people of India, both men and women, are busy with work. 
From ten-year-old boys and girls to seventy-year old men and women, nobody is idle.”123 
In short, “they (railways) have become the reason for the flourishing of India.”124 
 Like Naser al-Din Shah, Hajji Pirzadeh was also impressed by how new modes of 
transportation such as steamships and railways were supplemented by animal-powered 
transport. He noted the presence of “big, plump, and handsome” cows that “would not be 
seen in Iran, as well as other animals such as camels, mules, and donkeys.125 Just like the 
hardworking people of India, these healthy animals transported both goods and people 
from the port and railway station to various quarters within the city and to the hinterlands 
of the city. Thus, in his mind, animal-powered transport did not embody the shameful 
backwardness of Iran. Rather, it was an integral part of the transportation network that 
symbolized the prosperity of India. 
 After leaving India, he traveled by train numerous times, including in Egypt from 
Suez to Cairo, and then from Cairo to Alexandria, and in England. Yet, as he got 
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accustomed to them, descriptions of railways became brief and perfunctory. He still 
described such matters as Egypt’s rich agricultural lands as the train came closer to Cairo 
and the new subway in London, but neither of them made him compare the sorry 
situation of Iran with Egypt in the way his experiences with the Indian railway system 
had done earlier in the journey.  
Europe was the final destination for both Naser al-Din Shah and Hajji Pirzadeh, 
however accidental the choice of the destination was for the latter. Both travelers were 
mesmerized by the transport system in Europe, which had the highest speed trains, long 
tunnels that took half an hour to go through, and new subways, at a time when nowhere 
else in the world had such things. Yet, focusing exclusively on Europe as the source of 
knowledge about new modes of transport among Iranian travelers to Europe is 
problematic because it ignores the lands that lie between the starting point of their 
journey and Europe. Iranian travelers relied on various kinds of animal-powered transport 
such as camels, horses, and horse carriages in Iran. When they departed the Qajar 
domain, they were not in Europe yet. In the continuous landscape that connected Iran and 
Europe, they passed through the Caucasus, Russia, or India, depending on their route, 
where they had the first encounter with the railway.  
While Naser al-Din Shah first traveled by the railway in southern Russia, Hajji 
Pirzadeh witnessed the railway in India before reaching Europe. Particularly in the case 
of Hajji Pirzadeh, India gave a convenient comparative case with Iran because of its 
geographical proximity as well as its comparable economic condition prior to railway 
construction, as exemplified by the existence of the old city quarters that resembled 
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Iranian cities. Thus, more than railway systems in Europe, Indian railways allowed him to 
imagine an optimistic future for Iran. In this context, it is indicative that the only place in 
Naser al-Din Shah’s travelogue where he mentioned the construction of a railway was in 
Poti, Georgia, when he was on the way back to Tehran. While all descriptions of railways 
in Europe focused on the experience of being on a train, in Georgia, he discussed the 
difficulties in constructing a railway from Poti to Tiflis due to the region’s heavy forest, 
marsh, and inundation.126 The different focus might be attributable to the apparent 
comparability of the situation of Georgia with that of Iran due to Georgia’s geographical 
proximity to Iran and its history of Iranian rule until it was ceded to Russia in the Treaty 
of Golestan in 1813. Railway construction may have appeared to be a possible future for 
Iran if it was happening in the former Qajar domain of Georgia.  
It is also crucial to consider the fact that the vast majority of Iranian travelers who 
set foot on foreign land never visited Europe. In the list of 283 Qajar-period travelogues 
compiled by Morikawa, the two most popular destinations outside of Qajar dominion 
were Mecca and the ʿAtabat, with over forty travelogues each. Europe and India 
comprised the next most common destinations, with over twenty travelogues each. Other 
major destinations included Egypt, Istanbul and Anatolia, the Caucasus, Russia, and 
Central Asia, with between five and ten travelogues each.127 Since Iranian travelers to 
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Europe traveled through such places as the Caucasus and Russia before reaching Europe, 
European railways were rarely the first railways Iranian travelers witnessed. 
Mirza Mohammad Hoseyn Farahani was one of such travelers whose journey did 
not take him to Europe. Being a diplomat in the Naseri period, he had served in India and 
performed pilgrimage to holy cities such as Mashhad, the ʿAtabat, and Mecca multiple 
times in the course of his life. In the existent travelogue of his pilgrimage to Mecca that 
started in 1885, he took advantage of the rapidly developing railway networks of the 
Caucasus and took the route from Tehran to Baku, Batumi, Istanbul, Alexandria, Suez, 
and Jeddah before entering Mecca. He traveled from Tehran to the Caspian port of Anzali 
via Qazvin and Rasht by a horse-drawn carriage, the most comfortable mode of land 
transport at the time. From Anzali, he crossed the Caspian Sea by steamship to Baku, 
where he experienced a seventeen-hour railway journey to the Black Sea port of Batumi, 
which Russia seized from the Ottoman Empire in 1878.128 Since the Russian-built 
railway had only opened two years earlier, Farahani explained to the reader logistical 
issues such as where to buy tickets, what kinds of luggage required an extra fee,  and how 
to maintain ritual purity during a railway journey among non-Muslims.129  
Before reaching Mecca, he traveled by train again from Alexandria to Suez in 
Khedival Egypt, which had been under British occupation since 1882. Farahani’s 
comments with regard to the two railway systems shed light on his view about the 
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adequate role of the state in maximizing the economic impact of railways. In Batumi, in 
addition to the Russian military uses of the railway, he noted the rapid growth of the port 
city of Batumi since the opening of the railway, which, in his opinion, stood in stark 
contrast with the decline of Poti, another Black Sea port city located about seventy 
kilometers north of Batumi. Poti had served as a land and sea transportation center before 
the railway to Batumi opened, but its position was being taken over by Batumi since the 
opening of the railway. He attributed the growth of Batumi to Russian policy, which 
included the construction of orderly bazaars and streets near the railway station. More 
importantly, the Russian government issued a decree not to impose customs duties on 
imported items that would enter from Batumi.130 Thanks to these measures, he believed, 
Russia maximized the benefits of the new railway in Batumi. 
In contrast, Farahani found the Egyptian Railway less than satisfactory. Although 
he did not understate the economic impact of the railway on Egyptian cities, he 
complained at length about how the Egyptian government operated and maintained the 
railway. His complaints included the uncleanliness of station buildings, the lack of 
amenities, the unavailability of food and drink, and unpunctuality, sometimes in direct 
comparison with the Russian Railway in the Caucasus.131 He explicitly attributed the 
poor condition of the Egyptian Railway to the political condition of Egypt, “For those 
twenty-five years that it (the railway) was with the (French) company, all was in perfect 
order. Then the company’s term expired, and now the railway has been given over to the 
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Khedive of Egypt. He gives the profits to the English because of the debt.”132 Thus, 
Farahani considered that the Egyptian bankruptcy and the British occupation made it 
impossible for the Egyptian state to use profits for the proper maintenance and operation 
of the railway, causing its rapid deterioration. To Farahani, the active involvement of the 
state, along with the danger of a foreign occupation, seemed essential in maximizing the 
benefits of a railway in an economy. 
These travelogues comprised a small sample of the many travelogues from the 
Naseri period. Yet, the descriptions of railways contained in them indicate that travels to 
foreign lands and subsequent travelogues written and circulated during the Naseri period 
provided knowledge about technological innovations that originated in Europe. Although 
existing scholarship often emphasizes Europe as the geographical location of Iranians’ 
encounters with technology,133 Iranians more frequently encountered railways in Iran’s 
neighboring world than they did in Europe. In fact, railways in such places as Karachi, 
the Caucasus, and Egypt gave travelers more practical models that seemed applicable to 
Iran’s situation, and thus travelers went beyond being mesmerized and provided more 
detailed descriptions on such issues as the economic impact, the molding of productive 
citizens, and the role of the state. Thus, because Iran was a latecomer to the age of 
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railways when its surrounding world experienced the nineteenth-century transport 
revolution, Iranian travelers had multiple points of reference to acquire knowledge about 
railways. This was similar to the case of Siam, where travelers and rulers encountered 
railways not only in Europe but also in nearby European colonies such as Java and 
India.134 Along with the contemporary treatises discussed in the next section, travelogues 
discussed here contributed to the evolution of the Qajar political elite’s idea about what 
an Iranian railway project should look like. 
 
Imagining an Iranian Railway Project 
While knowledge about railways was being accumulated through descriptions in 
travelogues in the second half of the nineteenth century, some Iranian diplomats proposed 
railway construction in Iran within two decades of the Reuter Concession. Diplomats 
were especially well-positioned to write such proposals because of their extensive 
experience of living abroad and the connections they often had with influential figures in 
political, commercial, and religious circles of Iranians both inside and outside Iran.  
 One of the diplomats was Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh, who had 
served in Tiflis and Paris, and later in his life, played a pivotal role in the development of 
new roads such as the Qazvin-Tabriz road by forming a liaison with Tabrizi and Isfahani 
merchants, mojtaheds, and prominent officials.135 He was also connected to influential 
individuals in and outside Iran, including the reformist premier Mirza Hoseyn Khan 
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Moshir al-Dowleh and the anti-clerical intellectual in the Caucasus, Mirza Fath ʿAli 
Akhundzadeh. While not excluding the possibility of foreign capital altogether, 
Mostashar al-Dowleh proposed two ideas for railway construction, preferably by 
domestic capital, in 1874 and 1879 respectively, and presented them to Naser al-Din 
Shah. His 1874 proposal was entitled the “Naseri Project of the Qom Railway (porozheh-
ye naseri-ye rah ahan-e qom),” and as the name indicated, it was a plan to build a railway 
from Tehran to Qom via Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim.136 Thus, the proposal intended to connect 
two major shrine cities that were popular pilgrimage destinations for the population in 
Tehran. In fact, the cited benefits of building a railway included facilitating pilgrimage, 
along with improving life through the development of industry, fishery, and agriculture 
and the eradication of famine. The last benefit became particularly important in the wake 
of the 1870 famine that devastated the Iranian population due to the lack of an adequate 
transportation infrastructure in Qajar dominion.137 To provide an estimate of profits, 
Mostashar al-Dowleh took into consideration the number of pilgrims, the money they 
would spend depending on their economic status, agricultural products transported from 
around Qom to Tehran, and various items carried to Tehran, northwest Iran, and Istanbul 
from areas south of Qom, including India.138 
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 The opposition of the ulama to the Reuter Concession pushed forward by his ally 
Mirza Hoseyn Khan may have made Mostashar al-Dowleh more cautious. To secure 
support from the ulama, he attached to his proposal a fatwa of Hajji Molla Sadeq, a 
prominent mojtahed in Qom. The fatwa proclaimed, “railways result in the cultivation of 
dreadful ruins and uncultivated lands as well as the reduction of the price of not only 
grains and fruits but also most food and consumption items. They also remedy idleness 
and help the unemployed and profligate to find use”139 Thus, “if God’s will and His favor 
include the conditions of the Iranian people, a railway will connect the land to the sea, 
and there will be a prosperous kingdom, and the brokenness and misery of people will be 
remedied, and everybody will be working.”140 
 Though the Naseri Project of the Qom Railway did not materialize, during his 
sojourn in Mashhad, Mostashar al-Dowleh proposed another railway, which remained 
unimplemented. The plan was to build a railway from Tehran to Mashhad, in addition to 
a branch line from Shahrud to Bandar-e Gaz to connect the line to the Caspian Sea. Like 
his previous proposal, Mostashar al-Dowleh secured support from prominent local 
figures, including merchants, Qajar notables, and six mojtaheds in Mashhad, who cited 
the rapid development of Alexandria thanks to the Egyptian railway system. Also like his 
previous proposal, he justified his plan by stressing the economic benefits of the line. 
First, he believed that the railway would generate sufficient profits to construct another 
line from Tehran to Khaneqin due to the presence of Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, the 
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most popular pilgrimage site in the Qajar domain. Second, he argued that the increase of 
trade, agriculture, and industry would allow Iranians to accumulate capital and diminish 
the need to rely on foreign capital and expertise. Furthermore, considering the remoteness 
of Khorasan, he stressed the political benefit of strengthening the presence of the central 
government.141  
 The other proposal was circulated among statesmen and intellectuals by 
Mohammad Mirza Kashef al-Saltaneh, who was a young diplomat working as the vice 
minister of the Iranian Embassy in Paris at the time of authoring the treatise on the 
benefits of railways in 1889. After living in Paris for eight years, he later served in Russia 
and India and actively participated in the Constitutional Revolution.142 Kashef al-
Saltaneh strongly believed in the benefits of railways, particularly their economic benefits 
to the public. Railways would foster industry and agriculture and create jobs. They would 
also facilitate the internal distribution of food, which would prevent disasters like the 
1870-71 famine.143 More fundamentally, compared to Mostashar al-Dowleh, he stressed 
the importance of international trade in economic development, as the case of France 
demonstrated, where the total trade volume increased by eight times between 1840 and 
1870.144  
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 To maximize the economic benefits of railways, Kashef al-Saltaneh believed that 
the state needed to get involved in the railway sector. He cited numerous examples of 
European governments, including Belgian, Dutch, and German, building new railways 
and purchasing existing railways from private companies and argued, “in no European 
country, companies own railway tracks but only the right to use the state-owned tracks 
for the period of ninety nine years,” with the notable exception of England, where private 
companies paid five percent of their ticket sales to the government.145  
 The cases that particularly interested him with regard to state involvement were 
Russian and Brazilian railways because of the prominent role of the state to construct and 
operate railways in vast, sparsely-populated territories, which made them more 
comparable to Iran’s case than such other cases as Germany and France. In both cases, in 
order to protect the interests of the public, the state subsidized the railway sector at least 
initially until freight and passenger traffic started to increase and the railways started to 
generate enough revenues for the state. Thus, citing a French engineer/politician, Kashef 
al-Saltaneh proclaimed, “([e]ven if railway companies do not generate profits at all and 
the government needs to shoulder the entire expenses, it should try to increase 
railways.”146 
 His deep knowledge of various European railways did not make him a Europhile 
in the manner similar to Mirza Hoseyn Khan, who favorably viewed the Reuter 
Concession. What infuriated the young diplomat was the domination of the West 
                                                
145 Ibid., 96-7. 
146 Ibid., 100. 
 84 
(maghreb zamin) over the Islamic East (mashreq-e eslami) and the inattention of Iranian 
authorities to tackling this threat. He deplored that, “the Iranian governmental authorities 
do not pay attention to acquiring what brings national progress (taraqqiyat-e mellat), and 
because of their ignorance and inattention, neighbors have exploited the opportunity and 
invaded from all directions. They will gradually gain control of our country 
(mamalek).”147 His criticism went beyond Iran. Reflecting the prevalence of various 
identities that transcended the nation in the last decades of the nineteenth century, he 
lamented, “Oh people of Asia and Africa. Oh brothers of the Islamic land! How long are 
you going to sink yourselves in the sleep of ignorance?......What makes you finally feel 
that your homeland, language, customs, and religious traditions are disgraced?”148 
 According to Kashef al-Saltaneh, the fundamental reason behind Europe’s rapid 
progress was not education, because European powers did not dominate the East until the 
nineteenth century despite the existence of education in Europe prior to that.149 It was not 
due to the inherent superiority of Europeans or the richness of Europe’s soil, either, 
because people of Asia, especially Iranians, were more apt and hardworking, and the soil 
of the East was more productive than anywhere else.150 Nor was it because of the wealth 
of natural resources, as proven by the poverty of Iran despite its rich natural resources.151 
The root cause of “the progress, wealth, and power of European nations (taraqqi va 
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servat va qodrat-e mellal-e farangestan)” was the invention of steamboats and railways 
because these innovations revolutionized movement.152  
At this juncture, Kashef al-Saltaneh employed a physiological understanding of 
the human body and drew an analogy to the national community to make a case for the 
utmost importance of movement for a nation. He divided movement into internal and 
external, without which all living beings, both plants and animals, would be considered 
dead. Just like a human body, an animal, or a plant, a society needed both internal and 
external movements, and its necessity increased as the population increased. Therefore, 
just like blood circulated through arteries and veins of the human body, a nation needed 
to transport agricultural and industrial products within its territory on roads, canals, and 
rivers and communicate via the telegraph. Yet, having only internal movements was 
insufficient. Nations needed external movements, too, which were political and 
commercial connections and relations between nations. Without such internal and 
external movements, a nation would be a “soulless nation (mellat-e bi ruh).”153 Because 
the invention of railways transformed this fundamental component in the life of a nation, 
they enabled Europe to surpass the power of the East, which had not experienced a 
revolution in movement, in a short period of time. Therefore, in order to tilt the power 
balance back toward Iran and the East in general, railway construction was crucial.  
 Kashef al-Saltaneh predicted that Iran would face major challenges in railway 
construction due to its lack of local capital and unity among its people (ettehad-e 
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qowmiyat),154 as exemplified by the failure of previous plans such as the Reuter 
Concession and Mostashar al-Dowleh’s proposals. Nevertheless, he advocated only a 
specific method of raising funds for railway construction. First, he opposed giving 
concessions to a British or French company because they would eventually interfere with 
Iranian affairs by using their government’s influence and would fill important positions 
with their compatriots. Instead of giving concession to a European company, he proposed 
that the concession should be given to a patriotic Iranian, especially since any 
concession-holder would have to establish a company with investors or receive loans to 
execute a costly railway project anyway.155 Second, while he did not oppose receiving 
loans in principle, he opposed receiving loans from Europeans because they did not share 
any sense of unity with Iranians. Instead, he proposed that Iran should receive loans from 
“fellow Easterners (hamkishan-e mashreqi) such as the Ottomans, Indians, and the 
Chinese.”156 In his view, borrowing from other Easterners would strengthen the solidarity 
among Eastern governments and allow them to regain power over the West. 
 With the goal of strengthening Iran and Iran’s unity with Muslims of the “East,” 
particularly the Ottoman Empire, India, and Afghanistan, Kashef al-Saltaneh proposed 
some potential routes for a future railway project. He argued that Iran should prioritize an 
international line, because only by tapping into its geographical advantage of lying 
between the “West” and the “East,” Iran could become a major player in international 
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trade.157 Thus, his proposals ironically echoed some British and Russian proposals that 
aimed to connect European and Indian railway systems by viewing Iran largely as a 
passing point. Specifically, he proposed several lines including: 1) Istanbul-Ankara-
Trabzon-Tabriz-Tehran-Bandar Abbas-Karachi; 2) the Caucasus-Tabriz; 3) Alexandretta-
Baghdad-Shushtar, a trunk line that would penetrate central Iran such as Isfahan; 4) 
Tehran-Mashhad-Merv-Mongolia-Beijing; 5) Mashhad-Kabul-north India. While most of 
these lines completely ignored the international politics of railway construction, Kashef 
al-Saltaneh also advocated a railway within Iran. Contrary to arguments for a railway 
from Rasht to the port of Bushehr, a significant transportation center connecting Iran and 
the Persian Gulf at the time, he proposed a line to connect Amol on the Caspian Sea coast 
with Shushtar on the Persian Gulf coast due to its relative shortness and less challenging 
geographical features for construction.158 
 The proposals submitted by Mostashar al-Dowleh and Kashef al-Saltaneh in the 
two decades after the Reuter Concession exemplified shifting trends in the Iranian 
discourse of railway construction. Rather than attempting to attract European investment 
with railway construction in Iran as the circle of Mirza Hoseyn Khan Moshir al-Dowleh 
did in the 1870s, Mostashar al-Dowleh presumed that private investors would provide 
funds for the construction of the railway with minimal involvement of the Iranian state. 
He even consulted with Iranian merchants in commercial centers such as Tabriz, Isfahan, 
Bushehr, Istanbul, and Bombay, who also expressed interest in such projects to increase 
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their commercial opportunities.159 His assumption was partly based on the understanding 
that the Qajar state would be financially incapable of completing a railway. Incidentally, 
in 1887, approximately the same time as the writings of Mostashar al-Dowleh and Kashef 
al-Saltaneh, the prominent merchant Hajj Mohammad Hasan Amin al-Zarb launched the 
railway project in the Caspian Sea province of Mazandaran, with the possibility of an 
extension to Tehran, using his own capital.160 Although Amin al-Zarb’s Amol-
Mahmudabad Railway ultimately failed, the case of Amin al-Zarb, along with the 
proposals presented by Mostashar al-Dowleh and Kashef al-Saltaneh, illustrated the 
increasingly active attempts by Iranians to construct railways with Iranian capital as early 
as the 1880s, a little over a decade after the 1872 Reuter Concession. 
While Mostashar al-Dowleh did not contemplate the possibility that the state 
would undertake railway construction, Kashef al-Saltaneh envisaged active state 
involvement as a more desirable option. Although he considered the involvement of 
fellow “Easterners” in Iranian railway construction as a more realistic option given the 
financial weakness of the Qajar state, he observed the international trend of active state 
involvement in the railway sector, particularly among latecomers to the Industrial 
Revolution and sparsely populated countries. Therefore, at roughly the time that Russian 
state involvement with railways in the Caucasus was impressing Farahani on his way to 
Mecca, Kashef al-Saltaneh articulated the benefits of considering railways as state 
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projects rather than schemes of entrepreneurs, indicating the gradual evolution of 
opinions with regard to the economic role of the state among the Qajar political elite.161 
Furthermore, as indicated by Mostashar al-Dowleh’s plans, profitable railways 
that transport Shiʾi pilgrims would be legitimate projects as long as they had a positive 
impact on agriculture and industry as well. In contrast to the modernist consensus by the 
early Pahlavi period that viewed popular religious practices and sometimes Islam as 
incompatible with modernity symbolized by the railway, Mostashar al-Dowleh did not 
consider any popular religious practices among Shiʾi Iranians as obstacles to achieve 
progress. In fact, his plans were submitted with an unambiguous endorsement of some 
members of the ulama. These characteristics found in the late nineteenth-century Iranian 
imaginations of railways underwent further changes by the rise of Reza Khan in 1921. In 
the next section, I will discuss how these characteristics of nineteenth-century railway 
imaginations changed in the first few decades of the twentieth century. 
 
Imagining an Iranian Railway during the Constitutional Period 
                                                
161 Kamran M. Dadkhah points out the evolution of Iranian economic thought in three 
phases. The first phase is the period of economic liberalism that stressed attracting global 
capital in the nineteenth century. The second phase is the emergence of nationalism that 
attempted to mobilize domestic capital since the Constitutional Revolution. The third 
phase is the period of state dominance in economy from the 1920s. I argue that the shift 
in trends was far more gradual and often preceded political developments, as indicated by 
such examples as Mostashar al-Dowleh’s attempts at generating capital among Iranian 
merchants. See Kamran M. Dadkhah, “From Global Capital to State Capitalism: The 
Evolution of Economic Thought in Iran, 1875-1925,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 4 
(2003): 140-158. 
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By the turn of the twentieth century, expatriate Persian-language newspapers such as the 
Calcutta-published Habl al-Matin fed Iranian readers with reports on railway projects in 
Iran’s adjacent lands. By this time, as discussed in Chapter Two, Iran was surrounded by 
railway systems in India under British rule, Central Asia under Russian rule, and the 
Ottoman Empire. In particular, the construction of the Hejaz Railway, which was funded 
by donations from Muslims all over the world, received attention.162 With future railway 
projects that extended to cities just across Iran’s western border, such as Van and Mosul, 
it appeared that Iran was falling behind in acquiring the new technology that seemed to 
guarantee economic prosperity elsewhere. 
The Constitutional Revolution that started in 1905 changed the political context of 
discussions regarding railway construction. Most significantly, while proponents of 
railway construction prior to the revolution had to rely on their informal ties to share their 
proposals with influential merchants and members of the ulama, the Constitutional 
Revolution enabled them to discuss the matter in the legislative body, the Majles, with 
other elected representatives. In this new context, the issue of railway construction 
became a matter of public debate, sometimes recorded in drafts of legislation proposed by 
various groups. For instance, although unimplemented, the bill to establish a national 
bank included a clause that would give the bank the right to construct railways 
throughout Iran.163  
                                                
162 For instance, see “Rah ahan-e hejaz,” Habl al-Matin (December 10, 1900), 22-3, and 
“Rah ahan-e dameshq,” Habl al-Matin (March 25, 1901), 21. 
163 Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Shura-ye Melli. Dowreh-ye 1, Jalaseh-ye 29 
(January 19, 1907), 4 (the page number corresponds to the online version) 
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Even when discussions did not result in legislation, railway advocates now had 
the option of gathering as an informal group to discuss potential railway projects and 
have their voices heard in the form of petitions on the floor of the Majles. In 1910, a 
commission named the Rescue Commission (komisiyun-e nejat) was formed with the 
purpose of establishing an Iranian company that would construct a railway with Iranian 
capital. Its members included such prominent figures as Arbab Keykhosrow, Saniʾ al-
Dowleh, Aqa Seyyed Zia al-Din, Hajji Moʾin Bushehri, Kashef al-Saltaneh, Hajj 
Mohammad Hoseyn Amin al-Zarb, the son of late Hajj Mohammad Hasan Amin al-Zarb, 
and Mostashar al-Dowleh, the son of late Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh, 
among others.164 Although the commission ultimately failed to achieve its goal, the report 
composed by its appointed members was read in the Majles as a petition in January 1911. 
Rather than allowing Russia to continue to express its desire for railway concessions in 
Iran, the report urged the government’s serious participation in railway construction by 
Iranians, which would require a national bank, with half the capital from the government 
and the other half from contributions by Iranians.165 Despite the failure of the 
commission, their proposal illustrated the growing desire among Iranian merchants and 
intellectuals for the state to play an active role in railway construction, while maintaining 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.ical.ir/index.php?option=com_mashrooh&view=session&id=20029&Itemid=
38 (retrieved on September 21, 2014).  
164 Mojtaba Malakuti, Rah Ahan-e Iran (Tehran: Chapkhaneh-ye Khandaniha, 1948), 
22-3. 
165 Ibid., 24. 
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the private character of the project through the proposed national bank that relied 
partially on contributions by Iranians.  
The most influential proposal for a trans-Iranian railway during the Constitutional 
period came from Saniʾ al-Dowleh, the German-educated constitutionalist and a member 
of the Rescue Commission, during his tenure as the Minister of Finance in the spring of 
1908. Just like previous advocates of railway construction, Saniʾ al-Dowleh came from a 
prominent family. His brother was Mehdi Qoli Khan Hedayat Mokhber al-Saltaneh, and 
the daughter of Mozaffar al-Din Shah was his wife. He also had extensive experience in 
Europe from when he had accompanied Naser al-Din Shah there in 1873 and received 
education in Germany.166 The proposal came about two months before the end of the 
First Majles period due to the counterrevolution led by Mohammad ʿAli Shah, and thus 
remained unimplemented. Nevertheless, it influenced debates on the route and source of 
funding for the Trans-Iranian Railway that took place in the post-WWI period. 
 He articulated much of his proposal in the Majles when he wrote a treatise called 
Rah-e Nejat, which was written about six months prior to introducing the bill. In the 
treatise, Saniʾ al-Dowleh listed four duties of a government in order for the welfare of its 
citizens: 1) military power to secure the assets and lives of people; 2) a justice system to 
protect people from oppression; 3) a modern education system so that people would 
acquire necessary knowledge and skills for survival; 4) a transportation system, 
especially a railway system, so that “people of this country can transport cheaply and 
                                                
166 Morteza Qoli Khan Saniʾ al-Dowleh, Rah-e Nejat: Resayel-e Qajari, Ketab-e Avval 
(Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Iran, 1984), 5. 
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easily from places near and afar what they need for life.”167 A transportation system was 
particularly important because, unlike a modern education system whose benefits would 
become apparent only after several generations, the benefits of having an advanced 
transportation system were immediate.168 Thus, in contrast to previous proposals that 
envisaged primarily private investment or loans as potential sources of funding, in the 
midst of optimism with the power of the new constitutional government, Saniʾ al-Dowleh 
considered railway construction an urgent duty of the government.  
 The problem for the Iranian government was, in Saniʾ al-Dowleh’s view, unlike 
Europe, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, Iran did not have an efficient system of 
taxation. Thus, the new constitutional government of Iran needed a way to tax its citizens, 
particularly the wealthy, who were not paying taxes proportionate to their wealth. This 
point was developed into a concrete solution when he proposed the bill for a trans-Iranian 
railway to the Majles in 1908. In the bill, Saniʾ al-Dowleh advocated the imposition of 
taxes on essential consumption items of sugar (qand va shekar) and tea with the rate of 
ten shahi per tabrizi man (approximately three kilograms) of sugar.169 Although this 
would hit the poor more severely, by imposing indirect tax on consumption items, 
collecting taxes would be theoretically less problematic for the Qajar government, which 
did not have the means to collect direct tax effectively from the population. Saniʾ al-
                                                
167 Ibid., 10-11 and 17. 
168 Ibid., 15. 
169 Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Shura-ye Melli. Dowreh-ye 1, Jalaseh-ye 263 (April 
25, 1908), 2-4 
http://www.ical.ir/index.php?option=com_mashrooh&view=session&id=20263&Itemid=
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Dowleh’s proposal to tax sugar and tea reemerged later on in the form of the state 
monopoly on the sale of sugar and tea, ratified by the Fifth Majles in 1925 to generate 
funds for the Trans-Iranian Railway. 
 Financing the railway would be a problem even with taxes on sugar and tea. 
Therefore, rather than opening the entire line at the same time, Saniʾ al-Dowleh 
advocated the construction of a north-south trans-Iranian railway between the Caspian 
Sea and the Persian Gulf, opening section by section in a gradual manner. He argued that, 
because railway construction would be costly, the Iranian government should construct 
the most lucrative section of the railway first and spend the profits from operating that 
section to build other sections. Once the entire trans-Iranian railway started its operation, 
he predicted that the lower transportation cost would enable Iranian farmers to sell their 
agricultural products to distant cities and countries.170 Thus, like previous advocates of 
railway construction, he conceived the benefits of railways primarily in economic terms. 
 Saniʾ al-Dowleh’s proposal shared another assumption about the impact of 
railways. With regard to reliance on animal-powered transport, he assured that railways 
would not eradicate animals. Rather, the reliance on animal-powered transport would 
increase because the total volume of trade in Iran would increase significantly and 
animal-powered transport would be indispensable in carrying goods from railway stations 
to cities and villages.171 Like advocates of railway construction prior to the Constitutional 
                                                
170 Ibid., and Morteza Qoli Khan Saniʾ al-Dowleh, Rah-e Nejat, 16. 
171 Ibid., 22. 
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Revolution, Saniʾ al-Dowleh conceived animal-powered transport supplementary to rail 
transport rather than mutually exclusive.  
Outside the Majles and circles of politically active constitutionalists, too, larger 
segments of society were exposed to the idea that Iran needed a railway for “progress.” 
The burgeoning Iranian press of the Constitutional period contributed to the heightened 
awareness of broader political, economic and social issues. The Constitutional Revolution 
ushered in a rapid proliferation of newspapers that functioned as a public forum to 
discuss contemporary issues. Particularly important in a society with a low literacy rate 
like Iran was the distribution of political cartoons such as the satirical newspaper known 
for its cartoons Kashkul, which was edited by Sheykh Ahmad Majd al-Eslam Kermani, 
who also edited the Constitutionalist newspaper Neda-ye Vatan.172 Kashkul printed 
several cartoons with regard to railway construction in Iran,173 among which two 
contrasting cartoons from 1908 captured the constitutionalists’ growing impatience with 
the absence of railways in Iran (Figure 3.1). The cartoon below showed a steam train with 
a caption that read, “This is a European railway that travels twelve to twenty farsakh per 
hour.”174 In contrast, the cartoon below showed two kinds of animal-powered transport, a 
horse-drawn carriage with a broken wheel and camels. The caption above the carriage 
read, “This is an Iranian railway that travels one farsakh per hour in a two-day trip from 
                                                
172 Shiva Balaghi, “Print Culture in Late Qajar Iran: The Cartoons of ‘Kashkul,’” 
Iranian Studies 34 (2001): 167. 
173 Ibid., 175-7. 
174 Kashkul, May 12, 1908. One farsakh is approximately six kilometers.  
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Tehran to Qom.” The camels were even slower, with the speed of “one farsakh every 
three hours.”175  
The cartoon also captured the gradual shift in the perception of animal-powered 
transport in the Iranian nationalist discourse at a time when horse-drawn carriages were 
gradually disappearing from European cities. While the discourse in the Naseri period did 
not see any contradiction in the symbiotic relationship between animal-powered transport 
and the railway, the cartoon in Kashkul depicted animal-powered transport as an 
opposing category to the railway, which embodied European modernity. Notably, the 
horse-drawn carriage, the quintessential “new” mode of transport in the previous period, 
was lumped together with camel transport in contradistinction with the steam power of 
the railway. Thus, rather than imagining Iran’s future in which the railway and animal-
powered transport comprised a high-speed transportation system to foster economic 
growth, the cartoon presented a dichotomous view in which Europe and Iran were 
juxtaposed by the presence of either the railway or animal-powered transport. In this 
view, Europe became characterized not only by the presence of the railway but also by 
the absence of animal-powered transport.  
 




(Figure 3.1) Juxtaposing Iran and Europe. Kashkul, May 12, 1908. The cartoon provides 
one of the early examples of visualizing the dichotomy between “civilization” with 
railways and “backwardness” without them. 
 
 Due to the bombardment of the Majles and its subsequent closure in 1911, 
followed by the chaos during World War One, when Iran became a battleground for 
warring empires, proposals made during the Constitutional Revolution remained 
unimplemented. Nevertheless, the Constitutional period was significant in the evolution 
of Iranians’ imaginations of railways because discussions about railway construction 
found new vehicles of expression such as the Majles and the rapidly growing Iranian 
press. As the example of the Rescue Commission indicated, railway advocacy among 
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prominent constitutionalists could find a larger audience by filing a petition to the Majles, 
where the petition was read out loud to representatives. Notably, some members of the 
commission included those who had expressed great interest in matters of railway 
construction prior to the Constitutional Revolution, including Kashef al-Saltaneh. In 
addition to the Majles, constitutionalist newspapers disseminated the need for a railway 
in Iran to a broader audience of literate and illiterate Iranians through recitations of 
newspapers at social gatherings and coffeehouses as well as political cartoons that 
visually conveyed the central message that Iran was lagging behind Europe due to the 
absence of railways. These new media popularized the idea of Iran’s need for a railway 
with an active involvement of the Iranian state. Importantly, the call for state involvement 
did not necessarily preclude possibilities of railway construction by foreign entrepreneurs 
backed by their governments, as illustrated by Saniʾ al-Dowleh’s negotiations with 
Germans for a railway project during his tenure as the Minister of Finance in 1910.  
Some of the ideas articulated during the Constitutional Revolution were to be 
implemented after the rise of Reza Khan, such as the imposition of consumption taxes on 
sugar and tea to fund the railway project. Yet, the chaos that ensued after the invasion of 
Iran by both Allies and Central Powers during the war halted further discussions of 
railway construction among Iranians within Iran, although prominent figures in exile such 
as Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh and Hoseyn Kazemzadeh Iranshahr remained active in 
Berlin. The hiatus ended after World War One. The controversy over the 1919 Anglo-
Persian Agreement and the rise of Colonel Reza Khan following the 1921 coup 
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engendered a new context in which railway construction by Iranians occupied one of the 
central concerns of the new regime. 
 
Ratifying the Railway Act 
The early 1920s witnessed a series of military campaigns launched by the new regime of 
Reza Khan, which would continue sporadically throughout the early Pahlavi period. The 
campaigns attempted to end provincial disorder and suppress semi-autonomous 
movements that mushroomed in response to the weakness of the Qajar state during and 
immediately after World War One. In this political context, the new regime faced the 
need to move troops promptly to volatile provinces, including the province of Lorestan, 
located on the strategically crucial route between Tehran and the oil-rich western Persian 
Gulf province of Arabestan (present-day Khuzestan), where the British maintained a 
strong presence. Hence, simultaneous with the renewed interest in railway concessions 
among imperial powers discussed in Chapter Two, the Majles and the Iranian press 
debated possible railway and road construction as a way to extend the authority of the 
central state and create a national economy with Tehran at its center by improving 
provincial security.176 
 In the Iranian press, too, railway construction became a major topic. Unlike in the 
previous decades, however, the issue was not limited to railways. The process of 
automobilization and the advent of aviation in other parts of the world forced Iranian 
                                                
176 For an example of Majles debates of road and railway construction, Mashruh-e 
Mozakerat-e Majles-e Shura-ye Melli, Dowreh-ye 4, Jalaseh-ye 103, June 11, 1922. 
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modernists to reconsider the absence of railways in Iran in the broader context of the 
global technological hierarchy. For them, the absence of railways in Iran encapsulated the 
widening gap between the “civilized (motamadden)” world that underwent a series of 
revolutionary changes in transport, which would facilitate transformations in various 
realms of life, and “backward (‘aqabmandeh)” Iran, which would stagnate due to the 
absence of new modes of transport. 
Two juxtaposed cartoons printed in Setareh-ye Sobh in 1925 exemplified the 
trend visually (Figure 3.2).177 The first cartoon portrayed the state of civilization in the 
world. A young female figure, possibly an anthropomorphic representation of the world, 
and the smiley sun were surrounded by blessings of technological advancements in the 
background such as an iron suspension bridge and factories whose chimneys were 
smoking all over the sky. In the foreground, the reader would find a steam train, an 
airplane, and an automobile with a chauffer and a gentleman in European clothing and a 
silk hat smoking a cigarette. In contrast, the cartoon that depicted the state of civilization 
in Iran featured an old, sullen female figure, possibly an anthropomorphic representation 
of Iran, and the sun surrounded by mountains and a mosque in the background. In the 
foreground were men in traditional clothing with traditional long pipes (chopoq) using 
animal transport such as a donkey.  
                                                
177 The newspaper Setareh-ye Sobh, edited by Mirza Ebrahim Khan Nahid, was also 
published under such different names as Aflak, Khalq, and Nahid. It started its publication 
in 1921 and quickly became a popular reformist paper with a socialist leaning famous for 
its abundant caricatures. Although Nahid was arrested five times for criticizing the new 
regime, as Chapter Five discusses, he shared the sense of urgency for social change and 





(Figure 3.2) Juxtaposing Iran and the world. Setareh-ye Sobh, July 4, 1925. The caption 
to the cartoon above says, “an example of the civilization in today’s world!” and the 
caption to the cartoon below says, “an example of our civilization today!” 
 
Thus, in the cartoons, Iran was characterized by the lack of modern transport 
technologies and industries as well as by the persistent presence of animal transport and 
religiosity, which corresponded to differences in preferred commodities between the 
gentleman smoking a cigarette and Iranians using the long pipe. In other words, the 
difference between new modes of transport and animal transport was no longer a matter 
of technology alone. Rather, it signified two completely different, and implicitly 
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incompatible, cultural orientations. One stood for growth, industry, and a European 
lifestyle devoid of any public expressions of religiosity while the other stood for decline, 
backwardness, and a traditional lifestyle with a visible presence of Islam.178  
A letter that Mehdi Qoli Khan Hedayat Mokhber al-Saltaneh received from an 
acquaintance named Mohammad Ali also indicated the end of a symbiotic relationship 
between railways and animal-powered transport by the 1920s. The letter was written 
immediately following Majles discussions of railway construction in February 1927. It 
included a poem: 
 
In the West, they need railways because they don’t have donkeys 
We have donkeys. When do we need railways? 
The enemies of railways are loving friends of donkeys 
We are the loving friends of donkeys and enemies of railways 
Railways uproot donkeys from the country 
We uproot whoever wants railways 
Until there would be Sir Camel and His Highness Donkey 
When would it be permissible for us to boast of railways?179 
                                                
178 For other examples that speak to the difference between new transport technologies 
and animal transport, see “Mosaferin ba havapeima miravand, ba shotor savari bar 
migardand,” Khalq, April 10, 1926, “Mardom beh taraf-e taraqqi va ‘elm!” and 
“Ma…..!” Khalq, July 17, 1926, and “Marasem-e esteqbal az yek kandid-e vekalat dar 
iran,” Nahid, April 17, 1928. 
179 Hajj Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat (Tehran: Ketabforushi-ye 
Zovvar-e Tehran, 1984), 372. 
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In contradistinction with the imaginations of such figures as Hajji Pirzadeh and Saniʾ al-
Dowleh, the poem did not consider animal-powered transport as supplementary to 
railways. Animal-powered transport did not comprise an integral part of the economy in 
this poem. Instead, it mocked those who did not support the railway project for various 
reasons by characterizing them as friends of donkeys and enemies of railways. 
Nevertheless, as discussed below, disagreements over the railway project did not stem 
from aversions to railways. Rather, dissenting voices concentrated on the issues of 
prioritizing railways over roads and choosing the most beneficial route. 
 Debates about constructing a railway intensified during the Fifth and Sixth Majles 
periods. Following the first elections after the 1921 coup, the Fifth Majles started in early 
1924, with the majority of representatives endorsing drastic reform policies such as 
conscription and male sartorial regulations as a way to build a centralized state and a 
homogeneous nation. It was during the Fifth Majles that the 1925 law of state monopoly 
of sugar (qand va shekar) was ratified to fund the future railway project. Furthermore, in 
early 1926, the Fifth Majles decided to hire German and American engineers introduced 
by the American financial advisor Arthur Millspaugh for the preliminary survey to 
determine the future railway route.180 After the preliminary survey, “the law of permitting 
the construction of a railway between Khormusa, the port of Mohammareh, and Bandar-e 
Gaz (Qanun-e Ejazeh-ye Sakhtman-e Rah Ahan ma bein-e Khormusa va Bandar-e 
                                                
180 Mahbubi-Ardakani, Tarikh-e Moʿassesat-e Tamaddoni-ye Jadid, Jeld-e Dovvom, 
344-5.  
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Mohammareh va Bandar-e Jaz),” or the Railway Act, was submitted to the Sixth Majles 
on February 22, 1927, and hastily ratified two days later.181 
As new legislation passed the Majles in the 1920s, making the beginning of the 
Trans-Iranian Railway project an imminent future of Iran, Majles representatives and 
Iranian journalists familiarized themselves with updated knowledge of transportation 
issues in the world. For instance, Ali Mohammad Oveisi, a member of the commission 
established in 1924 under the Ministry of Public Works to consider various options for a 
railway project,182 had published his ideas in the Iranian press in 1923, prior to his 
appointment in the commission. In the articles, he argued for the possibility of building 
road rails, instead of railways, from Bandar-e Gaz on the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf 
via Firuzkuh, Damavand, Tehran, Qom, Borujerd, and Khorramabad, in order to reduce 
construction costs.183 As Oveisi’s articles illustrated, by the 1920s, railway technology, 
especially steam locomotives, did not enjoy the status of being the latest technological 
innovation. Therefore, because Iran’s railway project was taking place so late, it had to be 
justified in comparison with other new modes of transport. Iranshahr, a modernist 
newspaper published in Berlin, also introduced a better alternative to steam locomotives. 
                                                
181 Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Shura-ye Melli, Dowreh-ye 6, Jalaseh-ye 67, 
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The Iranian writer of the articles, who was trained at the German locomotive maker 
Borsig Company, proclaimed, “these two (civilization and transportation) need each 
other. Without one, the other is unimaginable,” while also arguing that steam locomotives 
were not sufficient to make Iran truly “civilized (motamadden).”184 He contended that 
Iran needed to follow the recent trend of electrifying railways in Europe and America, 
partly due to the negative impact of the smoke on the health of the Iranian population.185 
 The most serious challenge to a railway project came from the global trend of 
automobilization. In Tehran alone, 1,140 automobiles existed already in 1926, excluding 
vehicles owned by the Ministries of Finance and War, and the number of cars was rapidly 
increasing.186 To encourage economic activity and facilitate the movement of troops, the 
Iranian state invested much in road construction throughout the 1920s, particularly in key 
areas such as Lorestan, Arabestan, Mazandaran, and Azarbaijan.187 Majles 
representatives also considered road construction as a less time-consuming alternative to 
railway construction. For instance, assuming that the railway project would take a long 
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time to finish, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh advocated road construction and transportation 
by trucks in 1924, without eliminating the possibility of a railway system in Iran.188 
 Although few individuals questioned the feasibility of the railway project in 
public for fear of political ramifications, many were skeptical of it and preferred road 
construction, given the cost of railway construction and the burden it would put on the 
population when roads could extend to more areas. European and American observers 
often raised the question and wondered why it had to be a railway, as did Mohammad 
Mosaddeq, the future leader of the oil nationalization movement.189 In response to these 
critiques, Ettelaʿat, a daily newspaper that would acquire a semi-official status in the 
1930s, printed articles that argued against road construction. The articles admitted that 
places far from the railway could decline, but they ultimately found more problems with 
automobiles and roads. According to the articles, while recent automobilization benefited 
Europe and the United States, for countries like Iran, which were less integrated in the 
global market, cars would bring more harm than good. For one thing, places in between 
destinations would be skipped. Therefore, while villagers used to sell eggs, yogurt, and 
other items along the road, they could not do so anymore because automobiles moved too 
fast and never made a stop in small villages, making the poor suffer while benefiting the 
wealthy who would drive around for recreation. Furthermore, automobilization would 
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increase the consumption of gasoline in Iran too rapidly.190 In short, while the articles did 
not clarify why the railway would be a better option, by presenting automobilization in a 
negative light, they implicitly responded to some of the arguments publicly and privately 
made against the Trans-Iranian Railway project. 
 Besides the question of automobilization, the Railway Act received criticism from 
those who suspected another imperial ploy behind the project. For instance, Mosaddeq 
erroneously suspected the British role in the choice of the route to connect the Caspian 
Sea with the Persian Gulf as a way to gain easy access to the Soviet border.191 Other 
Majles representatives also suspected it, as the Minister of Education insisted that the 
issue of the Railway Act was pertinent only to domestic politics and that there should be 
no place for foreign politics.192 Mokhber al-Saltaneh, the Minister of Public Works, 
responded to this suspicion by reassuring him that the railway project was strictly about 
domestic politics and reminded the Minister of Education that late Saniʾ al-Dowleh, his 
own brother whose credentials as a constitutionalist were unquestionable, also proposed a 
north-south line as the best route for the nation.193 The fact that Mokhber al-Saltaneh 
understood exactly what the Minister of Education insinuated was indicative of the 
prevalence of the conspiratorial view among other Majles representatives.  
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 The issue of the exact route of the planned railway received the most significant 
attention in the Majles. The Railway Act was remarkably vague about the route, which 
was to be modified a number of times before the end of construction in 1938 due to such 
issues as cost and technical problems. The bill only stated that the route would be from 
Bandar-e Gaz on the Caspian Sea coast to Mohammareh (present-day 
Khorramshahr)/Khormusa (present-day Bandar-e Emam Khomeini, Bandar-e Shahpur 
before the Islamic Revolution) via Tehran and Hamadan.194 In response, Majles 
representatives from the provinces that would not be on the railway route proposed 
various alternative routes so that their regions would benefit from the project. For 
instance, Seyyed Yaʾqub Anvar from Shiraz stated that the line from the Caspian Sea and 
Tehran to Isfahan, Shiraz, and Bandar Abbas would be more beneficial. He also 
introduced a proposal printed in the newspaper Shafaq-e Sorkh to extend the railway to 
Chabahar in coastal Baluchistan.195 Others proposed a line to other urban centers such as 
Mashhad, Tabriz, Bushehr, and Anzali. Representatives from Azarbaijan in particular 
requested the insertion of Qazvin between Tehran and Hamadan to ensure that the 
                                                
194 Importantly, the finalized route differed significantly from this proposal. Bandar-e 
Shah (present-day Bandar-e Torkaman), instead of Bandar-e Gaz, became the northern 
terminus, and the railway did not go through Hamadan. The extension to Mohammareh 
was not part of the initial trunk line completed in 1938, either. For the Majles 
proceedings, see Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Shura-ye Melli, Dowreh-ye 6, Jalaseh-
ye 66, February 22, 1927, 4.  
http://www.ical.ir/index.php?option=com_mashrooh&Itemid=38&majlestype=2&term=1
3 (retrieved on February 21, 2015) 
195 Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles, Dowreh-ye 6, Jalaseh-ye 66, 6-7. 
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railway would reach a city that lay on the way from Tehran to Tabriz.196 Therefore, as the 
construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway became imminent, Majles representatives 
expressed regional interests so that the province they represented would benefit from the 
costly project that all Iranians had to fund through the taxes they paid for sugar and tea 
regardless of where they were in Iran.  
Although the exact route continued to go through modifications well into the 
1930s, the general goal of connecting the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf remained 
intact. A nationalist newspaper Kushesh justified the benefits of the route from Bandar-e 
Gaz to Khormusa via Tehran by pointing out problems with alternative routes. The East-
West route to connect India with the Mediterranean Sea would cross a large barren land 
in eastern Iran. Furthermore, Indo-European trade would be much cheaper and easier by 
sea, making the railway a less attractive option. Equally importantly, the route would 
force Iran to use foreign ports for trade. The article continued to discredit the Tabriz-
Tehran route and the Anzali-Tehran route, noting that both Azarbaijan and Gilan were 
already well-connected to international trade routes and had no trouble exporting their 
agricultural products to Russia. Thus, the benefits of the railway would be comparatively 
small. In contrast, the article argued, because fertile northeastern provinces of Khorasan 
and Mazandaran were currently isolated from the outside world, building a railway from 
the port of Bandar-e Gaz in Mazandaran to Tehran and further south would dramatically 
                                                
196 “Mozakerat-e Majles dar Atraf-e Rah Ahan,” Ettelaʿat, February 22 and 23, 1927. 
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facilitate Iran’s export, improving the trade balance.197 Therefore, the particular route 
from the southeastern shore of the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf was justified in terms 
of its positive impact on the national economy that would engage in international trade. 
When Mokhber al-Saltaneh introduced the bill to the Majles, he justified the route 
primarily from an economic standpoint. First of all, by connecting the two seas, Iran 
would have access to the global market. Moreover, by going through Hamadan, the 
railway would tap into the economic resources of the rich provinces of western and 
northwestern Iran. Furthermore, the railway would result in the cultivation of Astarabad 
(present-day Gorgan) and the province of Mazandaran, which would be connected with 
the fertile provinces of Lorestan and Khuzestan via Tehran. Finally, compared to other 
routes, the route from Bandar-e Gaz to Mohammareh/Khormusa would cost less due to 
the shorter distance between the two termini and the less serious geographical 
obstacles.198 Therefore, the argument was based not only on the perception of existing 
economic wealth but also on the prediction of the future transformation that the railway 
would bring about in regions with the highest agricultural potential. In this sense, the 
common criticism that the choice of this railway route was unwise because it did not pass 
through large cities except for Tehran is correct yet fails to capture the perception of 
railway technology shared by Iranian modernists. Admittedly, some Majles 
representatives such as Mosaddeq expressed skepticism with regard to profitability due to 
the absence of large cities on the route, but there were also others who imagined that the 
                                                
197 IOR/L/PS/11/209, From Percy Loraine to Austen Chamberlain, October 31, 1925. 
198 Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles, Dowreh-ye 6, Jalaseh-ye 66, 4.  
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Trans-Iranian Railway would transform the empty landscape and create fertile lands and 
thriving cities. 
Importantly, no Majles representative brought up the issue of pilgrimage traffic. 
In contrast to some of the past proposals by both Iranians and Europeans, the Shi’ite holy 
city of Qom was not on the route initially proposed in the Railway Act. Instead, the 
proposed route largely resembled the route that Reza Shah expressed his preference for 
during his tenure as prime minister, which was a north-south route from the Caspian Sea 
to Mohammareh via Tehran, Saveh, Soltanabad (present-day Arak), and Khorramabad.199 
The plan was later modified in the 1930s to go through Qom most likely due to the 
geographical difficulties and higher cost of other possible routes. Yet, the fact that 
pilgrimage traffic did not receive any attention in Majles debates before 1927 deserves 
attention, along with the absence of any overt references to pilgrimage traffic even among 
advocates for the Tehran-Mashhad line. Chapter Six will continue the discussions on the 




                                                
199 IOR/L/PS/10/794, “Railway Construction in Persia,” Foreign Office to Charles 
Greenway of APOC, January 7, 1924. The choice of the Tehran-Saveh-Soltanabad 
alignment deserves attention here, because this route, just like the proposed Tehran-
Hamadan route in the Railway Act of 1927, did not include the holy city of Qom on the 
route, indicating that initial plans ignored the lucrative pilgrimage traffic, unlike 
Mostashar al-Dowleh’s proposals. It is also noteworthy that after the north-south line, 
Reza Khan considered the northwestern line from Tehran to Tabriz and the western line 
from Tehran to Khaneqin the second and third most important. 
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This chapter traced the evolution of Iranian imaginations of railways. Iranian ideas of a 
railway project changed in some important ways between the 1860s and 1927. By 1927, 
Iran’s political elite ratified a bill that considered railway construction as a state project to 
connect the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf via Tehran, funded by taxation on the 
general population as well as loans from the newly established national bank. As this 
chapter examined, these characteristics should not be taken for granted. Iranian travelers 
and diplomats gradually formulated ideas about a trans-Iranian railway through 
witnessing and learning about railways outside of Iran. For instance, the reliance on 
foreign capital among a small group of the political elite such as Mirza Hoseyn Khan 
Moshir al-Dowleh in the 1860s and 70s quickly gave way to an emphasis on Iranian 
capital by the late nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century, the emphasis 
shifted to the role of the state, partly influenced by the witnessing of state involvement 
with economic development through railways, such as the case of the Russian state in the 
Caucasus. Also, as advocates of railway construction moved from the margin of the 
decision-making process in Qajar politics to its center—the Majles—after the 
Constitutional Revolution, it seemed natural that they hoped to take the matter in their 
own hands with the support of Iranian citizens, or the voters; hence, the emphasis on a 
trans-Iranian railway project undertaken by the state partially with the funds acquired 
through taxation on citizens.200 
                                                
200 In reality, due to property qualifications and the exclusion of women, only a fraction 
of the population voted in the First Majles. For the restrictions on voters, see Janet Afary, 
The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911, 64. 
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 Iranian ideas about such issues as the role of the state, pilgrimage traffic, and 
animal-powered transport shifted significantly, but what consistently appeared from the 
1860s to the beginning of the Pahlavi period was the widely shared belief in the 
transformative power of railways, particularly their role in transforming the economy. 
The title of Saniʾ al-Dowleh’s treatise “The Road to Salvation (Rah-e Nejat)” revealed 
the tremendous power to transform Iran that was assigned to railways. Similar to 
European and American officials and investors, Iranian modernists viewed railways as 
facilitators of economic development since the Naseri period. Unlike European and 
American officials and investors, however, Iranian modernists envisioned the creation of 
a national economy with Tehran as its center. Therefore, unlike a number of plans 
proposed by the British and Russians that aimed to secure imperial economic interests in 
their spheres of influence, it was inconceivable in Iranian proposals of railways to ignore 
Tehran. The ultimate goal was to connect regional economies to Tehran and create a 
national economy, which would trade with foreign countries through ports on the Caspian 
Sea and the Persian Gulf or borderland cities such as Tabriz, Mashhad, and Khaneqin.  
By the early Pahlavi period, however, Iranian modernists assigned another 
transformative power to railways: cultural transformation. As the juxtaposed cartoons in 
Setareh-ye Sobh indicated, the existence of new modes of transport was reimagined to 
encompass a broader notion of  “civilization (tamaddon)” and “progress (taraqqi).” The 
possession of railways by Iranians became associated with the comprehensive package of 
the “modern” man, making a cultural transformation to create a homogeneous nation 
equally important to an economic transformation. I will discuss Iranian modernists’ 
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attempts at creating a homogeneous nation through railways, particularly railway 
journeys, in Chapter Six. The next chapter will examine how diverse groups of people 
who lived along the railway route experienced the construction of the Trans-Iranian 
Railway and the concomitant increase of the presence of the Pahlavi state in the period 




















Chapter 4: Living Along the Railway Route 
  
 
(Figure 4.1) Juxtaposing the Naseri period and the Reza Shah period. Nahid, 30 October, 
1928. Naser al-Din Shah's military campaign against Lors (right), and Reza Shah's 
military campaign against Lors (left). 
 
Introduction 
In 1928, the satirical newspaper Nahid printed juxtaposed political cartoons (Figure 
4.1).201 On the right page was a portrayal of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar’s military campaign 
to the southwestern province of Lorestan. The cartoon depicted Naser al-Din Shah on a 
donkey proceeding across an empty, plain field, while leading a swarm of veiled women. 
                                                
201 Nahid, 30 October, 1928. 
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The Lors simply retreated on their donkeys as the shah approached. The caption below 
the cartoon made its ridicule of the previous regime unambiguous by stating that Naser 
al-Din Shah was “preoccupied with donkey-riding among women of his harem,” despite 
the urgency of the situation.  
In contrast, the cartoon on the left page showed Reza Shah’s visit to Lorestan and 
the Persian Gulf province of Khuzestan in October 1928 to commemorate the opening of 
a new road from Borujerd to Dezful as well as to inspect the progress with railway and 
port construction.202 It showed Reza Shah and his retinue in motorized vehicles passing 
on a road penetrating the mountains of Lorestan. Spotting the landscape on both sides of 
the road were black tents in which nomadic tribes of Lorestan were forcibly sedentarized 
and watchtowers where guards were stationed to prevent highway robbery.203 
By juxtaposing the two eras, Nahid celebrated the triumph of the central state in 
tribal areas in this new era of improved infrastructure and an equally improved means of 
transport. While Naser al-Din Shah’s campaign led only to the temporary retreat of the 
Lors and did not achieve long-term control of Lorestan, the cartoon on the left 
proclaimed the success of the new Pahlavi regime in establishing its permanent presence, 
thereby controlling recalcitrant tribes along the route of the new road. According to the 
                                                
202 IOR/L/PS/11/209, 234/22/6410. R.C. Parr to Lord Cushendun, 1 November, 1928. 
203 The policy of forced sedentarization of nomadic tribes was implemented more 
broadly only in the 1930s. See Kaveh Bayat, “Riza Shah and the Tribes,” in Stephanie 
Cronin ed. The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941 
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 217. 
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caption below the cartoon of Reza Shah’s campaign, the new regime was to “open the 
greatest economic and military road in Iran.”204  
In reality, the Pahlavi state did not successfully pacify Lorestan until the early 
1930s, several years after the opening of the road. Even after the pacification, attacks on 
trucks that passed through Lorestan continued to occur throughout the 1930s. Moreover, 
after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, security in Lorestan deteriorated and thus 
revealed the precariousness of the “pacification” that had taken place in the previous 
decade. Furthermore, many of the roads built in the Reza Shah period were incapable of 
handling heavy traffic, as became clear after the Allied invasion in 1941. Thus, the 
proclamation of the triumph of central authority in Nahid turned out to be premature. 
More importantly, the juxtaposition of the two cartoons exemplified a widely shared 
sense among urban elites of the early Pahlavi period that the inherently hostile tribal 
forces continued to defy the authority of both the previous regime and new one, and only 
the new regime under Reza Shah could put an end to recalcitrant tribal power.  
As recent scholarship critiques, for a long time, Iranian historiography accepted 
this fundamental tenet of nationalist agendas. As Stephanie Cronin argues, state-society 
relations in rural Iran of the early Pahlavi period should be seen as a “more erratic 
narrative” influenced by contingent factors, rather than a linear narrative in which an 
eternal conflict between tribes and central authority inevitably culminated in violent 
                                                
204 Nahid, 30 October, 1928. 
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repressions of tribal forces by the state.205 Contemporary press sources like Nahid may be 
adequate sources to examine the “peculiar frame of mind”206 widely shared among urban 
elites with regard to the “tribal problem,”207 but they do not shed much light on how the 
vast majority of Iranian society experienced the development of transportation 
infrastructure.  
This chapter uses Iranian, British, and Danish archival sources as well as 
published documents in Persian and European languages to discuss the impact of railway 
construction on Iranian society, both rural and urban, whose mobility increased in both 
voluntary and compulsory manners. It pays particular attention to how various social 
groups such as merchants, landowners, tribes, and construction laborers interacted with 
state- and quasi-state institutions that dramatically increased their presence in the wake of 
railway construction. This chapter is by no means a comprehensive study of rural Iran, 
both settled and nomadic, in the early Pahlavi period. Nevertheless, it provides snapshots 
of how the specific conditions produced by railway construction affected various parts of 
Iran. Also, discussions here are generally limited to provinces that experienced 
comparatively drastic changes due to the development of transportation infrastructure, 
namely, Lorestan, Khuzestan, the Caspian province of Mazandaran, and the site of 
                                                
205 Stephanie Cronin. Tribal Politics in Iran, 3. 
206 For a discussion of the “peculiar frame of mind” that envisaged the confrontation 
with tribal groups inevitable, see Kaveh Bayat, “Riza Shah and the Tribes,” 217-8.  
207 Cronin raises a similar question to Bayat’s in her problematizing of the “tribal 
problem.” See Cronin, Tribal Politics in Iran, Introduction, especially 2-4. 
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Tehran Station, although evidence from other provinces also receives consideration when 
necessary. 
Some recent studies of rural Iran have consciously moved away from the 
“peculiar frame of mind” prevalent among urban elites. These bottom-up studies have 
emerged in response to the tendency among scholars to overemphasize the Pahlavi state's 
policies toward rural Iran without giving due attention to rural communities themselves. 
The state-centric approach often assumes inhabitants of rural Iran received top-down 
reforms passively or helplessly, as they were molded into modern citizens.208 In contrast, 
some studies of rural Iran, including anthropological studies, focus on the resistance of 
rural Iran. These studies have enriched our understanding of rural Iran in the early 
Pahlavi period by delving into how the powerful such as landowners and tribal khans, as 
well as the not-so-powerful, such as peasants and tribal members, reacted to pressures 
exerted by the state and the powerful in their communities.209 They have also 
demonstrated that state policies planned in Tehran often did not work effectively when 
they were actually implemented.210 
                                                
208 For a classic work with this approach, see Amin Banani. The Modernization of Iran, 
1921-1941 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961). For a recent critique of state-
centrism in Iranian historiography, see Cyrus Schayegh, “‘Seeing Like a State’: An Essay 
on the Historiography of Modern Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 42 
(2010): 37-61. 
209 Kaveh Bayat, “Riza Shah and the Tribes,” Richard Tapper. Frontier Nomads of Iran: 
A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), and Mohammad Gholi Majd. Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and the 
Ulama in Iran (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000). 
210 For example, see Richard Tapper’s discussion of how forced sedentarization of tribes 
worked for the Shahsevans. See Tapper. Frontier Nomads of Iran, 288-294. 
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Nevertheless, both approaches focus mainly on political life in their discussions of 
rural Iran, where state policy and rural resistance clashed through revolts. Even though 
bottom-up studies stress that the confrontation between central authority and tribal forces 
in rural Iran was not inevitable, they still accept the view that confrontation ultimately 
characterized state-society relations in rural Iran during the early Pahlavi period. I take a 
different stance here. Rather than focusing on rural resistance as the key to understanding 
how inhabitants experienced state power, this chapter considers the methods of 
engagement used by inhabitants in rural Iran to face the increasing presence of state- and 
quasi-state institutions as their tactic in a de Certeauian sense at a time when strategies of 
the state became more impactful in rural Iran. Thus, instead of focusing on moments of 
state-society confrontations, this chapter examines how railway construction increased 
more mundane interaction between state- and quasi-state institutions and various 
segments of society, which could lead to dramatic moments of confrontations or to more 
subtle methods of redefining relations between state and society. 
In fact, “resistance” characterizes only part of society’s encounters with state 
power. It presumes that rural Iran ultimately reacted confrontationally to fend off outside 
forces. In contrast, “engagement” implies that inhabitants of rural Iran resituated 
themselves vis-à-vis new players in local politics into their everyday lives as the best 
option available, because the new players ceased to be external to the web of power 
relations in rural Iran. Thus, the politics of engagement in rural Iran entailed a constant 
process of negotiation between inhabitants along the railway route with both the state and 
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non-state entities, with the aim of solving practical issues that arose as railway 
construction accelerated.  
 
Booming Towns on the Route  
On October 16, 1927, the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway started with the 
official ceremony at the planned site of Tehran Railway Station, which was located in a 
largely arid area outside the city. In the following years, the construction started in both 
northern and southern termini, where the construction of ports simultaneously proceeded, 
so that the line would eventually meet in central Iran. Initially, based on the bill 
submitted to the Majles in April 1928, the German-American syndicate that included the 
German firms of Philipp Holzmann, Julius Berger, Siemens Bauunion, and the American 
Ulen Company, obtained the contract to undertake a survey of the planned railway route. 
Following the survey, the construction of trial sections to estimate the total cost of the 
project began, with the German firms starting from the northern terminus, while the Ulen 
Company undertook the construction from the Persian Gulf.211 By 1930, however, Iran’s 
financial crisis, coupled with Reza Shah’s dissatisfaction with the completed trial section 
in the south led to the cancellation of the contract with the Ulen Company, followed by 
                                                
211 IOR/L/PS/10/794, Clive to Chamberlain, April 21, 1928, and Clive to Chamberlain, 
May 5, 1928. While the German firms maintained close relations with the Soviet Union, 
the Ulen Company included limited French and British participation to reduce the 
financial risk. Specifically, in return for the guarantee that the German firms would buy 
Soviet construction materials, the Soviet Union agreed to give free transit for German 
materials. IOR/L/PS/10/794, Clive to Chamberlain, April 5, 1928. For the Ulen 
Company’s preference for Anglo-French participation, see Clive to Chamberlain, March 
9, 1928. 
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the termination of the contract with the Germans in 1931.212 For the next two years, the 
Pahlavi state attempted to continue the construction on its own. When that turned out to 
be unfeasible due to the lack of technical expertise, in 1933, Iran signed a contract with 
the Danish-Swedish consortium Kampsax, which had experience with railway 
construction in the Turkish Republic.213 Kampsax oversaw the construction of the Trans-
Iranian Railway until its completion in 1938, with many managerial and high-ranking 
engineering positions occupied by Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, Swiss, Germans, Czech, 
and Hungarians, among others.  
The construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, along with concurrent road 
construction projects, created booming towns where there used to be none. For instance, 
from 1933, Salehabad in the northern part of the Persian Gulf province of Khuzestan 
started to develop as the temporary northern railhead of the southern line. It emerged as a 
hub for switching from rail to motor transport. Recollecting his 1936 visit to the town, an 
American likened it to a nineteenth-century mining town in the American West, with “the 
ramshackle character of its hastily built wooden buildings and its broad unpaved 
streets.”214 The small town boasted the visible presence of European workers and 
engineers, including Italians, Germans, Russians, the French, Danes, and Swedes, along 
                                                
212 Luft, “The USA and the Trans-Iranian Railway,” 131-2. For the distrust between 
Germans and Americans from the beginning, see IOR/L/PS/10/794, Clive to Foreign 
Office, May 14, 1930.  
213 Kauffeldt, Danes, Orientalism, and the Modern Middle East, 167. 
214 Henry Filmer. The Pageant of Persia (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1936), 45-46. 
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with Iranians. Also, in the main street, a Russian restaurant that served vodka catered to 
workers from Russia and the Caucasus.215 
Salehabad expanded further as the temporary railhead, thanks to the government 
policy of not allowing trucks to operate between Bandar-e Shahpur, the terminus on the 
Persian Gulf, and Salehabad. Furthermore, the government ordered that garages for 
trucks be moved from Ahvaz to Salehabad to encourage the use of the railway for 
transporting goods.216 Even when Salehabad lost its status as a railhead after the grand 
opening of the Trans-Iranian Railway, the city continued to grow under its new name 
Andimeshk, thanks to the presence of railway- and automobile-related facilities such as 
depots and repair factories. By 1943, various stores and bars made downtown Andimeshk 
busier, with a conspicuous presence of mostly American soldiers stationed in Iran.217
 While Andimeshk developed into a middle-sized industrial city, other booming 
towns did not transition to permanent urban centers. For instance, in the late-1920s, after 
the beginning of the construction of the railway and a service road, Keshvar in the 
southwestern province of Lorestan was transformed from a remote hamlet that was a two-
day journey by horse or mule from Khorramabad, the capital of the province, to a 
bourgeoning yet small village that took less than two hours by car from Khorramabad. 
The expanding village boasted homogeneous houses for workers as well as a small 
bazaar and teahouses, where patrons from various places spoke different foreign 
                                                
215 Ibid. 
216 IOR/L/PS/12/3400/PZ1442, Khuzestan Diary, December 1932. 
217 COWI Archives (former Kampsax), Kurt Olsen. “Storm Over Mellemøsten (Storm 
over the Middle East)” (Copenhagen: H. Hirschsprungs Forlag, n.d.), 65. 
 124 
languages.218 Yet, it shrank back to its original size once the construction was over, as did 
ʿAbbasabad by Veresk Bridge in Mazandaran (Figure 4.2). Such shrinkage occurred even 
in more established cities such as Borujerd.219  
 
 
(Figure 4.2) ʿAbbasabad during construction. COWI Archives, Photo Album F57b, 77. 
 
Because the railway project could impact urban growth or decline, groups of local 
merchants and residents found having railway stations in their cities an important issue, 
as exemplified by the case of Mohammareh and Khormusa. Immediately after the 
ratification of the Railway Act, the Mohammareh Chamber of Commerce sent a telegraph 
                                                
218 COWI Archives, Kasse 106, Ingolf Boisen. “Banen Skal Bygges Paa Seks Aar” 
Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, 1946, 138-140. 
219 COWI Archives, Kasse 106, Povl Buhl, “Mit liv Orienten (My Life in the Orient),” 
and COWI Archives, Kasse 106, Boisen. “Banen Skal Bygges Paa Seks Aar,” 70. 
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to Tehran, protesting that the selection of Khormusa as the southern terminus was a poor 
choice. Instead, the telegraph requested that the railway should start from Mohammareh 
for the following reasons: 1) since Khormusa was not a thriving port compared to 
Mohammareh, building an entirely new city would be expensive; 2) because Khormusa 
stood on marshlands, land reclamation would be costly; 3) Khormusa harbor would be 
unsheltered from storms; 4) there was no fresh water in Khormusa; 5) since Khormusa 
was far from existing transport routes, it would cause inconvenience to merchants and the 
public.220 175 merchants, traders, and notables of Mohammareh and Abadan also 
petitioned jointly to the Majles to conduct more research by sending specialists to the 
region and find out the suitability of Mohammareh as the terminus rather than Khormusa. 
They cited additional advantage of Mohammareh over Khormusa, including the lower 
cost of construction because there was no need to build bridges to cross two major rivers 
and the strategic advantage of protecting Iran’s territorial rights due to Mohammareh’s 
proximity to the Iraqi border.221 
Only a few weeks after petitions from Mohammareh and Abadan, another petition 
came from Hajj Gholamali Meʾmar, who advocated the route from Khormusa to Dezful 
and claimed, “whoever has a different view is either mistaken or has an ulterior 
motive.”222 In particular, he claimed that the Khormusa route should be easily done in 
conjunction with the building of the Ahvaz Dam, which he thought could be done in two 
                                                
220 IOR/L/PS/10/794, Clive to Chamberlain, April 23, 1927. 
221 Majles Library Archives (ML) 6/14/13/1/70. 
222 ML6/5/6/1/67. 
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million tomans, unlike European engineers who had evaluated the cost to be three million 
tomans. Moreover, he added that he could build the railway for six thousand tomans per 
mile.223 
 The route of the railway went through a number of modifications before 1938, but 
the southern terminus of Khormusa was not changed. It was constructed under its new 
name, Bandar-e Shahpur. Mohammareh was located too close to the border with Iraq and 
the disputed Shatt al-Arab to serve as the terminus for the national railway, which 
justifiably raised security concerns, as the Iran-Iraq War would demonstrate during the 
1980s.224 We do not have enough evidence to generalize the case of local residents’ 
reactions to the originally ratified route of the Trans-Iranian Railway. It is conceivable 
that local communities in other urban centers petitioned for the change of the railway 
route, particularly such major cities with a large presence of influential merchants as 
Isfahan and Shiraz, which only bore the burden of the project through taxation yet did not 
directly benefit from it.225  
Iranian construction companies also found opportunities to participate in the 
Trans-Iranian Railway project, particularly in areas with less geographical obstacles. As 
was the case with the Turkish railway project, the consortium acted as a “virtual agency 
of the state” as the overseer of the entire construction, including all building activities, 
                                                
223 Ibid. 
224 IOR/L/PS/11/209, From Clive to Austen Chamberlain, November 26, 1927. 
225 About two decades after the Railway Act, during the 1946 tribal insurrections, the 
Qashqa’is, supported by the Bakhtiyaris, demanded that the railway should be extended 
to Isfahan, Shiraz, and Bushehr. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 235. 
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negotiations with subcontractors, payment to employees from state funds, and medical 
service, staffed mostly by Iranians.226 At the same time, the consortium divided the route 
into small sections, which were tendered out to construction companies from various 
countries, including twenty Iranian companies such as Kalantari and Neka.227 
Furthermore, Iranian companies were among hundreds of subcontractors that engaged in 
various aspects of construction such as asphalting service roads, laying rails, ballasting 
the embankment, and building railway-related facilities like hospitals and stores for 
workers. For instance, along with Italian and German companies, Iranian companies 
Moqtader (Razan) and Etteka secured the contract for ballasting the embankment in 
Salehabad, while Iranian Armenian companies got the contract for laying the sleepers and 
rails in the same area. These companies sometimes had ties to prominent figures within 
Iran, as was the case with Moqtader, in which Yamin Esfandiari (Yamin al-Molk), the 
former governor of Bushehr, was a partner.228  
Furthermore, in the Caspian Sea province of Mazandaran, some landowners took 
advantage of the increased demand for Mazandarani lumber. Supplemented with lumber 
from elsewhere such as Dalmatia and Luxemburg, lumber from Mazandaran was widely 
used to build bridges, especially since oak trees from such regions as Lorestan were not 
                                                
226 Kauffeldt, Danes and the Modern Middle East, 167-8 and 176. 
227 Some of the European contractors included Angiolini Balocca and Mottura Zaccheo 
of Italy, Hochtief A. G. Essen of Germany, Brüder Redlich of Czechoslovakia, and 
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suitable.229 In short, although existing scholarship mentions only the involvement of 
European companies, particularly Kampsax, the railway project also provided business 
opportunities, albeit limited, to local entrepreneurs and landowners.  
 
Land Disputes and Compensations 
The railway project also caused dislocation. In agricultural communities in low-altitude 
Mazandaran areas such as Sari, Shahi (present-day Qaʾemshahr), and their surroundings, 
former rice-cultivating peasants became laborers due to forced dislocation. Facing a high 
mortality rate among laborers because of malaria in the region, the state prohibited rice 
cultivation in the immediate vicinities of railway construction sites to eradicate the 
breeding grounds for mosquitos. Then it ordered rice farmers to either move elsewhere or 
take other occupations. With no prospects for finding a job elsewhere, many opted for 
employment on railway construction sites.230  
 The Railway Act of 1927 included an article added later on, which stated that the 
government was responsible for providing just compensation for property owners of 
eminent domain.231 This was implemented at least in some cases. When the Ulen 
Company planned Ahvaz Railway Station, a new town around it, and the railway track 
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from the station in 1929, around fifty houses and stores in Ahvaz village had to be 
destroyed. The owners received the total compensation of 25,200 toman, although 
disputes existed between the powerful merchant Moʾin al-Tojjar and occupants of the 
houses regarding who legally owned the properties.232 
In other cases, landowners did not receive compensation. Many landowners 
suffered from arbitrary land confiscation and damage done to their properties by the 
development of transportation infrastructure. Buildings, farms, orchards, and forests were 
confiscated often without compensation and turned into railways and roads, depriving the 
landowners of their primary source of income. Particularly in Mazandaran, landowners 
lost their lands, which were used for construction projects or incorporated into the 
massive estates that the Pahlavi family acquired throughout the period. Furthermore, the 
fact that landowners adjoining new roads were prohibited from building water channels 
either across the roads or underneath them often made it difficult for them to maintain the 
qanat, an underground irrigation system that played a pivotal role in agriculture of largely 
semi-arid Iran.233 Railway engineers made an extra effort to protect the qanat by coating 
it with reinforced concrete, but not all landowners benefited from this precautionary 
measure.234 
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Landowners often responded to the increased presence of state power by 
petitioning.235  For instance, Banu Mirzadeh Erfeʾi and Maʾsumeh Ardabili, large 
landowners near Maragheh, complained to the Majles about damages done to their 
orchards by a train crash. When a train crash occurred in 1941 near Maragheh, on the 
railway route from Tehran to Tabriz under construction, the Railway Organization cut 
trees of orchards nearby to prevent the spread of fire, leaving the lands barren. Ardabili 
persistently petitioned fourteen times to both Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah in 
1941 and 1942, which resulted in two investigations by engineers and representatives of 
the city to evaluate the appropriate monetary compensation for the damages to her 
orchards. 236  
Petitions did not come from powerful landowners alone. Villagers in Kachu 
Mesqal in the province of Isfahan collectively filed a petition to protect their water rights. 
When the construction of the line from Qom to Yazd started, Zavareh, another village 
roughly twenty five kilometers from Kachu Mesqal, became a planned site of a railway 
station. The problem was that Zavareh stood in a completely arid area. The Railway 
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Organization planned to take the qanat water of Kachu Mesqal to Zavareh, but villagers 
protested that transporting precious water out of the village could ruin the agriculture in 
the village. Losing water to Zavareh would mean insufficient water to keep alive the over 
one hundred fruit-producing trees in the poor village.237 Thus, when the issue involved 
the entire community rather than individual landowners, villagers submitted a collective 
petition to have their voice heard. 
Because of the involvement of the state in developing transportation 
infrastructure, most complaints were directed at various state institutions. Nevertheless, 
in some cases, petitioners attempted to solve disputes between themselves and contractors 
through the intervention of the state. For instance, in his petition to the Majles, a 
landowner in Qeshlaq (present-day Garmsar) asked for an investigation by state agents 
when an Irano-Greek contractor for railway construction destroyed his orchard by setting 
fire to trees.238 In another case, an agent representing the landowners of Zirab in 
Mazandaran submitted a complaint to the Majles to solve a dispute between them and 
railway construction contractors, who cut trees from their forests without payment.239 In 
both cases, the petitioners were unable to solve the issues among themselves or through 
the mediation of local governmental entities such as municipal and provincial 
governments and the Office of Forestry (edareh-ye jangalbani) and hoped for 
intervention by the central government. Considering that the contractors were 
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undertaking a state project, and considering that the petitioners had attempted to solve the 
conflicts through provincial governments, they could have blamed the negligence on the 
abstract “state.” Nevertheless, they tried to win the support of the Majles by showing 
deference to the institution while complaining about specific contractors and local state 
institutions in a way somewhat akin to how Egyptian peasants under Mehmet Ali handled 
disputes with intermediaries of the central state.240 Moreover, as the state became 
increasingly bureaucratized in the early Pahlavi period, the interactions that petitioners 
had with the “state” became diversified. They took their case to various state institutions 
to have their voice heard by at least one of them. 
Despite the existence of records of these isolated cases of petitioning, anecdotes 
of disputes related to railway construction are extremely fragmented. We get only a 
glimpse of how the development of transportation infrastructure impacted agricultural 
lands, their owners, and their engagement with various state institutions. In order to show 
how petitioning worked for local inhabitants more closely, the discussion below 
examines the ways in which similar cases of land confiscation unfolded in a relatively 
well-documented location from approximately the same period. 
Like landowners elsewhere in the country, landowners near the site of Tehran 
Station experienced the confiscation of their lands in the Reza Shah period. The 
propaganda in the censored Iranian press represented the immediate vicinities of the site 
of Tehran Station in south Tehran as “underdeveloped,” “empty,” “silent,” and “the 
lowest” places that became a thriving center of the city only thanks to the Trans-Iranian 
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Railway project.241 The area had not been incorporated into Tehran’s expanding urban 
area. Nevertheless, it was not an empty field waiting to be developed, either. Various 
landowners possessed agricultural lands, caravanserais, and icehouses there before the 
station was built. All of the landowners, some of whom were absentee landowners, 
possessed at least 4,000 square meters, many of them around 40,000 square meters. In 
some cases, according to the petitioners, the Ministry of Roads did not even notify them 
about the destruction of their properties and the construction of the station.242 In other 
cases, only a portion of the confiscated land became part of the station, while the rest was 
given to prominent families such as the Farmanfarma family.243 When they found out 
about the confiscation and destruction of their properties to make way for Tehran Station 
and surrounding railway facilities, the landowners sought compensation and complained 
to various branches of the government, including the ‘adliyeh court, the Ministry of 
Roads, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, contractors, municipal 
governments, the Majles, and the shah. 
Petitions to the Majles increased particularly in the immediate aftermath of the 
abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, when the return of lands confiscated under Reza Shah 
was announced.244 No longer fearful of possible ramifications, former landowners 
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expressed dissatisfactions with the negligence of authorities regarding their properties 
during the Reza Shah period. Nevertheless, petitioners had to go through a long process 
to get their cases investigated at all. Theoretically, confiscated lands that had been turned 
into public spaces such as stations, squares, and roads were excluded from the law of 
returning confiscated lands and were freely handed to municipal governments. On the 
receiving end of free gifts, the municipal governments did not feel obliged to compensate 
the former landowners, nor were they financially capable of doing so. Various ministries, 
especially ministries like finance and justice, also did not consider compensating former 
landowners to be part of their responsibilities. The Ministry of Roads simply forwarded 
the petitions to municipal governments.245 Contractors had nothing to do with land 
acquisition. 
Therefore, petitions were often tossed around from one branch of the government 
to another. For instance, a certain Hajj Seyyed Hasan Sabuni complained in late 1941 that 
the Ministry of Roads and the municipal government of Tehran did not investigate the 
confiscation of his land and caravanserais for seven years during the Reza Shah period. 
According to Sabuni, the ministry had claimed that the investigation of land losses was 
the responsibility of municipal governments as decided in a ministerial meeting, but the 
municipal government did not respond to his petitions, either.246 In the case of Ali Qalʾeh 
Vaziri, the municipal government responded to his request and claimed that his case had 




been taken to the court, but no response came afterwards.247 In the case of Ali Akbari in 
late 1945, appraisers from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Roads, as well as local 
trustees evaluated the value of the confiscated land together and determined that the 
Railway Organization (bongah-e rah ahan) should compensate accordingly, but nothing 
followed the investigation.248 In the case of Esmaʾil Firuzi, the investigation determined 
that the Ministry of Roads should compensate him 10,000 riyals, but it did not do so, as 
the ministry considered it the municipal government’s responsibility.249 
As the examples above demonstrate, the involvement of multiple institutions 
made it difficult for previous landowners to demand compensation from any particular 
branch of the state.250 The apparent absence of a standardized procedure and a clear sense 
of institutional divisions of labor confused petitioners, and possibly government 
employees as well. As a result, seemingly similar cases were handled differently, while 
the result was similar among different cases. Many petitions apparently got lost in the 
nebulous labyrinth of various state institutions and their complex divisions of turfs.  
What is crucial here is not so much the fact that petitioning functioned as a 
resistance of the weak, because petitioning usually failed to achieve its goal to be an 
effective form of resistance. In fact, the question of whether petitioning was successful or 
not was beside the point. Regardless of its effectiveness, local inhabitants continuously 
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engaged with a number of state institutions in the process of navigating through the new 
state bureaucracy and new non-state entities in rural Iran such as international contractors 
and Kampsax. The frequency with which landowners had to deal with these institutions 
was evidence that rural Iran had become increasingly integrated into the web of power 
relations not only between state and society but also among various state and non-state 
actors. 
 
On “Friendly” and “Unfriendly” Tribes of Lorestan 
While landowners engaged with the changing power relations through petitions in 
response to threats posed to their properties, the vast majority of ordinary people who did 
not own land experienced the coming of the Trans-Iranian Railway differently. Most 
notably, many inhabitants along the route worked on construction sites as wage laborers. 
In this section, I will discuss the case of Lorestan, especially a part of southeastern 
Lorestan called Bala Gariveh, to examine how the railway project impacted a rural 
society that was both sedentary and nomadic, society, since the 1920s. Bala Gariveh 
serves as the most appropriate example to study the impact of the railway project, 
precisely because the area experienced only very limited penetration of the Iranian state 
power and European presence prior to the Trans-Iranian Railway project, compared to 
other provinces along the railway route such as Khuzestan and Mazandaran. 
 When Reza Khan came to power in the aftermath of the 1921 coup, Lorestan was 
politically decentralized, with the exception of the western part of the region, which was 
called Posht-e Kuh and is part of the Ilam province today. In contrast to Posht-e Kuh, 
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Pish-e Kuh, separated from Posht-e Kuh by a mountain range, did not have the presence 
of the state after the death of Naser al-Din Shah in 1896. In fact, governors sent from 
Tehran for tax collection could not even enter Khorramabad, the capital of Lorestan 
situated in Pish-e Kuh.251 In Bala Gariveh, which lay southeast of Khorramabad and Pish-
e Kuh, too, Lor tribes remained mostly autonomous until immediately before 1921. 
Various Lor tribes in Pish-e Kuh and Bala Gariveh, such as the Baharvands, 
Bayranvands, Judakis, Papis, and Sagvands did not form a large, stratified confederation, 
unlike the hierarchical structure the Bakhtiyari Confederation.252 The influence of tribal 
khans over members of their tribes was also relatively weak.253 The absence of the state 
and a dominant local ruler kept eastern Lorestan in “a chronic state of anarchy,”254 which 
could disrupt the broader economy of Iran because of Lorestan’s crucial location 
connecting the Persian Gulf with Tehran via Dezful, Khorramabad, and Borujerd. 
 Economically, Bala Gariveh was tied to Borujerd and Dezful rather than 
Khorramabad, which was tied more to its surrounding areas of Pish-e Kuh.255 In 
particular, the nomadic Lors of Bala Gariveh traveled southwards to the vicinities of 
Dezful in winter and spring and sold such items as charcoal in Dezful, while purchasing 
such items as tea and sugar. C. J. Edmonds, a British officer, noted that during his 1917 
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trip to Lorestan escorted by local tribes, the Lors of Bala Gariveh such as the Judakis and 
Papis came down to Dezful en masse with their livestock for sale and built their black 
tents on the bank of Dez River.256 Raiding and blackmailing caravans for protection also 
defined the economic interaction between city-dwellers with tribes of Lorestan. Constant 
pillaging by the Lors of Bala Gariveh closed trade routes that connected the Persian Gulf 
with Tehran in the 1910s. Settled cities and villages could also suffer from raids by the 
Lors, as the Bayranvands attacked Borujerd.257 
 The new regime’s policies that I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, such 
as Reza Khan’s military campaigns in the early 1920s and the concurrent road 
construction projects to connect Tehran with Khuzestan via Lorestan, occurred in this 
context. Furthermore, Reza Khan attempted to disarm the tribal populations. As was the 
case with other provinces, Tehran often attempted to achieve this by negotiating with 
tribal khans, following military campaigns, in order to convince them to accept such 
forms of incentives as subsidies and governorships as a quid pro quo for allegiance.258 
Moreover, in tandem with these attempts at restoring provincial order, the new regime 
implemented various policies to create a homogeneous nation. Conscription, sartorial 
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regulations for men, and forced sedentarization were particularly disruptive to the tribal 
societies of Lorestan.259  
 By the late 1920s, tribal resistance in Lorestan largely lost momentum and 
became sporadic raiding by a handful of Lor tribes such as the Bayranvands, especially 
after the 1928 opening of the new road to connect Tehran and Khuzestan via Borujerd, 
Khorramabad, and Dezful. Therefore, the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, 
which took place primarily during the 1930s in Lorestan, did not play a role in restoring 
security in the region. Rather, it functioned to maintain the shaky stability in Lorestan by 
providing employment to tribes that had reached an agreement with the Pahlavi state 
during the 1920s. 
 The Papi tribe in Bala Gariveh experienced the coming of the Trans-Iranian 
Railway in a particularly drastic manner. Around 1920, the Papis comprised of about two 
thousand families, mostly nomadic pastoralists who spent summers in the territory 
between the future railway stations of Mazu and Bisheh and moved southwards to the 
vicinity of Salehabad in fall.260 In the early 1920s, the Papis joined other tribes of 
Lorestan against Tehran’s military campaigns, such as the 1923-24 campaign that ended 
with the executions of several Lor tribal khans. Yet, they agreed to disarm along with 
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several other Lor tribes in the summer of 1925, with the understanding that they would be 
required to agree to a sedentarized life in the land distributed at the expense of nearby 
landowners, mostly Arabs.261 During the tribal unrest in 1928, the Papi khan, who was 
released from captivity in Khorramabad upon the arrival of Reza Shah, worked as a 
liaison between the Lors and the shah, which resulted in the distribution of gifts to Lor 
tribal chiefs.262 No detail is available regarding Papis’ relations with the Pahlavi state 
between this incident and the early 1930s. Yet, while names of some other Lor tribes 
continued to appear in British documents as perpetrators of highway robberies and 
attacks on road and railway construction sites in the 1930s, the Papis ceased to appear in 
these documents after 1928. 
 Having established comparably amicable relations with the Pahlavi state, the 
Papis, along with some other tribes of Lorestan, secured employment on railway 
construction sites as laborers and sometimes even as more skilled laborers, while 
sometimes retaining their livestock and farms.263 Though casualties on construction sites 
were high, the Papis also benefited from stable employment and the distribution of 
certain kinds of medicine at dispensaries and hospitals along the railway routes. 
Consequently, despite the widespread starvation in Lorestan during the Allied 
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occupation, the Papis appeared “very healthy and no cases of malaria or splenic 
enlargement were found among those examined,” unlike other Lor tribes.264 Thus, the 
Trans-Iranian Railway project created employment opportunities in a precariously 
pacified area to keep formerly nomadic tribes content and maintain security and state 
control in the region. 
This attempt at establishing a lasting stability could pose a problem when 
construction projects came to a halt leading to increased unemployment. The danger of 
high unemployment first started to show its effect in the oil industry. By the early 1930s, 
the depression manifested itself in Iran. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company reduced the 
number of its employees in 1931, increasing unemployment in southwestern Iran. Barely 
able to survive, desperate former laborers for the company turned into tribal bandits, 
robbing on highways.265 As this case indicates, there was only a blur and contingent 
distinction between “friendly” tribes that provided laborers and guards and “unfriendly” 
tribes that threatened rural security.  
A similar danger plagued the railway project at the beginning of the 1930s, when 
construction slowed down owing to the lack of funds. In addition to a massive layoff of 
the clerical staff, the reduction of workers seemed inevitable in the summer of 1932, and 
by the beginning of 1933, the construction of new sections of the south line of the railway 
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was temporarily suspended.266 By February, five hundred armed Arab tribesmen aligned 
with the Lors led by Yadollah Khan of the Bayranvand tribe attacked a railway workers’ 
camp, killing some laborers and robbing about six thousand riyals.267 The Bayranvands, 
joined by conscription deserters, had engaged in the kidnapping of prominent figures 
such as the governor of Lorestan, pillaging of villages, and highway robbery between 
Khorramabad and Dezful. By the beginning of 1933, they made passing through Lorestan 
difficult, especially for trucks carrying goods, although they engaged in transporting 
basic consumption items such as tea and sugar to make a profit, and local authorities of 
Khorramabad continued to purchase goods from them.268 Nevertheless, their alliance with 
unemployed Arab tribesmen posed a serious threat to workers’ camps and railway 
facilities. Thus, the practical issue of high unemployment in Lorestan activated the 
potential for disorder caused by “unfriendly” tribes. 
Nevertheless, the Lor tribes’ desire to remain “friendly” with the state and its 
institutions in Lorestan, including the Trans-Iranian Railway, was mutual if that 
friendliness ensured survival for tribal groups. The supposedly recalcitrant tribes such as 
the Bayranvands also explored ways to resituate themselves vis-à-vis new players in the 
region such as the Pahlavi state and the railway syndicate. At the beginning of 1933, in 
return for the safety of traffic, Yadollah Khan was demanding his appointment as the 
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governor of Lorestan, the withdrawal of Iranian troops from the province, and no 
stationing of a garrison there.269 By this time, he led over 3,500 rebels in Lorestan. While 
his demands revealed his desire to maintain a decentralized structure of the previous eras, 
keep the central state out of Lorestan, and retain his power vis-à-vis local communities, 
another demand he made in the same year suggested his willingness to resituate himself 
in the face of new players in the province. 
In March 1933, the Bayranvands kidnapped C.J. Carroll, the American director of 
the south line of the railway under construction. In his demands, Yadollah Khan asked 
the Pahlavi state to ensure the safety of his tribe and the distribution of land in return for 
the release of Carroll, indicating his desperation and willingness to choose 
sedentarization like the Papis. More importantly, he demanded that “certain members of 
the tribe must be given employment on the Persian Railway,” which showed that his goal 
was more pragmatic than the complete rejection of the presence of the Pahlavi state.270 
Following the promise that his demands would be considered, Carroll was released from 
his third experience of captivity, while Yadollah Khan was captured and sent to Tehran in 
April.271 Throughout the 1930s, the Bayranvands were exiled to various provinces of 
Iran, including Khorasan. 
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Such attacks on railway construction sites, workers’ camps, and railway facilities 
could cause serious damage to the project. For instance, between February 1931 and 
January 1932, workers’ camps and railway facilities were attacked at least ten times by 
nearby Arab tribes in interior Khuzestan alone, often resulting in injuries, deaths, and the 
loss of property and cash.272 Furthermore, these attacks made it difficult to recruit 
laborers and thus hindered the completion of the railway project that symbolized Iran’s 
New Civilization (tamaddon-e jadid). To solve the problem, soldiers were stationed to 
protect workers’ camps and railway facilities.273 In addition, local Lor and Arab 
tribesmen whose chiefs had reached an agreement with the state were employed as 
guards to placate them and prevent looting in return for government subsidies to tribal 
chiefs (Figure 4.3). This differed from the previously prevalent practice in road 
construction sites of allowing locally recruited guards to independently levy road tolls, as 
an unofficial compensation for their service.274  
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(Figure 4.3) Lor guards. COWI Archives, Photo Album F51a, 70. 
 
 As the experiences of the Papis and the Bayranvands illustrate, while the coming 
of railways and highways caused displacement and impoverishment among both 
sedentary and nomadic tribal communities, local inhabitants did not simply defy the 
penetration of state power as an outside force, embodied by local officials and 
governmental institutions. Rather, local inhabitants, including “unfriendly” tribes like the 
Bayranvands, actively attempted, if not always successfully, to gauge their positions vis-
à-vis new political and economic entities that had become components of power relations 
in rural Iran. They demonstrated flexibility to changing conditions, even though they 
were not necessarily rewarded for the flexibility.  
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 Again, after the completion of the Trans-Iranian Railway in 1938, “friendliness” 
based on the reward of employment turned out to be tenuous, as the completed railway 
could not create as many employment opportunities as construction sites for unskilled 
laborers. Consequently, cases of robbery increased.275 When economic conditions got 
worse during the occupation by the Allied forces from 1941-45, payment and even ration 
to laborers could be halted.276 To survive economic hardship, locals who lived along the 
railway often snatched the copper telephone wire off the poles.277 In addition to such 
petty crimes, some locals resorted to raiding to survive the occupation. In late 1941, 
inhabitants of Zanjan County filed a petition, according to which, disorder ensued after 
the collapse of the central state in 1941. Exiled tribes returned to their homelands and 
resumed nomadic life, soldiers deserted the army, workers stopped receiving salaries, and 
even bread rations for laborers ran short. As economic conditions deteriorated, over three 
hundred laborers working in Zanjan on the railway project to connect Tehran to Tabriz 
became destitute and restless. They started to loot cities and villages under the pretext of 
railway needs, thus endangering the wellbeing of local inhabitants, who called for help 
from the Majles after unsuccessfully petitioning local authorities.278  
                                                
275 IOR/L/PS/12/3503, Intelligence Summary No. 23, 16 November, 1940. 
276 Olsen. “Storm Over Mellemøsten,” 68. 
277 Joel Sayre, I Served in the Persian Gulf Command (Isfahan?: The Information and 
Education Branch, The Office of Technical Information, The Persian Gulf Command, 
1945), 4. The locals may have been subsidized by the Pahlavi state before 1941 in order 
to prevent theft and vandalism, as was the case with the telegraph in the late Ottoman 
Empire and Meiji Japan. See Yakup Bektas, “The Sultan’s Messenger,” 692-3. 
278 ML12/84/42/1/28. The case of Zanjan was not an isolated case. Unpaid laborers who 
lost their jobs due to the closing down of railway and road construction sites in the 
 147 
As these incidents suggest, “friendly” groups chose to be “friendly” because of 
the concrete benefits they received. Once those benefits disappeared, they could easily 
turn “unfriendly” from the state’s perspective, indicating that local inhabitants actively 
and pragmatically calculated best options available when the presence of the central state 
and foreign contractors had become a reality of life in rural Iran. 
   
Construction Workers 
The scale of the construction projects in the early Pahlavi period was evident in the 
number of laborers various projects required. About 6,000 construction laborers worked 
on railway construction in Khuzestan alone as of March 1931.279 At the peak of 
construction, according to one estimate, about 40,000 to 50,000 men were employed for 
the project, with ninety percent of them recruited locally.280 Because so many laborers 
worked on construction sites, especially in Mazandaran and Khuzestan, the payment of 
wages for laborers caused a constant shortage of silver currency in all other provinces in 
the mid-1930s.281 
 Compared to the recruitment of guards through tribal khans, the methods by 
which unskilled Iranian laborers found employment on construction sites varied. On road 
                                                                                                                                            
occupied areas were often joined by army deserters to loot cities and villages after the 
abdication of Reza Shah in September, 1941. IOR/L/PS/12/3503, Intelligence Summary, 
No. 18-No. 20, 24 August-24 September, 1941. 
279 IOR/L/PS/12/3400/PZ3627, Khuzistan Diary, No. 3, March 1931. 
280 IOR/L/PS/12/3409, “Opening of the Trans-Iranian Railway,” H. J. Seymour to 
Viscount Halifax, August 30, 1938. 
281 IOR/L/PS/12/3472A, Annual Report, 1933, 90. 
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construction sites, when governors and local officials took charge of the projects, the 
tradition of corvée labor continued well into the 1930s.282 Not surprisingly, laborers often 
tried to escape, slowing down the progress of construction projects.283 Even when forced 
laborers were paid, as when residents of Mazandaran petitioned to the Majles, they 
received much lower wages than the market rate after local officials embezzled a portion 
of the wages.284 Theoretically, Kampsax was responsible for supervising contractors’ 
payments, but it is unclear whether corvée labor existed in reality on railroad construction 
sites. Even if corvée labor did not exist, delayed payment of salaries by Kampsax 
contractors occasionally caused laborers to take action. For instance, a number of laborers 
in Lorestan complained to the shah through the military government in 1934.285 
Tribes such as the Papis were generally recruited as members of the tribe through 
tribal khans rather than finding employment as individual laborers.286 If the recruitment 
                                                
282 For instance, the deputy-governor of Fuman extorted money and used forced labor in 
the construction of the Fuman-Masuleh road. IOR/L/PS/11/209/234/22, From A.Q. 
Davis, Vice Consulate of Rasht, to Percy Loraine, 13 April, 1926. For similar examples 
elsewhere, see IOR/L/PS/11/209/5349, A.L. Philip of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 5 
September 1928, “The Khuramabad Road,” IOR/L/PS/12/3415/P6635, Annual 
Commercial Report of the Provinces of Sistan and the Qainat for the Year 1927-28, and 
IOR/L/PS/12/3405, from G.F. Squire, Consulate General for Khorasan, to Charge 
d’Affaires, Tehran, 31 May 1938. 
283 IOR/L/PS/11/290/P2838, E2677/2661/34, R.F. Woodward to British Minister in 
Tehran, 4 May, 1928. 
284 Nuri, Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Shekayat-e roʾaya-ye edareh-ye amlak-e ekhtesasi-ye 
kojur az edareh-ye toroq-e mazandaran (ML9/118/33/51), 364-5. 
285 IOR/L/PS/12/3400, Khuzistan Diaries, May 1934. 
286 As the 1943 British report “Tribes of Luristan” indicated, tayefehs that were known 
for having “coolies” such as the Kord Alivands and Murad Alivands within the 
Baharvand tribe (il) had most of their adult members employed on construction sites, 
either temporarily or permanently. In contrast, others such as the Bayranvands had no 
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process of railway construction laborers worked similarly to road construction, 
construction companies would recruit laborers through provincial governors, who 
circulated information to tribal chiefs, who in turn supplied labor from their tribesmen.287 
Once recruited, unskilled tribal laborers were generally organized into a group of ten to 
thirty under a foreman, and most of them were between fourteen and twenty five years 
old.288 Every morning, workers got up before sunrise, worked throughout the morning, 
had a long lunch break in an effort to avoid heat in summer, then resumed work with the 
sound of a camel bell and continued working until sunset.289 Builders did not use 
machinery as widely as contemporary construction projects elsewhere. Tools such as 
pickaxes and chisels as well as wagons pulled by human did much of the work (Figure 
4.4).290 
                                                                                                                                            
known coolies. Thus, as was the case with Papis, it appears that tribal construction 
workers were usually hired as groups through tribal khans rather than individuals 
throughout the Reza Shah period. 
287 For instance, see IOR/L/PS/11/209/6410, R.C. Parr to Lord Cushendun, 1 November 
1928, and “Burujird-Dizful Road.” 
288 Gruner. Iran — “Persien,” 20-21. Another source notes the presence of smaller 
children around ten years old and much older men with red dyed beards among 
construction laborers in Eastern Iran during World War Two. See COWI Archives, Kurt 
Olsen. “Storm Over Mellemøsten (Storm over the Middle East)”, (Copenhagen: H. 
Hirschsprungs Forlag, n.d.), 76. 
289 “Vinterbulletin fra Persien,” COWI Archives, Kasse 106, November 1933, Ahvaz, 4. 
It appears that clocks were not used to measure working hours, as a Swiss engineer 
wrote, “working hours were what a modern man would estimate ten hours a day.” See 
Gruner. Iran — “Persien,” 24. For a discussion of time and work-discipline in modern 
Iran, see Touraj Atabaki, “Time, Labour-Discipline and Modernization in Turkey and 
Iran: Some Comparative Remarks,” Touraj Atabaki ed. The State and the Subaltern: 
Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran (London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2007), 1-16. 




(Figure 4.4) Iranian workers. Location unknown. COWI Archives, Album 57b, 104. 
 
 
Except for tribal laborers who lived in the vicinities of construction sites, 
construction workers lived in railway camps that comprised of tents, sheep huts or 
temporary housing (Figure 4.5). Since many construction sites were in remote areas, food 
and water for workers were transported on trucks and animal transport such as camels 
and donkeys via service roads that they constructed just prior to building the railway.291 
Workers complained about the overpriced water and bread considering their dreadful 
                                                
291 COWI Archives, Kasse 102, Jernbaner, Iran, Club Irano Scandinave, 21. 
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quality.292 When the workers’ camp was not close, workers also had to be transported 
daily, which caused a traffic jam on service roads.293  
 
 
(Figure 4.5) A construction site and workers’ camp near Keshvar, Lorestan. COWI 
Archives, Album F57b, 125. 
 
Laborers did not necessarily come from the immediate vicinity. They could be 
collectively recruited from neighboring provinces, too, as laborers from Semnan were 
found on construction sites in Mazandaran.294 Also, they did not always have to work on 
a particular construction site. They could potentially take advantage of different 
                                                
292 Nuri, Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Taqaza-ye ʿamalejat-e damghani,” 275. 
293 COWI Archives, Svend  Buhelt “Mit Persiske Eventyr (My Persian Adventure),” 55. 
294 Nuri, Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Taqaza-ye ʿamalejat-e damghani baraye pardakht-e 
hoquq-e sakht-e rah ahan (MA9/118/33/84),” 274-5. 
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construction projects managed by different contractors. For instance, when American 
engineers of the German-American railway syndicate initially commenced construction 
between Ahvaz and Dezful in Khuzestan in late 1927, the standard daily wage of road 
construction labor was two qerans per day.295 Following “some discussions as to their 
daily wage,” the American manager, who may have lacked familiarity with the average 
wage as a newcomer or desperately needed more laborers, offered three qerans per day. 
The immediate consequence was the spontaneous mass exodus of road construction 
laborers employed nearby under the supervision of a Russian engineer to railway 
construction sites.296 Laborers could benefit more from the high demand for labor at the 
peak of construction. The American Ulen Company had to increase the daily wage from 
three to four qerans in 1929 in order to attract more Arab laborers in Khuzestan, where 
agricultural harvesting had previously been prioritized over construction labor.297  
As illustrated by these examples, railway construction workers were paid as 
individuals, even tribal laborers who were recruited collectively. The practice of the 
employer paying an annual sum to tribal khans rather than to individual laborers from 
tribal groups was in decline by the 1920s but had not disappeared. Bakhtiyari guards who 
                                                
295 The wage was the same in southeastern Iran. See IOR/L/PS/10/794/E1/1/34, “Parsi 
Transport Company in Southeast Persia,” 30 May, 1923. Qeran was a currency used in 
Iran prior to its replacement with Rial in 1932. It was worth 20 shahi and 0.1 toman.  
296 IOR/L/PS/10/794/P56/E5438/201/34, from R.H. Clive to Austen Chamberlain, 26 
November, 1927. Mass exodus is a common form of collective action among coolies to 
protest against working conditions without making specific demands. Marcel van der 
Linden, “The Promise and Challenges of Global Labor History,” International Labor and 
Working-Class History 82 (2012): 71. 
297 IOR/L/PS/11/290/P4431, Ahvaz Diary, No. 4, April 1929. 
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were hired to protect properties of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had started to get paid 
directly from the head guards, not from the khans, by 1909.298 In contrast, Baluchi tribal 
khans who supplied the British with guards to protect infrastructure received payment as 
late as 1925.299 In the case of tribal laborers on the southern railway route, albeit more so 
in Khuzestan than Lorestan, prior experience with the APOC and road construction 
projects from the 1900s may have familiarized tribal populations with receiving salary 
individually by the time railway construction started in the late 1920s. 
Paying salary directly from the employer to individual laborers had the effect of 
weakening the influence of tribal khans. Furthermore, it worked as an incentive for 
laborers to come back to construction sites everyday rather than coming only when they 
did not have to harvest crops or tend livestock. Similar to the APOC at the beginning of 
its existence, the Trans-Iranian Railway project had difficulties with retaining the 
recruited tribal laborers for the entire year, or even for a short period of time such as one 
week or two. To prevent desertion of work and ensure continuity of the workforce, the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company made the payment on a fortnightly basis. Railway 
construction sites applied the same method of payment.300  
Nevertheless, the system was open to manipulation. For instance, many laborers 
sold the tickets that they received in exchange for daily labor on construction sites on the 
                                                
298 Touraj Atabaki, "From ʿAmaleh (Labor) to Kargar (Worker): Recruitment, Work 
Discipline and Making of the Working Class in the Persian/Iranian Oil Industry," 
International Labor and Working-Class History 84 (2013): 164. 
299 IOR/L/PS/10/787, Consul for Sistan to Percey Loraine, on Nov 16, 1925. 
300 Atabaki, "From ʿAmaleh (Labor) to Kargar (Worker),” 166-8, and Gruner, Iran — 
“Persien,” 20. 
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black market. In order to receive salary in cash, laborers had to present the tickets on 
specified payment days. Since many tribal laborers retained their land or livestock, 
however, it was sometimes difficult to be present at the construction site on payment 
days. Therefore, laborers sold them to vendors to reap the benefit of their labor. The long 
payday list that section managers had in comparison with the number of laborers who 
actually showed up indicated the prevalence of this practice, which in turn made it 
necessary for the Ministry of Roads to examine the tickets and ticketholders more closely 
at the time of payment.301  
As exemplified by the use of pink slips, construction laborers were not passively 
exposed to techniques of control introduced by mostly European contractors under the 
supervision of Kampsax. Despite Kampsax engieneers’ vision to “de-Orientalize” Iran 
and bring “Westernization” to Iran through the Trans-Iranian Railway,302 laborers were 
not simply molded into Kampsax’s vision of laborers. For instance, when railway 
hospitals distributed free quinine to workers in Mazandaran for malaria prevention, 
Iranian laborers sold it on the black market for additional income, making the medicine 
readily available in Tehran.303 Thus, Iranian laborers attempted to ameliorate their lives 
by adapting to the unfamiliar practices of new players in their locales, such as contractors 
for railway construction and hospitals’ medical staff. This is not to say that laborers 
                                                
301 Nuri, Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Javabiyeh-ye vezarat-e toroq dar mowred-e pardakht-e 
hoquq-e ʿamalejat (ML9/118/33/57),” 224. 
302 Kauffeldt, Danes, Orientalism, and the Modern Middle East, 168 and 171. 
303 COWI Archives, KX14, “Ingeniøren og Eventyret (Consortium Kampsax),” 
Indberetning nr., 41-2. 
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rejected “foreign” practices. As we will see in the next section, the presence of foreign 
workers had a major impact on the demands that Iranian workers formulated. 
 
Expressions of Grievances among Laborers 
As mentioned earlier, local populations such as Lors and Arabs were not the only 
workers present on construction sites. The workforce had varying compositions 
depending on the location. For instance, in the flat section immediately south of Qom, 
most of the 500 workers were Iranian because there existed little need for skilled 
stonecutters and masons.304  
In contrast, more challenging areas such as the mountainous areas of Mazandaran 
and Lorestan had a diverse group of engineers and workers who lived and worked side by 
side with locally employed unskilled laborers. Semiskilled diggers and masons were 
Azaris from the province of Azarbaijan, where they might have gained experience partly 
due to the existence of the Russian-built Jolfa-Tabriz railway and its extension to 
Sharafkhaneh by Lake Orumiyeh.305 Armenians worked as chauffeurs and low-level 
administrators. Furthermore, southern Europe exported thousands of skilled workers who 
needed employment during the Great Depression. The Greeks were stonecutters, the 
Slovaks were tunnel workers, and a great number of Italians were everywhere as 
                                                
304 Ibid., 54. 
305 Just like the British constructed railways in Iranian frontiers such as Dozdab 
(present-day Zahedan) in the southeast and Bushehr-Borazjan in the south during World 
War One, Russians completed a railway from its borders to the province of Azarbaijan. 
IOR/L/PS/18/193, Memorandum Regarding the Policy of His Majesty’s Government 
towards Persia at the Peace Conference, 17-18. 
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stonecutters, masons, engineers, and supervisors of the workforce. The Scandinavians, 
Austrians, Hungarians, Belgians, and Swiss worked in managerial positions or as 
engineers and construction supervisors.  
In addition, Europeans moved to Iran to open new restaurants, bars, and hotels 
that catered to Europeans who were involved in railway and highway construction.306 
Thus, construction projects of the Reza Shah period caused a massive influx of foreign 
workers and engineers to Iran. Importantly, unlike the presence of foreigners in the oil 
industry who were concentrated in Khuzestan, Europeans who worked in the construction 
sector were scattered along railway and highway routes in the western half of Iran, 
creating multiple sites of interactions between Iranians and foreign workers.  
These diverse groups of workers were treated differently depending on their 
nationality and credentials. In terms of salary, while unskilled laborers made six to nine 
rials per day even in the late 1930s, and skilled Iranians made fifteen to thirty rials, 
European workers made sixty to seventy-five rials per day. The manager of each of the 
twenty lots along the railway route made 7,000 rials per month, while managers of 
smaller sections made two to three thousand rials. They also enjoyed such perquisites as 
free furnished housing and transport service that lower-level employees did not enjoy.307 
Engineers and other professionals also lived separately from regular workers in workers’ 
camps, spatially formalizing the hierarchy. They either rented buildings in nearby urban 
                                                
306 Buhelt, “Mit Persiske Eventyr,” p. 22-23, and Gruner. Iran — “Persien,” 21-22.  
307 Ibid., 20-23. 
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centers or built tents surrounded by interpreters, chefs, servants, and livestock. Local 
laborers lived in a quarter closer to the entrance of the camps along with guards.308 
 While employment in the construction sector brought a stable income to local 
inhabitants-turned-unskilled laborers along the routes of railways, they acutely felt the 
preferential treatment that skilled workers from outside their community received. Their 
resentment against the perceived dominance of outsiders can be seen in emergency 
situations. When earthquakes repeatedly occurred in Mazandaran in early 1935, a tunnel 
and stone quarry collapsed and trapped Azari workers between logs and rocks. When 
local laborers were asked to rescue them, the laborers declined, saying that rescuing 
Turks was not their responsibility.309 Also, during ʿAshura of the same year, the ulama of 
ʿAbbasabad attributed frequent earthquakes to a divine wrath toward Europeans, who 
were drilling the mountains with no avail. When a Kampsax engineer was caught taking 
photos of ʿAshura processions in this volatile situation, he was forced to hide in a railway 
station temporarily, as local laborers attacked him as the disrupter of local life.310  
Furthermore, through petitions they submitted to the Majles, Iranian workers 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the perceived preferential treatment that foreigners, 
especially Europeans, received. For instance, at the beginning of 1931, Mohammad Zaki 
Valad-e Ahmad filed a petition to the Majles about his miserable condition. After 
working for the German-American railway syndicate for two and a half years, he lost his 
                                                
308 COWI Archives, Kasse 106 ,“Vinterbulletin fra Persien,” 3. 
309 COWI Archives, Buhelt, “Mit Persiske Eventyr,” 24. 
310 COWI Archives, Kasse 106, Boisen, “Banen Skal Bygges Paa Seks Aar,” 69-70. 
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leg during work, stayed in the hospital for half a year, after which he received a prosthetic 
leg. After this, however, his salary was reduced from 160 qerans a month to eighty, and 
after another half a year, the eighty-qeran salary was discontinued. Claiming that his 
house would be destroyed in three days if he could not secure money to give back to the 
debtor, he desperately wrote, “when a German lost an arm, they (the syndicate) would 
give him seven hundred tomans (7,000 qerans) and even give him a job. But however 
much I, a guardian of four people, three sisters and one mother, petition to the syndicate, 
they do not reply.”311  
Another construction worker who lost his arm to a dynamite accident in a tunnel 
on a Mazandarani construction site expressed a similar grievance against the injustice 
Iranians had to suffer. He deplored, “Is it fair in an era of a just king…that all foreigners 
and the like benefit from the best justice available and enjoy the homage while a 
dedicated man of the Iranian race (Iraninezhad) who lost his arm for his homeland 
(vatan) has been thrown into despair…”312 
Not only did unskilled laborers hold grudges against European workers, relatively 
skilled Iranians expressed grievances against different treatments they received. A 1934 
letter written by an employee of a military pharmacy in Sari criticized Kampsax for 
giving jobs to Europeans and not to the patriotic, pure Iranians (Iraniyan-e paknezhad-e 
                                                
311 ML 8/10/21/1/10. 
312 ML10/134/7/1/20. Praising the ruler as just while criticizing the system operated by 
intermediaries of the central state was a common feature of petitioning because it 
affirmed the petitioners’ loyalty to the ruler while sharpening their criticism of the 
corruption of intermediaries. For an example of peasants in Mehmet Ali’s Egypt, see 
Chalcraft, “Engaging the State,” 306-310. 
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vatanparast), creating a situation in which “every European porter spends a large amount 
of money for various excuses while poor Iranians remain unemployed.”313 To his chagrin, 
even educated Iranians did not get jobs because Kampsax considered Iranian youths only 
as capable as “savages in Africa” and thus permitted them only manual labor. According 
to the petitioner, this was the case in both technical and managerial positions, even 
though Persian speakers would have advantages in managerial jobs due to their ability to 
communicate with the laborers.314 Europeans would certainly disagree with the level of 
competency among educated Iranians, but the perception among Iranians who received 
education and training in Europe was that of unfairness.315 Thus, just like unskilled 
laborers, skilled Iranians formulated their demands based on what European employees 
received. Witnessing the generous compensations to which Europeans were contractually 
entitled emboldened Iranian demands for justice.  
As Mohammad Zaki’s petition indicated, there was only a limited institutional 
mechanism to provide Iranian laborers and their families with adequate compensation in 
cases of injuries and deaths. In 1931, the cabinet approved the first social security fund in 
                                                
313 Nuri, Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Shekvaiyeh az ʿadam-e kargiri-ye iraniyan tavassot-e 
sherkat-e kampsaks (MA9/118/33/45),” 268. 
314 Ibid., 269. 
315 Complaints among Kampsax and other European engineers about Iranian engineers 
were very common. For instance, one Norwegian complained, “[t]he Persian ‘engineers’ 
do six months engineering course [sic] at some university in Europe and then return ‘fully 
qualified.’” See IOR/L/PS/12/3404/PZ5610, E4632/302/34, A report by V.A.L. Mallet, 
28 September, 1935. For similar complaints, IOR/L/PS/12/3409/PZ3845/31, 
Memorandum by E.R. Lingeman, pp. 2-3, and IOR/L/PS/12/3409/PZ6548/31, Lacy 
Baggallay to Lord Marquess, 21 September 1931. 
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Iran.316 Workers on railway and road construction sites got two percent of their wages 
deducted to fund the program. According to Willem Floor’s study of labor in Iran, the 
fund covered the following services: 
 
1. Medical help to those fallen ill or wounded on the job. This 
included medicine, food, and medical services in the larger 
centers; 
 
2. In case of illness or accident as a result of employment the 
workers would be paid 50 per cent of their daily wage for a 
maximum of two years; 
 
3. Those permanently disabled would get a lump sum. In case 
of total disability, the sum would be equal to the 
contributions paid during the last two years with a 
maximum of 2,000 tumans. In case of partial disability, the 
indemnification would vary between 50 per cent and two 
and a half per cent of the contributions paid during the last 
two years depending on the kind of invalidity; 
                                                
316 Willem Floor. Labor and Industry in Iran, 1850-1941 (Washington DC: Mage 
Publishers, 2009), 93 and Cyrus Schayegh, “The Development of Social Insurance in 
Iran: Technical-Financial Conditions and Political Rationales, 1941-1960,” Iranian 
Studies 39, no. 4 (2006): 545. 
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4. Payment of a lump sum to the heirs, and to those for whom 
the deceased was responsible. The sum to be equal to the 
payments made during the last two years.317 
 
 
Despite the promises, the new regulations often failed to benefit construction 
workers. Petitions submitted by workers to the Majles indicate a lack of a standardized 
procedure. Submitting an application for compensation required a visit to the Ministry of 
Roads in Tehran even when the petitioner was disabled. The initial application was 
followed by a lengthy series of correspondence with multiple state institutions, which 
may or may not reply at all.318 More often, they simply had to face the consequences of 
work-related health problems on their own. In more fortunate cases, they could receive 
payment for an extended period of time like Mohammad Zaki. Thus, although Kampsax 
                                                
317 Floor, Labor and Industry in Iran, 1850-1941, 94. 
318 One of the common petitions to the Majles with regard to compensations for injuries 
and deaths complained about the non-responsiveness of various branches of the 
government such as the Ministry of Roads and municipal governments. For other 
petitions from disabled laborers and family members of deceased laborers, see Nuri, 
Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Taqaza-ye pardakht-e khesarat az taraf-e yeki az kargaran-e rah 
ahan beh dalil-e tasadof (ML9/118/33/69),” 270, “Taqaza-ye yeki az kargaran-e rah ahan 
baraye pardakht-e gheramat-e hadeseh az dast dadan-e pahayesh (ML9/118/33/75),” 273, 
“Taqaza-ye barqarari-ye moqarrari baraye yeki az jan bakhtegan-e sakht-e rah ahan 
(ML10/186/34/46),” 278, and ML11/19/39/1/3. 
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established the sanitation service and constructed hospitals along the railway routes,319 
laborers simply could not spare one hundred qerans for medical treatment when their 
daily wage was only two qerans, according to the complaints of laborers in the north 
line.320 
Collecting compensation turned out to be difficult for professionals, too, as the 
case of an Iranian railway engineer indicates. ʿAbbas Qoli ʿAtapur was a railway 
engineer who worked for the German-American railway syndicate for four years after his 
education in Europe. In 1932, during his survey trip in Mazandaran, he fell from a cliff 
and became disabled. Despite the contractual obligation to compensate, even four months 
after the accident, the Railway Administration (edareh-ye rah ahan) did not make an 
offer for compensation or a less mobile job ʿAtapur could perform, leading to the 
impoverishment of the family that had lost its only breadwinner.321 The answer ʿAtapur 
received five months after the accident from the Railway Administration stated that the 
case was still under investigation.322 Though it is unclear what happened to ʿAtapur’s 
case afterwards, it is quite possible that his case was lost in the complex web of state 
bureaucracy, the fate of many similar petitions in the early Pahlavi era.  
                                                
319 COWI Archives, KX 14,“Ingeniøren og Eventyret,” Indberetning nr., p. 46. Some of 
these dispensaries were converted into rest houses when the construction was over. See 
COWI Archives, Kasse 106, Boisen, “Banen Skal Bygges Paa Seks Aar,” 150. 
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322 Ibid., “Javabiyeh-ye edareh-ye rah ahan-e shomal beh darkhast-e ‘abbas qoli ‘atapur 
(ML8/33/32/100),” 263. 
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Iranian laborers struggled to survive these trying conditions in a number of ways. 
Employing the same tactics as European workers, or possibly in tandem with the 
Europeans, Iranians sometimes protested on construction sites to have their grievances 
heard (Figure 4.6), necessitating the dispatch of soldiers.323 They also complained to the 
Kampsax’s claims department, which handled disputes not only between workers and 
contractors but also between subcontractors and contractors.324 Moreover, like 
landowners, they petitioned to various government authorities such as the Majles, the 
Ministry of Roads, and municipal governments to take concrete actions to alleviate their 
problems.325 They even petitioned directly to the shah himself.326 During the Allied 
                                                
323 IOR/L/PS/12/3400/PZ8023, Khuzestan Diary, October 1931. Likewise, immediately 
after the 1929 strike by oil workers in Abadan, three hundred construction workers hired 
by the Ulen Company also demanded higher wages. Upon receiving advice from the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Ulen Company requested the governor-general of 
Ahvaz to arrest ringleaders of the strike. Touraj Atabaki, “Missing Labour in the 
Metanarratives of Practicing Modernity in Iran: Labour Agency in Refashioning the 
Discourse of Social Development,” in David Mayer and Jürgen eds., Interventions: The 
Impact of Labour Movements on Social and Cultural Development (Wien: International 
Conference of Labour and Social History—ITH, Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2013), 
186. 
324 COWI Archives, Olsen. “Storm Over Mellemøsten,” 57. Although Olsen states that 
Kampsax made sure that contractors paid workers regularly and deducted workers’ 
salaries from the contractors’ accounts if they did not, the effectiveness of this measure is 
questionable given the number of workers’ complaints regarding non-payment. I was 
unable to find any records left by the claims department at COWI Archives.  
325 Nuri, Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Taqaza-ye maldaran va ʿamalejat-e khatt-e kenar-e deh 
now baraye pardakht-e hoquq (ML9/118/33/57),” 223, “Taqaza-ye pardakht-e hoquq-e 
ʿamalegi dar jaddeh-ye shahi (ML10/186/34/16),” 225, and “Taqaza-ye pardakht-e 
hoquq-e ʿaqabmandeh-ye motasaddi-ye jaddeh-ye alasht (ML8/32/32/37),” 255-6. 
326 Nuri, Asnad-e Mazandaran, “Shekvaiyeh-ye mobasher-e rah ahan az ekhrajesh 
tavassot-e kampsaks (MA9/118/33/67),” 271-2, IOR/L/PS/12/3400/PZ850, Khuzestan 
Diary, 16 August to 20 October, No. 8, 1933, IOR/L/PS/3400/PZ4613, Khuzestan Diary, 
May 1934. 
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occupation, in desperation, laborers handed a petition letter to the manager of Kampsax 
who was passing their area, asking him to provide them at least bread, if not salary.327 
 
 
(Figure 4.6) A protest in the workers’ camp near Keshvar, Lorestan. COWI Archives, 
Album F57b, p. 125. Although the nationalities of the protestors are unclear, some of 
them seem to be wearing the Pahlavi hat, which was required for Iranian men between 
1926 and 1935. Others seem to be wearing a fedora or a flat cap, a common headwear 
among Turks after the abolition of fez by Mustafa Kemal in 1925. 
 
Conclusion 
Newly constructed railways touched heterogeneous local communities unevenly. This 
chapter has discussed primarily Lorestan, Khuzestan, Mazandaran, and Tehran to provide 
                                                
327 COWI Archives, Olsen. “Storm Over Mellemøsten”, 68. 
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snapshots of both settled and nomadic rural communities in the process of 
transformations brought about by the development of transportation infrastructure. While 
the experiences of Mazandarani construction laborers, Tehrani landowners, and Lor and 
Arab tribes differed significantly, what tied them together was the increasing level of 
engagement with various state- and non-state entities such as the Majles, ministries, the 
ʿadliyeh court, municipal governments, foreign workers, and contractors under Kampsax 
supervision. Through petitioning to various branches of the government, protesting on 
construction sites, manipulating practices of new players in rural Iran, and even 
kidnapping, inhabitants along the routes operated from within evolving power relations in 
the daily practices of rural Iran. Even such confrontational actions as kidnapping and 
protests were not simple expressions of resistance to the state intrusion into their lives. 
Rather, they were embedded in the continuous practice of resituating themselves in the 
evolving relationships among various branches of the state, local inhabitants, and 
contractors. True, local inhabitants failed to acquire what they hoped for more often than 
not. Yet, their politics of engagement may have normalized the existence of state- and 
non-state institutions in their minds. Despite the lack of a standardized procedure, 
petitioning various branches of the state became increasingly routinized for local 
inhabitants, who had to file petitions repeatedly to navigate through the emerging 
bureaucracy. Likewise, the daily presence of foreign workers shaped the demands that 
Iranians expressed, as Iranian workers petitioned using the language of patriotism versus 
favoritism toward foreigners. As these examples indicate, local inhabitants along railways 
and roads developed an intimate understanding of the expanding role of the state, the new 
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practices of foreign contractors and workers, and their rights as Iranians and limitations to 
those rights by engaging constantly with various political and economic entities of rural 



















Chapter 5: Mobilizing Railway Workers 
 
Introduction 
“What interested me most while working for this company (the Iranian State Railway) 
was our contribution during World War Two in advancing the Allies’ cause and gaining 
the title ‘the victory bridge (pol-e piruzi).’”328 This was the statement of Shahbaz Javadi, 
a fifty-year-old railway repair factory worker, referring to the use of the Trans-Iranian 
Railway by the Allies during the occupation from 1941 to 1945. Less than two decades 
before, Javadi, who came from a little village in Semnan Province, worked as a petty 
vendor in and around Mashhad yet continued to look for an opportunity in technical 
fields. His life changed dramatically when railway construction started in the wilderness 
by the Caspian Sea in 1928. The wilderness became the northern terminus called Bandar-
e Shah during a decade of his life as a railway construction worker in the north. He was 
eventually transferred to the repair factory in Tehran, joining the cadre of semi-skilled 
workers of the railway industry.  
Javadi was only one of the thousands of workers the course of whose lives 
changed drastically as a result of their employment in the nascent railway industry. 
During the second quarter of the twentieth century, in addition to the Lor laborers who 
were discussed in Chapter Four, sedentarized Iranians in urban centers and frontier 
provinces also joined the workforce en masse. By mid-twentieth century, the construction 
                                                
328 “Kargaran-e rah ahan ra beshenasid (Shahbaz Javadi),” Mardan-e Ruz, February 27, 
1946. 
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and operation of the Trans-Iranian Railway created the largest industrial workforce in 
Iran outside the oil industry. In addition to skilled and unskilled construction workers and 
a small number of engineers, a large number of workers had to be employed for operation 
and maintenance by the Railway Organization (bongah-e rah ahan), which was 
established in 1935 as a state institution to manage Iran’s railways under The Ministry of 
Roads. By early 1945, thanks to the increased need to transport goods and personnel 
during World War II, the Railway Organization maintained 36,000 employees, making 
the railway industry the largest state-owned industry in Iran.329 Even after a massive 
downsizing following the end of the Allied occupation and the subsequent decrease in 
demand, the organization retained approximately 24,000 employees.330 Thus, while oil 
workers were concentrated in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, the railway 
industry fostered the growth of a workforce in strategically important provinces all along 
the expanding railway network, including Azarbaijan, Mazandaran, Lorestan, and 
Khuzestan.  
 While the previous chapter included discussions of construction laborers in rural 
Iran, this chapter focuses more on workers who emerged after the opening of sections of 
the Trans-Iranian Railway in the early 1930a, including workers at repair factories, 
depots, and stations. As I will discuss in the next section, studies of the oil industry, 
especially Touraj Atabaki’s scholarship, provide important parallels and connections to 
                                                
329 Malakuti, Rah Ahan-e Iran, 66. 
330 Ibid, 67. 
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the formation of the railway workforce.331  Furthermore, rather than focusing on the 
formation of workers through overt political actions such as protests and strikes alone, 
this chapter is informed by scholarship on labor that considers the discursive construction 
of the “working class” by taking into consideration workers’ social settings.332 
Through discussions of the backgrounds of railway workers, their socialization 
process, and their quest for improving living and working conditions, it examines how 
the large railway workforce came into being as a group that shared specific experiences 
and goals by the end of the 1940s. The arguments of this chapter are twofold. First, 
contrary to existing scholarship’s emphasis on the role of the Pahlavi state in creating the 
first generation of railway workers, I argue that early railway workers were often mobile 
populations who had gained industrial experience prior to the Trans-Iranian Railway 
project. Therefore, rather than discussing labor formation in the Iranian railway industry 
within a national framework, we need to take into consideration transnational flows of 
labor that were not necessarily contingent on the policies of the Pahlavi state. Second, 
railway workers’ demands developed concomitantly with the Railway Organization’s 
increasingly comprehensive strategies to regulate workers’ lives. In other words, the 
Railway Organization did not simply impose disciplinary measures on its workers. 
Rather, the disciplinary measures were shaped in conjunction with various expressions of 
discontent among railway workers. 
                                                
331 For a general study of labor in Iran prior to the Allied occupation, see Floor, Labor & 
Industry in Iran. 
332 For instance, Atabaki, "From ʿAmaleh (Labor) to Kargar (Worker).” 
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Origins of Railway Workers 
The few accounts of the Trans-Iranian Railway published in Persian do not discuss the 
employees of the Railway Organization in detail. With regard to upper-echelon 
employees such as Iranian railway engineers, these accounts start with the dispatching of 
students to Europe at the start of the Reza Shah period.333 In terms of the birth of rank-
and-file railway workers, they begin with the establishment of various technical schools 
to train railway workers, such as the Railway Technical School (honarestan-e rah ahan) 
in 1936.334 Although these discussions encapsulate the Pahlavi state’s efforts to gradually 
indigenize the workforce, they omit other stories that do not fit the narrative of the Trans-
Iranian Railway as a Pahlavi state project to build the nation. In contrast to these 
approaches, this section resituates Iran in the broader region of Russia, the Caucasus, 
Anatolia, India, and Iraq, and considers the mobility of non-state actors. 
 Employees of the Railway Organization included not only managers and 
engineers but also workers of various skill levels who came from extremely diverse 
backgrounds. This section discusses the origins of the diverse employees, especially 
rank-and-file workers, in order to elucidate the increased geographical and 
socioeconomic mobility of both Iranians and non-Iranians fostered by the railway system. 
As this section demonstrates, the movement of workers occurred provincially, nationally, 
                                                
333 For instance, see Mahbubi-Ardakani, Tarikh-e Moʿassesat, p. 381 and Malakuti, Rah 
Ahan-e Iran, 195. 
334 Mahbubi-Ardakani, Tarikh-e Moʿassesat, pp. 383-5 and Malakuti, Rah Ahan-e Iran, 
202-8.  
 171 
and transnationally. Furthermore, the movement was not limited to Iran sending students 
to Europe and European engineers with expertise coming to Iran. The movement of labor 
between Iran and its surrounding countries played an important part in forming the first 
generation of Iranian railway workers. 
The significance of Iran’s surrounding countries applies even to high-echelon 
employees of the Railway Organization. Although many of the first generation of Iranian 
high-level managers and engineers received training in Europe, others gained work 
experience in Russia and the Ottoman Empire. For instance, Parviz Bahman, the head of 
the Railway Organization between 1935 and 1936, was born in Tabriz in 1874 as the 
great grandson of Abbas Mirza. After spending his adolescent years in Russia, he 
proceeded to the Engineering College of St. Petersburg. Upon completing his education, 
he worked on railway construction in Russia and the Ottoman Empire until its 
dissolution, before returning to Iran in 1924.335 As this case indicates, due to the absence 
of opportunities within Iran, the small cadre of the first generation of Iranian technocratic 
leaders received training and gained experience abroad, especially in neighboring Russia 
and Anatolia rather than Europe and the United States, where students from the early 
Pahlavi era were later dispatched. 
When the Majles ratified the Railway Act in 1927, the number of Iranian 
professionals who were qualified to run the Iranian Railway Organization was utterly 
                                                
335 See “Ro‘asa-ye sabeq-e rah ahan ra beshenasid,” Mardan-e Ruz, April 24, 1946. For 
a similar biography of a younger Tabrizi gaining higher education in Istanbul (and 
Germany) in the 1910s, see “Karmandan-e rah ahan ra beshenasid (mohandes-e 
taherzadeh behzad),” Mardan-e Ruz, February 27, 1946. 
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inadequate. Thus, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Iranian government had no choice 
but to employ a number of Europeans and Americans as surveyors, engineers, and 
clerical staff.336 To solve this problem, the Pahlavi state attempted to train a new 
generation of Iranian civil engineers, particularly railway engineers, by sending students 
abroad.337 Like earlier generations, the new generation mostly came from prominent 
aristocratic and clerical families. Unlike the older generation, after graduating from such 
schools as the Alborz School and Dar al-Fonun, they received higher education and 
training in Europe and the United States, including the Department of Transportation in 
Pennsylvania.338 By the late 1940s, and to the chagrin of European and American 
engineers who considered the young Iranians too inexperienced and lacking technical 
                                                
336 The composition of European and American employees changed during the 1920s 
and 1930s. When the German-American railway syndicate managed the construction 
from 1927, eighty-two Germans and thirty-seven Americans were employed as 
professionals under the railway syndicate. After 1933, when Kampsax, the Danish 
consortium, took over the supervision of the construction, Scandinavians, as well as 
Swiss and Germans, came to dominate the positions. IOR/L/PS/12/3455, “Foreigners 
employed in Persian government service, either directly under contract with the Majlis, or 
indirectly with the National Bank or under the Railway Syndicate,” from R. H. Clive to 
Arthur Henderson, October 3, 1929. For a German entrepreneur's involvement that 
influenced the Iranian government's decision to hire German railway experts, see Rashid 
Armin Khatib-Shahidi. German Foreign Policy towards Iran before World War II: 
Political Relations, Economic Influence and the National Bank of Persia (London and 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 47-50. 
337 For instance, between 1929 and 1932, the Ministry of Roads sent sixty-nine students 
to the West to study railway engineering. See David Menashri, Education and the 
Making of Modern Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 125. 
338 “Karmandan-e rah ahan ra beshenasid (Ibrahim Ruhi),” Mardan-e Ruz, January 23, 
1946, “Karmandan-e rah ahan ra beshenasid (Hosayn Hasheminezhad),” Mardan-e Ruz, 
February 6, 1946, “Karmandan-e rah ahan ra beshenasid (doktor Taba),” Mardan-e Ruz, 
February 20, 1946, “Karmandan-e rah ahan ra beshenasid (Khosrow Hedayat),” Mardan-
e Ruz, March 20, 1946.  
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knowledge, managerial positions of the Iranian Railway Organization were dominated by 
young Iranian technocrats in their thirties and forties. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, thousands of skilled foreign workers from various 
parts of Europe comprised a large percentage among workers on construction sites. As 
was the case with the oil industry, the Pahlavi state did not conceal its desire to 
indigenize the workforce.339 The Iranian government pressured foreign construction 
companies. For instance, the 1929 notification issued to the American Ulen Company 
read, “Only Persian subjects are eligible for jobs and contracts in the Railway. Should 
Persians not be available to fill up technical appointments then foreigners will be engaged 
but not without special permission first being obtained from the Governor-General (of 
Khuzestan).”340 
While pressuring foreign companies, the Pahlavi state attempted to indigenize low 
and middle echelon employees, including drivers and various types of mechanics and 
technicians. From the early 1930s, the central state began training children in recently 
suppressed tribal areas such as Turkoman children in Bandar Shah.341 The number of 
students in these technical schools was modest at the beginning. There were only seventy 
                                                
339 For the tensions between the Danish consortium’s lack of interest in indigenizing the 
workforce and the Pahlavi state’s desire to Iranize the operations from a business history 
perspective, see Andersen, “Building for the Shah.” 
340 IOR/L/PS/11/290. Consul for Khuzistan, Ahwaz Diary, No. 10, October 1929. 
341 Rudi Matthee, “Transforming Dangerous Nomads into Useful Artisans, Technicians, 
Agriculturalists,” in Stephanie Cronin ed., The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society 
under Reza Shah, 1921-1941 (London: Routeledge, 2003), 132. 
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students in Bandar Shah, thirty-one in Tehran, and forty seven in Khorramabad.342 A 
limited number of students also received training in Europe in such areas as driving. They 
were, however, at least in the eyes of European and American engineers, utterly 
incompetent, particularly given the need to operate the railway system in the difficult 
mountainous terrains that the Trans-Iranian Railway penetrated compared to the 
comparatively flat terrains of some European railway systems.343   
Among foreign workers, Indians comprised a significant force. India had a history 
of exporting its abundant labor force to the Persian Gulf region.344 For instance, Indian 
railway workers played a significant role in the functioning, maintenance, and 
administration of railways in Iraq until the 1920s due to the lack of trained Iraqi staff.345 
Throughout the 1920s during the mandate period, however, Iraq reduced its reliance on 
Indian workers, eliminating contracts with both skilled and unskilled Indian workers.346 
Although no evidence exists to connect Indian labor migration directly from Iraq to Iran, 
                                                
342 Ibid. 
343 As was the case with the oil industry, European engineers frequently complained 
about the perceived incompetence of Iranian “boys.” For instance, see 
IOR/L/PS/12/3409. From Lacy Baggallay to Lord Marquess, September 21, 1931, 
“Persia: Progress of the North to South Trunk Railway,” and IOR/L/PS/12/3404. From H. 
M. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Sir Samuel Hoare, October 24, 1935.  
344 Stefan Tetzlaff, “The Turn of the Gulf Tide: Empire, Nationalism, and South Asian 
Labor Migration to Iraq, c. 1900-1935,” International Labor and Working-Class History 
79 (Spring 2011): 7-27. 
345 Ibid., 15. 
346 “The Iraq railways, for example, reduced their subordinate staff of skilled and 
unskilled labor, many of whom were Indians, from 26,120 to 304 between 1920 and 
1931.” Ibid., 21. 
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many Indians, along with some Iraqis, filled positions in the Iranian railway industry 
when their employment opportunities in Iraq were diminishing.  
After the Trans-Iranian Railway construction started in the late 1920s, the demand 
for qualified industrial workers, as well as locomotive engineers, increased. Thus, due to 
the lack of qualified Iranian personnel, recruiting Indian and Iraqi drivers, clerks, 
mechanics, and other necessary personnel became an urgent need for Iran’s nascent 
railway system.347 The recruitment process occurred through the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (the Anglo-Persian Oil Company prior to 1935) and Iranian consulates in India. 
In theory, the AIOC was in charge of putting qualified drivers in touch with Iranian 
consulates in India. Then Iranian consulates were to work in liaison with the Ministry of 
Finance to get approval for the employment of foreign drivers. For the AIOC, which was 
under pressure from the Iranian government to progressively eliminate non-Iranian labor, 
Iran’s necessity to recruit Indians for the railway system would strengthen their claim that 
the oil industry, like the railway industry, still needed a large number of foreign 
workers.348  
By the late 1930s, however, Indian and Iraqi personnel, especially locomotive 
engineers, had become aware of the disadvantages of working for the Iranian Railway 
Organization. Consequently, “most of the Parsee drivers originally engaged” had left, 
unless they had arrears of payment due to them.349 The 1937 recruitment attempts aimed 
                                                
347 IOR/L/PS/11/290. Consul for Khuzestan, Ahwaz Diary, No. 2, February 1929. 
348 IOR/L/PJ/7/1904. From Nevile Butler to Lord Marquess, April 8, 1938. 
349 Ibid.  
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at Iraqi locomotive engineers failed miserably with only one or two successful 
contracts.350 The most pressing issue was the difficulty with remittance partially due to 
the control of currency exchange by the Iranian state and the overvaluing of the rial in the 
official exchange rate.351 Furthermore, locomotive engineers faced constant blackmailing 
by repair-shop workers, who took advantage of the penalty system in order to supplement 
their meager income. In this system, the Railway Organization fined locomotive 
engineers when engines required repair due to the alleged fault of the engineer. It 
necessitated locomotive engineers to bribe repair-shop workers to avoid both authentic 
and inauthentic accusations made against them.352 To alleviate the problems and attract 
Indian labor, one third of their 1,400-1,500 riyal of monthly salary was paid out in 
rupees, and Indians were to receive a free deck passage from India, free medical care, and 
allowances for rent.353 As the comparatively favorable deal offered to Indian locomotive 
engineers suggests, the Iranian State Railway desperately needed to hire foreign drivers 
precisely because of the highly specialized skill required to drive a train. 
In other mechanical and technical jobs such as carpentry, blacksmithing, welding, 
and so forth, however, the Iranian State Railway could employ a larger number of Iranian 
workers in addition to foreign workers, because skills and expertise required in these jobs 
were not as specific to the railway industry as driving was. Therefore, in these fields, it 
                                                
350 Ibid. 
351 Encyclopedia Iranica. Commerce vii. In the Pahlavi and post-Pahlavi periods. 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/commerce-vii (retrieved on March 24, 2014) 
352 IOR/L/PJ/7/1904. From Nevile Butler to Lord Marquess, April 8, 1938. 
353 IOR/L/PJ/7/1904. From Nevile Butler to Lord Marquess, June 1938. 
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seems that the construction and operation of the Trans-Iranian Railway in its early days 
relied not only on foreign workers from Europe and Iran's neighbors but also on workers 
who had gained relevant work experience in other minor railway systems in Iran and the 
oil industry in Khuzestan.  
A series of articles published in Mardan-e Ruz, the newspaper of the Railway 
Organization, gives a glimpse of the origins of these first railway workers who started to 
work in railway construction and operation in the late 1920s and the 1930s. The series 
was called “Know the Workers of the Railway (Kargaran-e rah ahan ra beshenasid),” 
printed in 1946, to introduce the lives and aspirations of ordinary railway workers to 
readers, most of whom were railway employees and their families (Table 5.1).354 Twenty-
six of these mini biographies from the series were available for this research. Admittedly, 
the number of samples is not sufficient to make a conclusive argument. Also, many of the 
employees featured in the series were in their forties and fifties and occupied supervising 
positions as foremen and masters (ostad) within particular units or divisions of railway-
related factories. Thus, they were generally characterized as examples for less 
experienced, newer employees who joined the Railway Organization during the Allied 
                                                
354 The name of the series was changed to "Payehha-ye pol-e piruzi ra beshenasid 
(Know the foundations of the Victory Bridge)" in September, 1946. Overall, the series 
was intended as a way to focus less on prominent white-collar employees (karmandan) of 
the Railway Organization and reach out to workers (kargaran) to make the newspaper 
truly relevant to all employees (karkonan). "Safheh-ye vizheh-ye kargaran," Mardan-e 
Ruz, January 2, 1946. 
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Occupation between 1941-45.355 Yet, the samples still allow us to get a sense of common 
life trajectories among early railway workers who joined the nascent railway industry 
during the interwar period. 
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 (Table 5.1) Backgrounds of Iranian railway workers. Based on twenty-six articles 
"Kargaran-e rah ahan ra beshenasid," in Mardan-e Ruz, 1946. Divisions of the Railway 
Organization at the time included North, Tehran, Arak, and South. Workers in the North 
Division lived in Bandar Shah, and those in the South Division lived in Ahvaz. The 
birthplaces of two workers (indicated by asterisk) were not mentioned in the interviews, 
but considering that they started to work in Azarbaijan and Khuzestan respectively when 
they were around fifteen years old, I inferred that they were originally from these regions. 
 
The articles were based either on oral interviews or written answers to 
questionnaires. Except for one driving instructor, all workers were mechanics and 
technicians with various specialties such as wagons, locomotives, and boilers. Unlike the 
organization's managers and engineers in the same period, most came from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Of the twenty workers who mentioned their fathers' 
occupations in the interviews, seven came from peasant families. Others came from 
various lower socioeconomic family backgrounds, including craftsmen, merchants, 
bakers, and laborers.  
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The lack of formal education and the experience of child labor were also 
indicative of their lower socioeconomic backgrounds compared to the managers and 
engineers of the Railway Organization. Only six of them had primary education, and 
three attended school after the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1926. Some of 
them were illiterate, and one interviewee, Mohammad Jalilzadeh of a North-Division 
factory in Bandar Shah, mentioned that he often asked his children to read such 
newspapers as Mardan-e Ruz, the Railway Organization's newspaper, and Rahbar, a 
Tudeh newspaper.356 Two others mentioned acquiring literacy through adult classes in 
Persian offered by the Railway Organization.357 
The life stories and previous work experiences of these individuals from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds illuminate how the first generation of railway workers 
emerged. For workers from northwestern Iran, the proximity to Turkey and Russia and 
the Russian-built Tabriz-Jolfa Railway provided opportunities for exposure to industrial 
work before the Trans-Iranian Railway project.358 Among the twenty-six workers, eight 
of them came from Azari-speaking regions in the northwest such as Tabriz and Ardabil, 
                                                
356 "Kargaran-e rah ahan ra beshenasid," Mardan-e Ruz, July 10, 1946. His choice of 
newspapers was in stark contrast with the nationalist newspapers that the technical 
consultant of the Railway Organization listed as his favorites other than Mardan-e Ruz, 
such as Mehr-e Iran, Khavar, Ettela'at, Ettelaʿat-e Haftegi, and Setareh. "Karmandan-e 
rah ahan ra beshenasid," Mardan-e Ruz, February 27, 1946. 
357 "Kargaran-e rah ahan ra beshenasid," Mardan-e Ruz, May 1, 1946, and May 8, 1946. 
358 Just like the British constructed railways in Iranian frontiers such as Dozdab 
(present-day Zahedan) in the southeast and Bushehr-Borazjan in the south during World 
War One, Russians completed a railway from its borders to the province of Azarbaijan. 
IOR/L/PS/18/193, Memorandum Regarding the Policy of His Majesty’s Government 
towards Persia at the Peace Conference, 17-18. 
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to which the first railway line did not even extend.359 Most other workers came from 
areas in which the Trans-Iranian Railway operated, such as Khuzestan, Tehran, and 
Mazandaran. The overrepresentation of workers from Azari-speaking regions during the 
interwar period, despite the absence of railway lines there until the 1940s, suggests the 
existence of the industrial workforce in northwestern Iran prior to the Pahlavi period.360 
Five of them worked either for Russian-owned businesses in northern Iran or in the 
Caucasus or Turkey prior to joining the railway industry. For instance, Mohammad 
Jalilzadeh from Sarab, a small city between Tabriz and Ardabil, moved to Russia in 1916 
when he was ten years old to escape wartime poverty in Iran and worked there as a 
laborer (ʿamaleh). After becoming a foreman (sar ʿamaleh) in Russia, he returned to Iran 
in 1934 to work on the Trans-Iranian Railway construction as a blacksmith.361 Three of 
the interviewees from northwestern Iran worked for the Tabriz-Jolfa Railway, whose 
construction by Russia started in 1913 and finished in 1915, prior to moving to the Trans-
Iranian Railway. For instance, after learning to become a chauffeur in Azarbaijan, Bala 
Fuladsaz went to the Ottoman Empire to work for the Anatolian Railway in 1911 before 
                                                
359 "Kargaran-e rah ahan ra beshenasid," Mardan-e Ruz, January 16, 1946, February 6, 
1946, May 1, 1946, June 19, 1946, July 10, 1946, August 4, 1946, September 11, 1946, 
and September 18, 1946. 
360 For temporary workers from northwestern Iran in the Russian Empire, see Touraj 
Atabaki, "Disgruntled Guests: Iranian Subaltern on the Margins of the Russian Empire," 
International Review of Social History 48 (2003): 401-426. Atabaki discusses workers 
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his employment by the Tabriz-Jolfa Railway under construction in 1914.362 As these 
examples suggest, the mobility of children from poor families allowed them to have 
industrial work experience in neighboring regions outside Iran before the Trans-Iranian 
Railway project. When the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway started in the late 
1920s, these workers joined the rank of semi-skilled Iranian workers. 
Some workers even acquired the crucial skill of locomotive driving in Russia, 
which afforded upward social mobility. Hosayn Sayyar, a locomotive-engineer trainer in 
the Tehran Division, worked in agriculture from age seven to seventeen in his native 
Tabriz before moving to the Russian Empire in 1911 to acquire technical skills. He 
worked for a silver-making factory in Vladikavkaz in Ossetia for three years before 
returning to Iran to work for the Tabriz-Jolfa Railway as a switchman, and then a 
conductor. After turning twenty five, he started to take private lessons in Persian and 
Russian. Then, he moved to the Soviet Union and received a diploma in driving from the 
Russian Railway. Afterwards, he returned to Iran in 1925 to work for the Tabriz-Jolfa 
Railway, which the Soviet Union ceded to the Iranian government based on a 1921 treaty. 
He joined the Trans-Iranian Railway in 1931 and became a driving instructor, whose 
monthly salary of approximately 4,700 rials was significantly above other industrial 
workers in the mid-1940s.363 As Sayyar's example indicates, the nascent railway industry 
in Iran was supported by mobile labor of northwestern Iran that frequently crossed 
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borders for educational and employment opportunities, which in turn encouraged those 
on the socioeconomic fringes to make an economically upward move.  
While railway systems in the Caucasus and Anatolia gave migrant workers from 
northwestern Iran exposure to industrial work, APOC was the gateway to industrial work 
for early railway workers in southern Iran. Among the twenty-six interviewed workers, 
eleven of them worked in Ahvaz, where the headquarters of the South Division was 
located. Most of them were from Khuzestan, especially Ahvaz and Dezful, with the 
exceptions of two Isfahanis and one from Chahar Mahal Bakhtiyari. Nine of them, all in 
their forties and fifties, started to work for the APOC in the 1910s as teenagers and 
gained experience as mechanics before joining the railway industry.364 For example, 
Baqer Simkesh of the South Division was born in Isfahan around 1902 to a poor family 
of a baker. At the age of seven, he started to work in Isfahani bazaar workshops in filing 
and engraving to acquire skills. He moved to Tehran after several years to work at the 
mint, and then at an arsenal. He later moved to Khuzestan to work for the APOC as a 
mechanic. He continued to work there until he joined railway construction in 1931 in 
building tunnels of the south line. A life trajectory such as Simkesh's is consistent with 
Touraj Atabaki's finding that the workforce of the APOC expanded in the 1910s and 
started to employ those from such cities as Dezful and Isfahan, which did not lie in the 
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immediate vicinities of APOC operations.365 Like Simkesh, during a decade or more of 
their work experience at the APOC, workers gained necessary skills and expertise as 
mechanics and technicians. Some even received formal training at the APOC. For 
example, Neʾmatollah Movaffaq, whose father was a carpenter employed by the APOC, 
began his training at the technical school of the APOC as a twelve-year old boy in 1915 
and continued working in the oil company until 1931.366 As these examples indicate, 
many early railway workers in southern Iran had gained industrial experience prior to the 
railway project in the oil industry during the 1910s and 1920s, in some cases moving 
between oil and railway industries multiple times depending on employment 
opportunities.367  
In short, in both northern and southern Iran, the nascent railway industry hinged 
upon not only foreign workers but also indigenous workers who had gained experience 
with industrial work in and outside Iran before the 1920s. The geographical mobility of 
these workers also corresponded to their upward social mobility, too, as many of them 
experienced their gradual transformation from unskilled construction laborers to semi-
skilled or skilled mechanics who specialized in a particular division of the railway 
industry. Therefore, the life trajectories among these workers were parallel to those of 
tribal construction workers, who were unskilled and often temporary, as is discussed in 
Chapter Four. Although no conclusive evidence exists, it is probable that some tribal 
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construction workers in such areas as Lorestan and Khuzestan made similar 
transformations as the workers discussed here. 
Yet, physical mobility was not guaranteed for everybody. A 1930 petition 
submitted to the Commission of Petitions (komisiyun-e ʿarayez-e majles-e shura-ye melli) 
shed light on how an employer could hinder its employees' move to a better-paid 
position. The petition was submitted by a seventeen-year old mechanic employed at the 
factory of the Belgian-owned Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim tramway. In 1927, the Ministry of 
Public Works (vezarat-e favayed-e ʿammeh) notified him about an opportunity to move to 
the Azarbaijan Railway (Tabriz-Jolfa-Sharafkhaneh), which was run by the Iranian state 
after being ceded from the Soviet Union in 1921. His request for a transfer was denied by 
the Belgian president of the tramway company, although the petition did not specify the 
exact reason for this decision. Instead, the company gave him a slight raise in salary in 
order to keep him. In 1929, he asked again for a transfer authorization from the company, 
hoping for a tripled salary at the German-American railway syndicate that had started 
construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway. Again, the company refused to authorize his 
move to the syndicate. Probably in the hope of dragging the Majles into this minor 
dispute between an employer and an employee, he concluded the petition by stressing the 
financial benefit for the railway project of employing him in the syndicate, in comparison 
with foreign mechanics whose salary would amount to four times as much as his.368 
Although no further reports about this case are available, it indicates that mechanics at 
the declining tramway company also tried to move to better-paid positions in the Trans-
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Iranian Railway project. It also indicates the likelihood that the tramway company was 
highly concerned about the possible drain of its workers to greener pastures and rejected 
requests from employees as a way to retain the workforce with a minimal raise in salary. 
As this section discussed, the Trans-Iranian Railway project was not the first 
exposure to industrial work for many early railway workers. Some came to Iran from 
neighboring regions, especially India and Iraq. This is similar to the role of early workers 
in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, who sometimes came from India, Persian Gulf ports, 
and the Ottoman Empire.369 Aside from foreign workers, many Iranian workers came 
from regions where opportunities for industrial work existed for children of impoverished 
families in the chaotic years of World War One. Others relocated, sometimes multiple 
times, crossing borders. They started out as unskilled workers in existing industries, 
among which the Tabriz-Jolfa Railway and the APOC were the most prominent 
employers. Therefore, the Trans-Iranian Railway project contributed to the increased 
socioeconomic and geographic mobility of unskilled laborers. The next section will 
discuss the socialization process of these workers from heterogeneous backgrounds. 
 
Making of the Iranian Railway Workforce 
As examined in Chapter Four, the Trans-Iranian Railway project created mobile Iranian 
construction laborers, which in turn fostered interaction not only amongst themselves but 
also with foreign workers and various state- and quasi-state institutions. Through such 
interactions, former nomads and peasants such as the Papi tribe were socialized into the 
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world of construction workers and possibly formulated various demands vis-à-vis the 
state and the railway consortium.  
This process of socialization occurred more intensively at new workplaces that 
were created since the 1935 establishment of the Railway Organization, including repair 
factories, depots, and stations. In this period, socialization outside the workplace became 
important since the Organization established numerous recreational facilities in railway 
workers’ communities outside major urban centers. Thus, compared to construction sites 
of the 1930s, socialization of workers generally took place in the space provided by the 
Railway Organization. In this sense, the employer played a much larger role in molding 
workers into disciplined members of the railway industry. Yet, as will be discussed, 
workers were not simply disciplined into loyal employees of the Railway Organization 
through the media of socialization provided by their employer. Rather, the Organization 
developed its culture in a discursive process, with the participation of competing groups 
of employees whose interests conflicted with the Organization as well as amongst 
themselves. 
When the Allies invaded Iran in September 1941, they took control of Iranian 
transportation routes, including harbors, railways, and highways, to transport provisions 
from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet Union. While Soviet forces controlled railway lines 
that lay north of Tehran, British forces initially controlled lines that lay south of Tehran 
until American forces took over at the beginning of 1943. As mentioned in Chapter Four, 
the Allied control of transportation routes and the subsequent restrictions on civilian 
traffic severely disrupted the economy and transport of food and other daily consumption 
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items, causing inflation and famine throughout the occupation period. In fact, the cost of 
living multiplied more than sevenfold between 1939 and 1944.370 This rapid inflation hit 
the salaried class of railway workers hard, as increases in their salary could not keep up 
with the rapidity of inflation. For the majority of railway workers, making ends meet 
became extremely difficult, raising expectations for the improvement of economic 
conditions after the occupation. 
The coming of the Allies also impacted the composition of railway workers 
significantly during the war. Soldiers of the Allied Forces, including those from India, 
were deployed all along the transportation routes that connected the Persian Gulf to the 
Caspian Sea and began working along with existing Iranian railway workers. Once the 
occupation started, it quickly became clear that the approximately 8,000 Railway 
Organization employees at the time were insufficient to operate the Trans-Iranian 
Railway, whose transportation capacity multiplied thanks to the massive construction 
projects undertaken by the Allies.371 The urgent need for workers in the railway sector led 
to the employment of thousands of Iranians. No available evidence tells much about how 
these newly employed Iranians and others were socialized in the workplace during the 
occupation. Yet, the condition of workers at the American-controlled truck assembly 
factories in Khorramshahr and Andimeshk as well as truck drivers discussed below, is 
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likely to have resembled the condition of the railway repair factories and depots built 
during the Allied occupation.  
 The two American-controlled factories were General Motors’ factories prior to 
the American arrival to Iran in 1943. They employed over 5,000 workers, or 
approximately one in seven civilian employees of the Persian Gulf Command of the 
United States.372 Iranians from various religious and ethnic groups comprised the vast 
majority, but a small number of non-Iranian citizens also found employment there, 
including “Iraqis, Afghans, Armenians, Egyptians, Arabians, Sudanese, and Indians as 
well as others.”373 Although having a diverse workforce served its purpose on such 
occasions as Ramadan, during which Armenians worked on the day shift and Muslims on 
the night shift, assembly lines did not mix different groups of Iranians such as Arabs and 
Armenians with Persian-speaking Muslim Iranians.374 Thus, similar to railway 
construction sites, in order to minimize religious and ethnic tensions, factories in the 
transportation sector during the occupation era maintained the division of labor among 
religious and ethnic groups. 
 In addition to the tensions among diverse groups, the lack of experienced 
personnel posed an urgent problem to ensure the successful transport of provisions, 
which was exacerbated by the lack of a common language between most Iranians and the 
Allies. The Motor Transport Service of Americans established three courses to train 
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Iranian truck drivers as promptly as possible, but the task was too time-consuming. To 
expedite the process, Iranian truck drivers and other semi-skilled workers, including 
mechanics, blacksmiths, and bricklayers, often received “on the job” training375 
Consequently, a number of less qualified personnel had to fill the positions in the 
transportation sector to meet the urgent needs of the war. Therefore, when the end of the 
European war grew near, the motor transport sector faced major issues of a divided 
workforce and the lack of qualified personnel.  
Similar to the motor transport sector, having a large number of unqualified 
workers could seriously compromise the safety of the Iranian State Railway, too, since 
the end of the occupation meant that Allied soldiers who operated the railways during the 
occupation would be gone. While celebrating the imminent departure of occupiers, the 
Railway Organization had to prepare itself to tackle the issue of the lack of experienced 
railway workers. Like the new truck drivers, many new railway workers who started 
during the Allied occupation seriously lacked proper training and basic knowledge of 
railway technology. Therefore, the Organization needed to expand opportunities for 
proper training urgently, despite the budget cuts resulting from the decline of railway 
traffic by the end of the war.376 Training Iranian employees turned out to be difficult, 
however. According to one article of Mardan-e Ruz, the problem of many Iranian railway 
workers was their lack of previous exposure to technology prior to employment. Unlike 
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European and American workers who were accustomed to being surrounded by 
technologies from childhood, Iranian workers often had absolutely no exposure to the 
smallest and simplest gadgets and had to learn how to use each of them after gaining 
employment as railway workers. Even more problematically, many did not have basic 
literacy, which significantly hindered learning.377 
To make matters worse, once the war was over, the Organization no longer 
needed as many employees. There was no need to transport provisions to the Soviet 
Union, and highways became open to civilian traffic once again, both of which led to the 
decline of railway traffic. The Railway Organization immediately responded by 
downsizing, the result of which was the massive layoff of approximately 12,000 
employees, or one third of its workforce between 1945 and 1946. The Organization also 
encouraged employees to take up positions elsewhere, most notably in the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company, which had signed an agreement to hire qualified employees of the Railway 
Organization. Since both the oil industry and the railway industry had a wide range of 
operations, the positions that opened up for employees of the Railway Organization were 
comprehensive. They included accountants, blacksmiths, chemists, mechanics, sanitation 
investigators, teachers, cooking teachers, dentists, surgeons, pharmacists, nurses, 
architects, telegraph operators, and so forth.378 Nevertheless, the vast majority of the 
12,000 laid-off employees were unable to find comparable jobs.  
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Those who remained in the Organization were also extremely underpaid. In fact, 
even many of the comparatively well-paid employees introduced in “Know the Workers 
of the Railway” noted their destitution and their struggle to support a large family with a 
modest monthly income of mostly between two thousand to three thousand rial, which 
was higher than the entry-level salary of a little over one thousand rial. While these 
exemplary workers stressed frugality and having a second job as a key to survivving, 
others took a more dubious path. Mardan-e Ruz articles occasionally addressed the 
widely shared public perception that railway workers engaged in theft. For instance, a 
poetically written article from 1946 reminded the readers of the crisis that the Railway 
Organization was facing in the postwar period. It pointed out that the reason that nobody 
thought about using the railway and used trucks instead was not just the availability of 
motor traffic after the end of the occupation. Possibly in reference to a 1945 railway 
accident that killed dozens of passengers, the article claimed that it was also because they 
knew “trains get derailed, wagons get burned, and items get stolen.”379 The article 
rhetorically asked if the reader would expect merchants to let the railway handle their 
merchandise when the Organization did not even admit its responsibility for theft, nor did 
it compensate for damages to merchandise due to accidents.380 Therefore, railway 
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workers’ solutions to economic problems were not always collective action such as 
protests, strikes, or petitioning with specific demands. In the space whose rules were set 
by the Railway Organization, the de Certeauian tactics of workers could be as simple and 
spontaneous as theft, which did not solve the fundamental problem but gave workers an 
ephemeral gain.  
In this condition of uncertainty among employees, the Railway Organization took 
several related measures to create productive Iranian railway workers: 1) creating 
knowledgeable and healthy workers through education and training; 2) providing 
institutions and facilities that were meant to enhance workers’ social lives; 3) 
indigenizing the workforce; 4) promoting a new official narrative of railway history. 
These measures could placate the Organization’s employees and boost their morale by 
fulfilling the needs of employees and expressing nationalist sentiments, which became 
increasingly more vocal as a popular movement after World War II and would soon 
culminate in the oil nationalization movement in 1951.381 As I will discuss, these 
measures developed almost simultaneously with the rise of an organized dissent among 
the Railway Organization’s frustrated employees in the postwar period. 
Institutions for training railway workers existed since the late 1930s, such as the 
first training course that was offered in 1936 as a six-month program in motion and the 
first industrial school (honaretan-e rah ahan) that opened in 1940 and incorporated a 
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one-year on-the-job training in the curriculum.382 But they expanded both in number and 
scope only towards the end of the occupation. By early 1946, 3,580 workers completed 
22 kinds of training courses that were typically offered as two-hours class taken twice a 
week. The courses included such diverse subjects as driving, cranes, repairing, 
construction, accounting, and police work. In addition, 400 students graduated from the 
three-year industrial school and joined the workforce.383 Adult Persian literacy courses 
specifically for railway workers expanded, too. In Qom and Arak alone, over two 
hundred workers gained literacy during early 1948.384  
The Railway Organization also promoted health among its workers. It constructed 
various sporting facilities such as soccer fields, basketball fields, tennis courts, and 
swimming pools and required physical education at the industrial school.385 Furthermore, 
the Sanitation Division of the Organization increased the number of hospitals and 
dispensaries along the routes, including a 50-bed hospital in Ahvaz.386 Along with regular 
medical treatments, the division offered treatments to opium-addicted employees 
“confidentially,” so that patients did not have to worry about having negative records on 
their company files.387 Given the concurrent wave of layoffs that hit the workers, 
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however, many addicts probably chose not to receive treatments, despite warnings from 
the division that untreated addicts would be laid off first.  
The Railway Organization provided more than education, training, and health 
services. To enhance both workers’ productivity and the quality of their lives, it also 
created facilities and institutional frameworks for sports and leisure. Prior to the Allied 
occupation, the Organization built facilities generally in provinces that the Pahlavi state 
prioritized, most notably Mazandaran and Khuzestan. Yet, towards the end of the 
occupation, more facilities were established in other provinces, often by converting 
former facilities left by the Allies.  
The case of the Arak Division in central Iran demonstrates the expansion of 
facilities provided by the Organization in the late 1940s. The Arak Division extended 
from Qom Station to Dorud Station in Lorestan via Arak Station. The division was 
primarily rural, with the Shi’i pilgrimage site of Qom and the emerging industrial city of 
Arak being the two major stations equipped with railway facilities such as depots, power 
plants, and water refineries.388 Yet, with the exception of some training courses for 
workers, institutions and facilities for railway workers and their families were seriously 
lacking before the occupation. 
After the occupation, other than training programs and hospitals, numerous 
railway institutions and facilities opened within the Arak Division and became important 
parts of workers’ lives. Two former American military camps were converted to 
sanatoriums in Arak and Qom, and another in Qom was converted to a railway club 
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(bashgah-e rah ahan). A larger club that opened in Arak in 1945 enjoyed a membership 
of over 1,000 and such recreational facilities as a cinema, bar, buffet restaurant, and 
furnished salon with a radio and newspapers.389 Although railway clubs such as these 
existed on a much smaller scale before the occupation, they expanded in the postwar 
period, with improved facilities such as salons, sporting fields, and party rooms.390 
Facilities in Arak paled in comparison with other large stations like Tehran and Ahvaz, 
which had separate clubs for various groups within the Organization such as graduates of 
the industrial school, engineers, accountants, technicians, and drivers.391 Yet, the railway 
club in Arak still boasted sporting facilities for soccer, wrestling in both traditional 
Iranian and Greco-Roman styles, and swimming. Workers could practice various sports, 
and during the companywide competitions held by the Railway Organization, they could 
compete with workers from other divisions, or even with students of the railway 
industrial school.392 Therefore, the new railway institutions and facilities fostered an 
environment in which railway workers could mingle with each other, even with those 
outside their immediate workplaces and divisions. Particularly because many workers 
lived in small provincial cities in which industrial workers from outside the railway 
industry did not exist on a large scale, the new institutions and facilities formed the basis 
of many workers’ social lives outside their working hours. In other words, at least in 
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theory, both their work and leisure came to be defined by the Railway Organization, 
creating an environment that was conducive to the workers’ dependency on their 
employer and their personal attachment to the Organization. 
The Railway Organization’s new facilities catered not only to workers themselves 
but also to their families. For instance, former American military camps within railway 
stations in Arak and Qom were converted into residential buildings and housed over 100 
families in Arak and over 50 in Qom.393 Also, churches for Allied soldiers were 
converted into mosques in early 1948 and opened with names of Iranian railway workers 
who lost their lives due to work-related railway accidents.394 Furthermore, workers’ 
children received education at elementary schools owned by the Organization. These 
schools often boasted names of prominent individuals who played an important role in 
the history of railways in Iran in order to remind employees and their families of the 
unique condition of their schools as schools for railway workers’ communities. The 
elementary school in Arak was converted from an American military barracks and 
opened as Varnus School in 1945, which was named after the former general manager of 
the Railway Organization. Likewise, the elementary school in Qom, which was converted 
from a former American military barracks, opened in early 1948 as Saniʾ al-Dowleh 
School. In the same year, another elementary school named Pirniya School, which was 
named after Hasan Pirniya, the prominent statesman of the Reza Shah period, opened in 
the small Lorestani town of Azna, indicating the rapid expansion of educational 
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institutions for children of railway workers.395 Thus, similar to the workers of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, not only the lives of workers but also those of their families 
became increasingly incorporated into institutions and facilities offered by the Railway 
Organization.  
Providing comprehensive facilities and institutions for workers and their families 
had several effects. First, the Organization could potentially buy the loyalty of workers 
through these perquisites. Moreover, it would allow the Organization to monopolize the 
space for social interaction among workers in the workplace as well as outside work. 
Such monopolization could be conducive to a shared sense of belonging among workers, 
who increasingly felt the ubiquitous presence of the Organization in every aspect of their 
lives. This was especially true when workers’ dependency on the organization was 
already high due to their having to live in remote areas in which they needed to rely on 
their employer to send food trains even for groceries and other daily consumption items. 
Furthermore, as the last section of this chapter will discuss, this served the Organization’s 
interest in controlling its workforce in the tumultuous political milieu of the late 1940s, 
which allowed various groups, including Tudeh-influenced labor unions, to voice their 
opinions as a result of weakened central authority. 
While establishing new facilities had the effect of including Iranian workers 
thoroughly into the Organization and making its presence felt everywhere in their lives, 
by the late 1940s, non-Iranian employees increasingly felt unwelcome. As discussed in 
Chapter Four in the case of construction sites during the Reza Shah period, the 
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antagonism toward non-Iranian employees itself was nothing new, particularly when 
there existed a significant gap in income and contractual status between Iranians and non-
Iranians. By the late 1940s, however, such factors as the spread of nationalism as a 
popular movement in Iran as well as the growth of anti-colonial movements in Asia more 
generally increased the resentment toward foreign interventions in Iranian affairs. 
Moreover, these factors increased the confidence among Iranian workers with their 
ability to run the Organization without the presence of foreign employees. 
This exclusion was both implicit and explicit. Immediately after the return of lines 
south of Tehran to Iranian hands in June 1945, an article in Mardan-e Ruz declared that 
the Organization was “a national asset that is bestowed in our hands” to celebrate the 
departure of the occupiers and encouraged “every patriotic and conscientious Iranian to 
protect this asset sincerely and love it like one’s own house.”396 Others were more 
explicit in rejecting the presence of foreign employees. For example, a Railway 
Organization engineer denounced foreign employees of the Organization for having 
caused much harm because of their lack of qualifications, higher salary, incompetence in 
management, and nepotism.397  
While the engineer clearly had his European counterparts in mind, middle-income 
semi-skilled workers from neighboring countries also became targets of criticism and 
exclusion. Due to their lower income compared to foreign engineers and managers, they 
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particularly suffered from the combination of deteriorating economic conditions in the 
1940s and their ineligibility for certain benefits. For instance, six foreign workers, headed 
by the Indian locomotive driver Manuchehr Rostamji, submitted a complaint to the 
Majles about their benefits. According to their letter, all complainants worked on railway 
construction and operation even before the establishment of the Organization in 1935. 
Despite their long service and commitment, they complained, they were not eligible for 
subsidies to purchase bread due to their foreign citizenship. With their monthly salary 
ranging from 1,200 to 2,000 riyals, it was impossible to feed their entire families.398 
Thus, with the rise of nationalism and the maturation of the indigenous workforce, semi-
skilled foreign workers like Rostamji felt more compelled to start a new life elsewhere 
after almost two decades in Iran. In effect, the measures discussed above delineated the 
Organization’s boundary separating insiders and outsiders. New institutions and facilities 
increased the everyday presence of the Organization in the lives of workers and their 
families to make them insiders of the Organization regardless of regional and 
socioeconomic backgrounds of the workers. In contrast, foreign employees were placed 
outside the boundary both in rhetoric and practice.  
Such politics of inclusion and exclusion were also at work in the framing of the 
official narrative of Iranian railways. In addition to numerous events to commemorate 
railway construction and operation as well as the Iranian press that reported those events, 
two books on the history of Iranian railways contributed to the formation of the official 
narrative. One was “Rah Ahan-e Sarasar-e Iran (The Trans-Iranian Railway),” a book 
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published by The Ministry of Roads in 1938 to commemorate the Railway’s 
completion.399 The other was “Rah Ahan-e Iran (Iranian Railways),” a book written by an 
engineer of the Railway Organization to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the 
1927 beginning of Trans-Iranian Railway construction. Thus, the initial official narrative 
was developed in the late Reza Shah period for the general audience while the new 
official narrative emerged in the postwar period with the approval of the Railway 
Organization. 
The new official narrative shared many features of the older narrative. Most 
notably, as the old narrative did, the new narrative legitimized monarchical rule. It 
continued to attribute the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway and the supposed 
nationwide achievement of progress, productiveness, and happiness primarily to Reza 
Shah. This interpretation was canonized in the 1947 inscription on the column that 
commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of railway construction, which 
read, “thanks to the capability of His Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi, the first pickaxe to 
build the Trans-Iranian Railway hit the ground on Mehr 23, 1306.”400 The legitimacy of 
Mohammad Reza Shah as the heir to his father’s legacy was symbolically displayed 
through his presence on exactly the same spot, exactly twenty years later, during the 
opening ceremony of the column along with the railway museum in Tehran. The scene 
was disseminated among Iranians through the display of the photograph taken during the 
ceremony, along with the exhibition of other photographs of the royal family and the 
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Trans-Iranian Railway, which not only adult visitors but also school children viewed at 
the exhibition.401 
The new narrative’s noticeable departure from the older narrative was the role of 
the Iranian people in completing the Trans-Iranian Railway. In the narrative of the Reza 
Shah period, the only “Iranian people” mentioned in statesmen’s speeches and press 
articles were taxpayers, who made significant sacrifices by consuming the exorbitantly-
priced tea and sugar monopolized by the state to fund the railway project. In fact, in the 
inauguration ceremony of the Trans-Iranian Railway, Reza Shah said, “I am truly 
satisfied with the Iranian people, who were prepared for the reform of the country from 
the bottom of their heart and paid the expenses for railway construction with pure heart 
because they recognized that this policy would be the cause of happiness and progress for 
Iran.”402 The shah did not explicitly mention workers’ contributions and sacrifices. In 
contrast, the new narrative promoted in the postwar period began to stress the role of 
railway workers, especially during the Allied occupation. For instance, the official 
corporate history published by the Railway Organization in 1948 praised Iranian railway 
workers at length and urged them to shout proudly to the Allies, “Your victory owes to 
our efforts and sacrifices (fath-e shoma marhun-e zahmat va jafeshaniha-ye ma ast).”403 
Thus, while hardly ever mentioned in the narrative of the Reza Shah period, railway 
workers were acknowledged in the post-occupation narrative as essential contributors to 
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the victory of the Allies in World War II and the subsequent end of the occupation, 
driving out foreign occupiers from the homeland. By stressing the contribution of Iranian 
railway workers as national heroes in the new narrative, the Organization attempted to 
secure the loyalty of its employees as a unified force.  
These measures that had the effect of securing the loyalty of workers developed 
almost simultaneously with another change. In the 1940s, overt expressions of 
discontentment among railway workers intensified through organized activism and 
frequent petitioning to various state apparatuses, including the Railway Organization, the 
Majles, and Mohammad Reza Shah himself. On one level, workers’ expressions of 
discontentment reveal the deep divisions among Iranian employees of the Organization, 
which attempted to conceal them by presenting an image of a united Iranian workforce. 
They also suggest that measures taken by the Organization, such as monopolizing sites of 
social interaction and constructing an official narrative, were not a matter of the 
Organization imposing its power to control on railway workers. Rather, the 
Organization’s methods of control developed discursively. In effect, repeated expressions 
of discontentment by railway workers, in tandem with new institutions and facilities of 
the Railway Organization that were established in the postwar period, had the effect of 
normalizing the presence of the Pahlavi state and its apparatuses in their daily lives. 
 Although limited in scale and impact compared to the post-Reza Shah period, 
railway workers had already started to take collective action before the 1941 abdication 
of Reza Shah. As early as in 1928, immediately after the beginning of railway 
construction, railway construction workers formed the Union of Northern Railway 
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Workers (Ettehadiyeh-ye Kargaran-e Rah Ahan-e Shomal).404 The promptness in 
establishing the union might indicate the role of those who had experience with industrial 
work elsewhere such as Russia and the Caucasus, as discussed earlier. After fighting to 
win rights for Mazandarani wage laborers for several years, the union expanded to 
southern Iran in 1935. Nevertheless, its stronghold apparently remained Mazandaran, as 
Zafar, the Tudeh Party’s organ, claimed that most workers in the north were under the 
union until the notorious arrest of the 53 communists in 1937, which led to the brutal 
suppression of communist activities and labor unions until the end of the Reza Shah 
period.405 Particularly since many railway workers of the 1940s started off as 
construction workers in the Reza Shah period, their experience with collective action 
from the construction period is likely to have impacted how railway workers expressed 
discontent from the 1940s onwards. 
 After the collapse of central authority following the Allied invasion, various 
workers’ organizations emerged separately until they were combined to form the Union 
of Railway Workers (Ettehadiyeh-ye Kargaran-e Rah Ahan) in June 1944.406 The union 
established 22 circuits (howzeh), each of which initially consisted of 20-25 members and 
rapidly increased membership among railway workers. Within a few years, branches of 
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the Union were established in smaller communities of railway workers such as Garmsar, 
causing confrontations between the Union and the local police.407 In addition to strikes 
and protests to make demands, donations to unemployed workers, and invitations to 
representatives of unions from other companies, the Union of Railway Workers gave out 
free tickets to film screenings to workers and offered adult literacy courses, competing 
with the service offered by the Railway Organization. 
 Although strikes and protests stood out as the most visible moments in which 
workers expressed their discontentment, railway workers, whether active union members 
or not, participated in other forms of disobedience more frequently. Most common among 
these alternative methods of expressing discontentment was writing petitions to various 
state apparatuses and have them printed in both the Railway Organization’s publications 
and left-leaning newspapers that mushroomed in the 1940s. For instance, along with 
letters from readers, Mardan-e Ruz allocated a generous space to print some of the 
petitions as well as actions taken by the Organization in response to them in order to 
demonstrate to its readers the Organization’s responsiveness. Thus, like landowners and 
construction workers examined in Chapter Four, railway workers directly engaged with 
state apparatuses. Yet, unlike landowners and construction workers, they had a medium 
of communication with a much larger audience of workers through left-leaning 
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newspapers and shared their discontentment relatively easily, due to the relaxation of 
censorship in post-Reza Shah Iran.408  
  Broadly speaking, demands of railway workers in petitions fell into three 
categories: namely, working and living conditions, salary, and insurance. Matters related 
to working and living conditions included the following: 1) the provision of free summer 
and winter clothing and blankets to all workers, including wage laborers; 2) no work on 
holidays including Fridays; 3) the acquisition of proper housing with water, electricity, 
and means of transport for workers who had no house to rent in the vicinities of 
workplaces; 4) the distribution of food for an appropriate price all along the railway 
routes.409 The latter two issues were peculiarly important to railway workers, whose 
communities scattered all along the railway routes, including small towns, and even in 
major cities, locations that were distant from city centers. For instance, workers at 
Andimeshk Station relied on food train service for such basic daily consumption items as 
bread and meat. Thus, when vendors overpriced them by tampering with the weighing 
system, the workers immediately relied on petitioning.410 Likewise, Ahvaz Station 
workers demanded the purchase of a bus to commute from Ahvaz Station and their living 
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quarters, which stood more than three kilometers from the station, since walking that 
distance in the scorching summer of Khuzestan would be impossible.411  
 While matters of working and living conditions affected all workers and did not 
cause major schisms among them, issues of salary revealed divisions within the railway 
workforce in the mid 1940s, when the Organization was going through a massive 
downsizing and budget cuts. The division was not so much between low-salary Iranian 
versus high-salary non-Iranian, as the official narrative of post-1945 Iran portrayed. 
Rather, after about three years of the Allied occupation, the division between the “natives 
(bowmi)” and “non-natives (gheir-e bowmi)” surfaced in railway workplaces. The 
division was particularly serious in such cities as Arak in central Iran and Andimeshk in 
southern Iran, which experienced an influx of Iranian workers from other provinces 
during the occupation as centers of rail transport that were equipped with depots and 
repair factories. 
 In 1943, railway workers who lived under a harsh climate outside their home 
regions started to receive a benefit that purported to incentivize their continued 
employment in southern Iran. Yet, possibly due to the deteriorating financial condition of 
the Organization, the benefit was cancelled. In response to this cancellation, workers in 
Andimeshk Station, depot, and locomotive repair factory filed petitions in the summer of 
1944 to various state entities, including the Majles, The Minister of Roads, and the 
Railway Organization, as well as such newspapers as Ettelaʿat and Rahbar. The 
petitioners’ complaint hinged upon two points. First, they justified the benefit in terms of 
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their significant contribution to the Allies’ war efforts. They stressed that they worked 
“night and day to fulfill their duty and play an important role for the goal of progress of 
the Allies” despite the poverty and harsh climate that they had to endure in Andimeshk. 
Given the higher salary of foreign employees, they rhetorically asked, “in a condition like 
this, how are we supposed to work next to foreigners and Americans at the factory?”412 
Second, they accused Tehran of making decisions “while sitting in perfect comfort 
behind a desk,” being unable to imagine the harsh summer of southern Iran.413 Whether 
these petitions impacted policymakers or not, the benefit was reinstalled later. 
 The debate did not end here, however. This time, native workers of the south 
complained that the benefit constituted a discrimination against native workers vis-à-vis 
non-native workers. The complaint made several points. First, both native and non-native 
workers contributed equally to the war effort. Second, both native and non-native 
workers needed the same amount of money to make ends meet. Third, both native and 
non-native workers experienced the same summer.414 The Organization responded to the 
complaint by citing the law that stipulated the distribution of the benefit as an aid to 
struggling workers, but not surprisingly, it did not make native workers eligible for the 
same benefit. 
 Aside from the schism between native and non-native workers, the debate over 
the benefit revealed how the culture of petitioning discussed in Chapter Four remained 
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largely intact until the mid-twentieth century. Both native and non-native workers relied 
on petitioning not only to their employer but also to other men of power within the state 
to influence their decisions. Both sides also used the press to share their ideas widely, to 
which the Organization responded by using the same medium. Through such interaction, 
the presence of the Organization as well as other state apparatuses became part of daily 
lives of Iranian railway workers, who, until a decade or two before, lived as rank-and-file 
nomads, peasants, or vendors, with less direct interaction with state entities. 
 Furthermore, the debate exemplified how the occupation period emboldened 
workers’ demands. Repeatedly, various workers’ petitions justified their demands by 
framing them as legitimate rewards for the sacrifices and contributions they made during 
the Allied occupation. As workers in Arak pleaded, having lived “for four years away 
from families” as workers for the railway system that functioned like the aorta of the 
Allied Forces, they felt entitled to “go back to their home regions” or have a higher 
salary.415 In another petition to Mohammad Reza Shah, one hundred employees stated 
that Iranians like themselves sacrificed so much, even their lives, to win of the war, and 
thus deserved a better life now that the war was over. By asking rhetorically how one 
could support himself and his family with only one thousand rial per month, the letter 
demanded extra pay for the Iranian New Year, one of the perquisites that were abolished 
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after the end of the occupation, so that workers would have enough to celebrate Nowruz 
in the coming month.416 
Therefore, the reframing of the official narrative that crystallized in Rah Ahan-e 
Iran, the 1948 book discussed earlier, did not evolve independently of the changes that 
occurred among railway workers. The overt inclusion of railway workers in the official 
narrative was a result of continued demands by workers to be compensated for their 
contribution to the war in numerous petitions. Railway workers capitalized on their role 
in winning the Trans-Iranian Railway using the epithet, the “victory bridge (pol-e piruzi)” 
to stress that they deserved to receive rewards from their employer. In return, the 
financially troubled Railway Organization acknowledged its workers’ role during the 
occupation in the canonized narrative of the history of railways and in an attempt to 
placate the frustrated workers. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the formation of the Iranian railway workforce from the turn 
of the twentieth century to midcentury, on the eve of the oil nationalization movement. 
Contrary to the nationalist historiography that stresses the role of the Pahlavi state in the 
formation and shaping of the first generation of Iranian railway workers, I have stressed 
the importance of mobile non-state actors who crossed borders in search of economic 
opportunities. Along with Iranian travelogues to Iran’s surrounding world discussed in 
Chapter Three, the active movement of migrant workers suggests that historians need to 
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continue resituating Iran in multiple regional frameworks to understand nation-building 
projects such as the Trans-Iranian Railway project. It also demonstrates that an 
overemphasis on the interaction between Iran and the “West” could obfuscate how the 
railway system became an integral part of the Iranian landscape. Similar to the case of 
Egypt at the turn of the century, a large number of southern Europeans came to Iran in 
search of an employment. Yet, as a latecomer to the railway age, experiences of Turkey, 
the Caucasus, India, and Iraq also impacted the formation of the Iranian railway 
workforce. 
 As employees of the largest state organization, railway workers, who were 
divided by various factors such as ethnicity, nationality, education, rank, age, and 
political belief, intensified interaction with the state, primarily the Railway Organization, 
by the mid-twentieth century. These heterogeneous workers of the Organization 
experienced socialization with other railway workers in the space provided by the 
Railway Organization,417 while having opportunities to socialize in the space created by 
the union as well. Therefore, the Railway Organization’s attempts at controlling its 
workers emerged in conversation with workers’ parallel attempts, as exemplified by 
examples such as competing adult literacy courses and film screenings. The Railway 
Organization attempted to win the “heart and minds” of workers by not only 
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Association in Washington D.C., on November 23, 2014. 
 214 
monopolizing the space of socialization but also crafting a historical narrative that 
acknowledged the contribution of railway workers in ending World War Two. Just as 
workers challenged the dominance of the Organization in the competition for the space 
for socialization, they challenged the official narrative of the Organization. While the 
Organization used the narrative to boost workers’ pride in the Railway Organization, 
workers used it to demand the betterment of their economic conditions. Although 
evidence is extremely limited, it is conceivable that in a similar manner, workers’ use of 
the space provided by the Organization resulted in the sharing of grievances against their 
employer, allowing them to shape an identity as railway workers with rights, not the loyal 
railway workers that the Organization hoped to mold them into. 
The next chapter will shift gears from builders and operators of the railway to 
travelers by examining the spatial politics of the Iranian railway. The railway space that 
came into being after the Trans-Iranian Railway project became a site of interaction 
among all the groups discussed so far, including British officers, Iranian modernists, Lor 




(Figure 5.1) Railway factory workers in the late 1930s. COWI Archives, Iran Tehran 












Chapter 6: Traveling Citizens in the Railway Space418 
 
Introduction 
Abu al-Hasan Ebtehaj, the pioneer of economic planning in Iran, recalled traveling in a 
horse-drawn carriage from Rasht to Tehran during World War One as one of the worst 
agonies of his adolescence.419 Confined in a four-person carriage, travelers had to endure 
the constant sway of the carriage traveling on a bumpy dirt road, as well as intense heat in 
the carriage when the windows were closed, or the dust and flies when the windows were 
open. The slow journey ended every day at a roadside inn (mehmankhaneh), where the 
tired travelers and horses rested.420  
Within a few decades, intercity travel by carriage had become a distant memory 
for the wealthy in Tehran. Najmeh Najafi, who grew up in a well-to-do clerical family in 
early-Pahlavi Tehran, detailed how she used to listen to her mother’s recollections and 
romanticize the uncertainties of traveling by camel or carriage. Compared to traveling in 
the back seat of a chauffeur-driven foreign car, long journeys through the trails from one 
inn to another while watching out for tribal raids sounded “much more interesting.”421 At 
the same time, she dreamed of traveling afar, especially by the Trans-Iranian Railway, 
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which was under construction then. Adults around her only complained about the heavy 
taxes on tea and sugar to fund the project. Yet, the railway completely captured the little 
girl’s imagination. At school, at home, at the public bathhouse, and in the streets, every 
time she heard about the railway, her wanderlust to travel afar by the railway was 
reignited. About a decade later, shortly after the end of World War Two, her dream came 
true when she visited Mazandaran by train on vacation. She was utterly fascinated by the 
nature of her country, which had been recently freed from the Allied occupation, and did 
not even converse with her family for fear of missing something more profound that 
might be passing by outside the window.422 
The opening of the Trans-Iranian Railway transformed experiences of traveling 
for various types of travelers such as vacationers, pilgrims, and local villagers. For one 
thing, traveling became speedier. Between 1920 and 1950, the travel time from Tehran to 
Baghdad was shortened from a month or so to around fifty hours. With this change, the 
kind of prolonged discomfort that Ebtehaj experienced became a nostalgic past to be 
romanticized.423 Furthermore, the coming of railways meant the creation of the railway 
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space —a new public space of railways that comprised of stations, platforms, railway 
cars, and tracks—in the everyday lives of ordinary Iranians.424 
Scholars have examined how modern urban space was produced and reproduced 
not simply by grandiose Haussmannization projects but through the everyday use of the 
space by its occupants, whose use of it often deviated from the modernist intention of its 
creators. Rather than being molded into the image of the modern promoted by the 
creators of the space, occupants of the new space created unintended uses of the space 
and often evaded attempts at control and surveillance.425 Thus, in response to the state’s 
imposition of what Michel de Certeau called a “strategy” for control, ordinary occupants 
of the urban space responded with the de Certeauian “tactic,” an action taken by the weak 
to win a temporary advantage in a space over which they had no control.426  
Recent scholarship on culture and railway technology has also demonstrated how 
various social groups contested over such issues as the definition of and access to the 
railway space in other historical contexts. For instance, in the context of Porfirio Diaz’s 
authoritarian modernization that followed a period of disorder, the late-nineteenth century 
                                                
424 I use the term “public space” in a broad sense to mean “space to which all citizens 
are granted some legal rights of access.” It includes everything from sidewalks and parks 
to shopping malls, theaters, and public transportation facilities. See Andrew Light and 
Jonathan M. Smith, “Introduction: Geography, Philosophy, and Public Space,” in Light 
and Smith eds., The Production of Public Space (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1998), 3. 
425 For example, Farha Ghannam, Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the 
Politics of Identity in a Global Cairo (Berkeley and London: University of California 
Press, 2002) and Di Wang, Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, 
and Local Politics, 1870-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).  
426 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 36-37. 
 219 
Mexican middle class used the print media to share an image of themselves as the 
“vanguards of modern life” against what they perceived as the backward behavior of 
provincial populations, and thus consolidated their urban middle-class identity.427 In 
colonial India, the middle-class male colonial subjects, who were excluded from the first-
class cars reserved for European passengers, demanded the hierarchical differentiation 
among Indian passengers as well as the separation of respectable Indian women from the 
public gaze and asserted their position in the colonial hierarchy.428 In both cases, rather 
than creating a homogeneous experience of railway journeys, the railway space revealed 
and fostered social differentiation. 
In line with these studies of the railway space, this chapter examines how Iranians 
imagined and experienced railway journeys and the railway space in the second quarter 
of the twentieth century. By extension, it investigates how their imaginations and 
experiences impacted their understandings of the self. The first part of the chapter 
discusses the broader context of Iran’s transport revolution and cultural changes in the 
early Pahlavi period. The second part examines the discursive construction of the railway 
traveler prototype prior to the opening of the Trans-Iranian Railway. The last part looks 
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at various uses of the railway space after the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway. I 
argue that, despite the desire of Iranian modernists to create a homogeneous nation 
through the Trans-Iranian Railway, the railway space came to embody the heterogeneity 
of Iranian society, which was divided by multiple factors. Consequently, modern middle-
class occupants of the space simultaneously identified with and distanced themselves 
from other occupants of the railway space, and thus formed both national and class 
identities.  
 
Taming the Danger of Mobility 
In 1925-26, Khalq printed a newspaper serial novel called “The True Dream (roʾya-ye 
sadeqeh).” The serial took the form of an imagined travelogue set ten years in the future 
by an Iranian who came back to his homeland after a decade in Europe. It showcased the 
optimism widely shared among the emerging modern middle class at the beginning of 
Pahlavi rule. The story began with the protagonist traveling on a ship from Baku to 
Bandar-e Pahlavi on the way back from Europe to Iran. On the deck, he witnessed young 
Iranian students dressed in European clothing behaving graciously just like European 
passengers. The sight of the youths reminded the protagonist of his experience a decade 
earlier when he left for Europe on the same ship. In that previous trip, he had seen Gilani 
and Mazandarani pilgrims who looked ludicrous with dyed beards, long hair, and sangria-
colored fingertips. They felt so at home on the deck that they even spread the customary 
Iranian sofreh, a “table cloth” spread out on the floor during meals on which to place 
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food, and started to eat lunch there.429 The contrast between these pilgrims of the 1920s 
and the students of the 1930s reassured the protagonist of Iran's progress during the first 
decade of Reza Shah’s rule. 
Throughout the novel, the narrative evoked an image of Iran as a prosperous 
Europeanized country, with symbols of industrialization such as factories, dams, and port 
facilities appearing in front of the protagonist’s eyes as he toured around cities by train 
and car. More than anything else, the railway epitomized the progress of Iran, as its 
existence gave the protagonist the mobility to tour throughout Iran speedily and witness 
signs of progress. After touring around Gilan, the protagonist took the electrified train 
from Rasht to Qazvin for sightseeing. He was impressed by the facilities of the railway, 
including magnificent railway stations, a sanitary restaurant, and food cars on the train.430 
Once the train departed Rasht Station, he enjoyed the panoramic views of the Iranian 
countryside, which used to be arid and uncultivated but which were now marked by 
pasture and fertile farms where mechanized agriculture was practiced, two-story houses, 
and new roads that connected the villages to the railway line. Instead of donkeys, mules, 
and camels, carts and cars ran through the new roads to transport village products such as 
fruits and vegetables to railway stations, from which they were taken to food processing 
factories as well as both domestic and international centers of consumption.431 Thus, the 
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railway was portrayed as a crucial vehicle that connected the Iranian countryside to the 
national economy, and to the global capitalist economy.  
Even more impressive to the protagonist was the cultural transformation 
exemplified in the behavior of his compatriots. During his ten years of absence from Iran, 
Iranians embraced European cultural institutions such as cafes, restaurants, cinemas, and 
theme parks, where men and women in European-style clothing mingled with each other 
during their leisure time.432 Notably, the cultural transformation of Iranians manifested 
itself in their behavior in the railway space. No one engaged in disorderly conduct or 
talked too loudly.433 The orderly behavior of passengers was matched by the behavior of 
child peddlers at Qazvin Station. These children, who used to be naked beggars, were 
now dressed in clean uniforms, surrounded the train cars, and sold souvenirs like textiles 
as well as food and drinks, to passengers.434 Thus, in this fictional account of Iran’s near 
future, nothing reflected Iranian local customs except for the souvenirs. The transformed 
Iranian culture and the railway journey that took place within that cultural milieu 
reproduced how European travelers were imagined to experience a railway journey in 
first-class railway cars. In this imagination, undisrupted orderliness governed the railway 
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space, epitomizing what Michel de Certeau called “a perfect actualization of the rational 
utopia.”435 
The serial novel encapsulated modernists’ desire for a transformation of Iranian 
society, which, in their view, urgently needed a radical break from its immediate past. In 
reality, however, the transformation was more of a gradual process that straddled the late 
Qajar and early Pahlavi periods.436 Of particular relevance to the railway space was the 
emergence of other new public spaces. As the serial novel depicted, new public spaces, 
including places that gave access primarily to paying customers such as cinemas and 
cafes, were becoming an integral part of the urban landscape in late Qajar and early 
Pahlavi Iran.437 At the same time, the spatial structure of Iranian cities changed. New 
paved streets flanked by tree-lined sidewalks such as Pahlavi Street, which connected the 
city with Tehran Railway Station in the southern outskirts, extended from new squares 
that gradually replaced old city gates.438  
Concomitantly, the improvement of rural security and the rapid influx of 
motorized vehicles, especially American cars and trucks, changed how Iranians 
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experienced traveling in the 1920s and 30s. Within the city, especially in Tehran, such 
new modes of transportation as buses and taxis (including trucks and motorbikes) 
competed with existing modes of transport, such as donkeys, tramways, and horse-drawn 
carriages, and ameliorated the condition of intra-city movement for city dwellers. 
Reflecting these changes, by 1926, in Tehran alone, there were 564 personal automobiles, 
432 taxis, 108 vehicles used by embassies, and 36 diplomatic cars.439 Other data from 
1930-31 noted the number of registered cars in Iran as 1,639 automobiles and 4,226 buses 
and trucks.440  
Yet, the spatial change of urban centers and the increase of new modes of 
transport that occupied the space did not suffice to transform the nation to meet 
modernists’ sensibilities. A more fundamental issue was to inculcate in the public an 
understanding of proper behavior in the public space. In some regards, more and more 
Iranians started to act in ways that satisfied modernists’ expectations. For instance, in the 
1910s, it was considered scandalous if a man and woman sat in the same horse-drawn 
carriage—even if they were married—the couple would be fined by the police for doing 
so.441 By the late 1920s, the presence of a married couple in a horse carriage gradually 
became more acceptable.442 
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Nevertheless, the behavior of most Iranians in the public space did not meet 
modernist sensibilities in other regards. For instance, while modernists valued the cinema 
to educate the general population, they were frustrated with the behavior of the Iranian 
audiences at cinemas, such as starting fights and bringing small children.443 Furthermore, 
new paved streets such as Sepah, Pahlavi, and Cheragh-e Barq in Tehran appeared more 
chaotic than orderly, as various modes of transport, including donkeys, horse-drawn 
carriages, cars, trucks, and buses, vied for their place along with pedestrians and 
unauthorized peddlers whose merchandise was spread all over the streets.444 While fruit 
sellers spread their watermelons and other fruits, coffee houses spread their tables and 
benches, carpenters spread wood, car repairers spread broken cars, and others spread 
whatever they sold.445  
Frustrated with the ubiquity of the “misuse” of the public space, Iranian 
modernists, using the burgeoning press, attempted to educate the population about proper 
behavior in different public spaces. An Ettelaʿat article concluded that people were 
unfamiliar with “social duties and responsibilities (vazayef va takalif-e ejtemaʿi).”446 
Thus, in addition to legal measures and the efforts of police departments and municipal 
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governments, it argued, Iran needed to educate people that “sidewalks were for the 
general public,” not part of their stores or playgrounds.447 Moreover, a series of 
illustrations printed in the 1930-31 issue of Salnameh-ye Pars, the official yearbook, 
discussed issues pertinent to urban traffic in an attempt to promote healthy and safe 
lifestyles to its readers. In addition to such issues as diet, exercise, smoking, drinking, and 
clothing, the illustrations promoted walking only on sidewalks and being punctual, 
because leaving home late could lead to moving hurriedly and anxiously. Another 
illustration cautioned against chasing after the bus when one missed it, since another one 
would come shortly.448  
The issue of Iranians’ behavior in public spaces became even more controversial 
when the Pahlavi state issued the 1936 decree for compulsory unveiling. The police 
stopped numerous horse-drawn carriages and cars to ensure women’s observance of 
unveiling,449 and official publications issued guidelines for proper behavior in gender-
mixed public spaces. In its 1936-37 issue, for instance, Salnameh-ye Pars elaborated for 
forty pages on social etiquette for both men and women, specifying what to wear on 
various occasions such as dinner events and sporting events.450 The articulated norm 
mostly followed examples of the upper strata of European societies. The article stipulated 
that during a trip, women should make sure to wear clean clothes and put on a coat with a 
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dark color, a small hat like a beret, socks, gloves, and shoes without heels, while men 
should wear golf clothes with a coat.451 Men were also required to sit to the left of women 
in cars and horse-drawn carriages to ensure that the women traveled on the safer 
pedestrian side of the roads.452  
The article also elaborated on proper behavior for men and women in the public 
space of streets. Men were advised against eating, spitting, and talking and laughing too 
loudly with excessive hand gestures.453 They were also advised to walk on the left side of 
a woman, engage in conversation with a female acquaintance only when she initiated it, 
and remove their right-hand glove when shaking hands with a woman.454 A woman was 
to greet by tilting her head and continuing to go rather than engaging in a lengthy 
conversation. If they ran into close friends or needed to talk, they should shake hands 
regardless of the gender of the other party, but without removing their gloves.455 Notably, 
the article provided an additional specification for women. They were advised to avoid 
walking down the streets unless they had a reason to do so, while such restrictions to 
excessive mobility did not apply to men.456 Therefore, to recreate the gender-mixed urban 
public space in a way that resembled elite circles in European societies, articles like this 
attempted to inculcate proper ways of interacting with the opposite sex while functioning 
as a way to maintain control over women’s mobility and sexuality.  
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In short, the issue of behaving properly in the public space was not just an issue of 
the appearance of orderliness. It was intimately intertwined with other sociocultural 
issues such as health and gender relations and would shape every aspect of modern life 
for Iranian citizens. For this reason, Iranian modernists at the beginning of the Pahlavi 
period considered it absolutely necessary to discipline the unruly populace and monitor 
the behavior of the occupants of the future railway space that would come into being 




(Figure 6.1) A crowded bus in Tehran. Men and women in a crowded car. Salnameh-ye 
Pars, 1930-31, 80. The caption reads, “In societies, observing rules is necessary.” 
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Constructing the Railway Traveler Prototype 
When the Pahlavi Dynasty was established in 1925, the only public transportation that 
was akin to a railway in Tehran was the tramway system discussed in Chapter Two. 
Tehran had an eight-kilometer steam tramway to the shrine of Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim and 
four lines of horse-drawn tramways within the city, both of which were opened in the late 
1880s by a Belgian company. Since the steam tramway’s opening, despite its frequent 
accidents and the occasional protests triggered by them, it garnered much excitement 
among the population,457 and “traveling on it was considered one of the most popular 
recreations.”458 Nevertheless, by the early Pahlavi period, Iranian modernists imagined 
the future Trans-Iranian Railway in contradistinction with the existing conditions in the 
Tehran tramway. 
By the 1920s, as was the case with other public spaces, Iranian modernists were 
increasingly frustrated by the ubiquity of what they described as improper behavior in 
and around steam and horse-drawn tramway facilities. An expatriate Iranian even claimed 
that the horse-drawn tramway had replaced “the clothes and hats and the varicolored 
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turbans” as the most serious harm to the prestige of Iran in Europe.459 Iranian behavior 
around tramway facilities greatly deviated from the idealized image depicted in “The 
True Dream.” Similar to the Indian colonial discourse, Iranian modernists’ fears revolved 
around the display of religiosity and domesticity in the public space by the masses, which 
would subvert the orderliness of the space.460 In contrast to the imagined railway 
passengers in European attire, most tramway passengers were pilgrims who boasted long 
beards and complete veiling, which led to a Nahid article’s deploring, “God forbid! We 
get on the railway car with clothes for sitting in a palanquin, donkey, or mule!”461 When 
these passengers arrived at the tramway station, they followed the gender segregation of 
station facilities. While they waited for the tram, they listened to female dervishes who 
attracted a large audience among local youths by reciting eulogies in praise of Ali and 
Hoseyn.462 In addition, the tramway space was occupied by a swarm of beggars, 
including the blind, the crippled, and the deaf, unauthorized water sellers, dry-fruit 
sellers, and all sorts of peddlers who crammed into the station.463 The ritualized wailing 
and begging of the poor became the audiovisual evidence of the perceived chaos in the 
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Tehran tramway. If this crowd bore any resemblance to anything European, as one writer 
put it to describe the chaotic situation, it was to “a tribe of strikers in London.”464  
The tramways manifested other signs of Iran’s past through patterns of 
consumption. Instead of eating continental breakfast before getting onboard, Iranian 
passengers ate the traditional dish of kaleh pacheh (sheep’s head stew). Instead of 
smoking cigarettes, Iranian passengers waited for the train sitting by the rail while 
smoking long pipes (chopoq).465 Furthermore, rather than bags and packages, tramway 
passengers carried onboard commodities that reflected their domestic lives, such as 
samovars, water pitchers (aftabeh), and a carrying pole with an earthen jar or jug on one 
end, and the sofreh, making Tehran tramcars visibly dissimilar to European ones.466 
Collectively, these commodities made the non-Europeanized cultural orientations of 
Iranians painstakingly visible. 
Chaos reigned inside the tramcars, just like the stations (Figure 6.2). Instead of 
sitting comfortably, Iranian passengers, even those with first-class tickets, were crammed 
into a crowded car, where one either had to stand on the running board and hug the pole 
firmly to avoid falling off the train, or sit on a seated passenger.467 When passengers 
finally managed to sit, they started to eat seeds and spit out their shells, creating a carpet 
of seed shells on the floors of the trains. Then, each time the train stopped, whether at a 
station or due to one of the frequent derailing incidents, new passengers invaded the car 
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as they pushed each other, resuming the chaotic process of settling down in the tramway 
cars.468  
Local youths further exacerbated the chaotic situation. Whenever the tram 
departed the station, groups of men climbed up the windows and kept hanging onto the 
tramcar, which occasionally resulted in accidents and serious, even fatal, injuries. Despite 
the presence of ticket inspectors and police officers who attempted to remove the 
troublesome youths from the tramcars, the youths learned to disguise themselves as 
passengers. Consequently, they continued to use the entire tramway space as their 
playground, sometimes playing tag and crawling between other passengers’ legs and 
under women’s chadors.469 In view of such behavior, modernists saw no resemblance 
between traveling by Tehran tramways and their imagination of a European railway 
journey.  
 
                                                
468 Ibid., and “Mosaferat-e Chand Saʿateh.”  




(Figure 6.2) The Tehran horse-drawn tramway in the 1920s. Satirizing the journey on the 
crowded horse-drawn tramway in Tehran. Khalq, May 22, 1926. The dark middle-section 
is reserved for female passengers. 
 
(Figure 6.3) The Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim tramway in the 1930s. The train was stopping in an 




The conundrum for modernists lay in the expected entry of these populations into 
the railway space once the Trans-Iranian Railway opened, because unlike the local 
tramways, the nation’s prestige hinged upon the national railway that would connect 
northern and southern Iran via Tehran. On the one hand, the railway was supposed to 
foster traveling and spread what modernists called “the New Civilization (tamaddon-e 
jadid),” including national consciousness, to create a homogeneous nation. So the entry 
of more Iranians as traveling citizens should have been welcomed. On the other hand, the 
increased mobility of the ignorant masses and their entry into the railway space was 
believed to jeopardize the ideal orderliness of the railway space unless their behavior was 
regulated and disciplined. To Iranian modernists, reminiscences of the past and perceived 
disorderliness manifested in the masses’ behavior seemed to corrupt the vehicle of 
modernity from within and undermine the project of successfully propagating 
“civilization.” Thus, without reforming the masses of future passengers, they argued, the 
Trans-Iranian Railway would fail to bring progress to Iran.  
The solution was to construct the image of the railway traveler prototype as a 
model that potential railway passengers would emulate. The process of constructing the 
prototype occurred in the Iranian press, which dramatically increased circulation as 
modern education expanded and raised the literacy rate in the early Pahlavi period. 
Nevertheless, the propagation of the railway traveler prototype was never intended to 
reach the ignorant masses, the stated target of reform. Rather, it was meant to ignite fear 
among the emerging modern middle class, who comprised the majority of Iranian 
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newspaper readers. The fear was intended to convince them to take action: traveling to 
enlighten the masses. Thus, the internalization of the values embedded in the railway 
traveler prototype, including the proper behavioral code in the railway space, functioned 
as a marker of difference for the emerging Iranian modern middle class to separate 
themselves from the masses whom they considered ignorant.470 
In the early Pahlavi period, journalists such as Nahid’s Ibrahim Nahid and 
Ettelaʿat’s Abbas Masʿudi enjoyed the privilege of traveling on the new portions of the 
railway and highways before inauguration, often as part of the royal retinue in order to 
witness, record, and propagate the supposed progress achieved by Reza Shah. The 
frequency with which travel experiences were printed increased, especially during the 
1930s. In this decade, the Trans-Iranian Railway, along with new highways, was opened 
portion by portion from both the northern and southern termini, waiting to be connected 
in central Iran. Combined with travel accounts presumably sent by readers, so many 
accounts of railway journeys appeared in newspapers that it was as if the nineteenth 
century trend of writing travelogues (safarnāmeh) had been revived on the pages of 
twentieth-century newspapers.471 In this sense, through the practice of newspaper 
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reading, along with witnessing railway facilities and participating in official events to 
celebrate the progress of construction,472 imagining a railway journey became embedded 
in the everyday life of the modern middle class. 
In addition to specifying proper behavior in the railway space, and thus defining 
the de Certeauian strategy that should be taken by the future Iranian State Railway, these 
writings printed in the Iranian press shared a pedantic goal of explaining why Iranians 
needed to travel. The railway traveler prototype was not a pilgrim. Rather, he was a 
tourist who traveled around his homeland. As one journalist noted, “when the Shah does 
not sit behind the curtain, princes, ministers, prominent political and military figures, 
journalists, and even ordinary citizens should not sit behind the curtain. They should 
learn closely with their eyes and ears open about the present and past conditions of the 
country. Namely, they should go to see all the places in the country.”473 Traveling would 
also allow Iranians to “blend and mix (ekhtilat va amizesh).”474 As more Iranians traveled 
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and mingled with those from other provinces, they would familiarize themselves with the 
ways of life elsewhere in Iran as well as different regions and customs. Such a 
transformation would be beneficial “both for individuals and the country,” and the 
interactions among Iranians would have positive impacts on “commerce, industry, 
agriculture, ethics, and public behavior.”475 Therefore, journalistic travel accounts did not 
simply introduce conditions and customs of faraway provinces to their readers. Rather, by 
providing vicarious experiences in the provinces, they were meant to serve as inspirations 
for future travelers on how to travel around Iran by train. They encouraged newspaper-
reading citizens to prepare for their own journeys and foster a national consciousness 
through direct interactions with their compatriots in destinations. In turn, local 
populations in the destinations would be exposed to ideas and customs of their more 
civilized compatriots. In other words, the railway traveler prototype would be a 
missionary of civilization, spreading “civilized” customs in the railway space and 
inculcating nationalism across Iran.  
 
The Spatial Politics of the Trans-Iranian Railway 
Within a decade of the 1938 completion of the Trans-Iranian Railway, additional lines to 
connect Tehran with Tabriz in the northwest and Mashhad in the northeast had started to 
operate in limited sections. Another line to connect Tehran to Yazd in the southeast via 
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Qom was also under construction.476 As the network expanded, the railway space began 
to intersect with a larger number of Iranians’ lives. As previous chapters have discussed, 
many landowners resented the damages that the railway caused to their agricultural lands, 
or even worse, the confiscation of lands. Some local villagers took advantage of the 
economic opportunities and flocked to the new stations to sell their products to travelers 
or opened inns by the stations.477 For many others, the railway became a fundamental 
means for intercity travel, be it as a part of their daily routine to move from one village to 
another, or as a special occasion such as pilgrimage and vacation. Despite the general 
trend of motorization, the railway continued to function as a common mode of transport 
in Iran partly because of the Allied occupation. 
As discussed in previous chapters, when the Allied forces invaded Iran in 1941, 
they took control over transportation routes from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet Union, 
including the Trans-Iranian Railway, which foreign workers such as Indians, the British, 
and later Americans, started to operate in order to transport war materials to the Soviet 
Union. During the occupation, the civilian use of highways and railways became 
restricted. For instance, before the war, the southern line from Tehran to Ahvaz operated 
four trains per week in each direction, with a capacity of 320 individuals on each train. 
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Once the occupation started, 140 seats were allocated to Allied passengers for each 
service, and two additional services commenced specifically for Allied military 
personnel.478 Thus, capacity for railway passenger traffic was reduced almost by half. 
Furthermore, motor transport simply became unaffordable during the occupation. The 
gradual depletion of tires and other parts necessary to maintain roadworthiness led to the 
lack of motorized vehicles in Iran, as a consequence of which the fare for motor transport 
skyrocketed quickly while the railway fare remained relatively stable.479 Though the 
impact of this factor was more obvious in freight traffic, it certainly contributed to the 
congestion of passenger traffic as well. 
Statistics indicate that the reduction of capacity resulted in railway journeys of 
perpetual congestion. In the summer of 1945, the southern line had the capacity to carry 
3,840 passengers per week, including Allied as well as Iranian government officials and 
military personnel but not including fourth-class roofed freight cars that were added to 
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Bongah-e Rah Ahan-e Dowlati-ye Iran, Gozaresh-e Natayej-e Mali-ye Hamkari-ye 
Bongah-e Rah Ahan-e Dowlati-ye Iran ba Mottafeqin Marbut beh Dowreh-ye Jang 
(Tehran: Chapkhaneh-ye Bongah-e Rah Ahan, 1946), 10. 
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carry extra passengers.480 Thus, the line theoretically had the capacity to carry 200,229 
passengers annually. As the Table 6.1 shows, the southern line carried 197,026 
passengers in 1944-45, excluding fourth-class passengers. Thus, railway traffic became a 
crucial means to maintain mobility for ordinary Iranians in the context of the Allied 
occupation. 
 
Districts 1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class 4th Class Total 
Excluding 
4th Class 
North 4 3,899 56,558 10,115 70,576 60,461 
Tehran 2,020 22,226 135,003 165,280 324,529 159,249 
Arak 51 3,727 46,202 35,579 85,559 49,980 
South 1,229 3,479 192,258 54,321 251,347 197,026 
Total 3,304 33,331 430,021 265,295 732,011 466,716 
(Table 6.1) The number of passengers in 1323 (1944-45) in each class. Based on the table 
in Amar-e Sal-e 1322-1323, page 31. The numbers in the original table contained some 
minor errors and did not add up, but the gap does not exceed 1,000. The North District is 
from Bandar Shah to Firuz Kuh, the Tehran District is from Firuz Kuh to Qom, Garmsar 
to Shahrud, and Tehran to Miyaneh, the Arak District is from Qom to Dorud, and the 
South District is from Dorud to Bandar Shahpur and Ahvaz to Khorramshahr.  
 
                                                
480 “Saneheh-ye istgah-e markaz-e garm: shayeʾat-e eghraqamiz haqiqat nadarad.” 
 241 
 
(Figure 6.4) The platform for the north line at Tehran Station in the late 1940s. Malakuti, 
Rah Ahan-e Iran, p. 419. This photograph printed in the official publication that 
celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of construction may illustrate what 
modernists considered an adequate image for the normative experience of an Iranian 
railway station. 
 
While the pace of motorization accelerated after the end of the occupation, rail 
travel continued to offer travelers a distinct experience by evoking a sense of national 
belonging among the occupants of the railway space, as ʿAla al-Din Mirmirani, an 
Iranian communist, recalled in his memoir. In 1948, he came to Tehran Station in order to 
leave Iran via the Caspian Sea region to enter the Soviet Union to join his comrades. 
Before getting onboard, he asked himself: “Where are you going? Aren’t you one of 
these people? Didn’t you grow up among these people? Why do you want to abandon all 
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your love of Iran?”481 As he witnessed his compatriots saying farewell to each other on 
the platform in a familiar manner, and as he shared a compartment with his compatriots 
who offered him food (taʿarof) and chatted with one another, he felt that he was leaving 
the familiar world for an unknown utopia. Despite his determination to join his comrades, 
the railway space reminded Mirmirani of the national community, of which he imagined 
himself to be a member.  
 Although the railway space evoked a sense of national belonging to its occupants 
like Mirmirani, contrary to the homogeneous railway space of modernists’ imagination, it 
embodied various divisions of the early-Pahlavi nationalist discourse and visualized 
them. Most obviously, in the railway space of the 1940s, the division between a small 
number of modern middle-class vacationers and the large presence of pious Muslims with 
visual markers of Iran’s Islamic present became evident. This was particularly the case 
for the southern line, whereas the northern line, which included coastal resorts on the 
Caspian shore, had a comparatively higher proportion of vacationers. While third-class 
passengers included both local villagers and pilgrims, and occasionally vacationers who 
could not secure seats in first- or second-class cars, most fourth-class passengers were 
pilgrims who flocked to the Shiʿi shrine cities of Qom and the ʿAtabat in Iraq. The Iraqi 
shrine cities were accessible by combining automobile and rail trips after reaching Ahvaz 
in southwestern Iran by train. Therefore, similar to elsewhere in Asia and the Middle 
                                                
481  Mirmirani, Kureh Rahi dar Ghobar, 6. 
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East, the Trans-Iranian Railway enabled mass pilgrimage,482 as indicated by the fact that 
third- and fourth-class passengers comprised about ninety-five percent of railway 
passengers.483  
Therefore, despite the modernist imagination of the railway space as exemplifying 
the Europeanized Iranian nation without any trace of the Islamic past, most occupants of 
the space did not actualize the railway traveler prototype. Rather, they were either 
villagers in local attire or pilgrims in religious attire, since the compulsory unveiling of 
women and the imposition of the “international hat” for men became irrelevant after the 
abdication of Reza Shah. The prominence of Shiʿi pilgrims in particular was reflected in 
the frequency of service, as special trains to Qom departed Tehran every Friday. 
Modernist travelers often noticed the visibility of religious attire in the railway space, as a 
Tehrani noted about the train to Ahvaz, “[p]assengers of this train are classified into three 
groups. There were many poverty-stricken, hungry people in shabby clothes going on a 
pilgrimage to Karbala. The second group was Hajjis and the wealthy on business trips 
under the pretext of pilgrimage. Others were government officials.”484 Thus, the railway 
                                                
482 In Iran’s case, while pilgrimage to the ʿAtabat used to be largely seasonal to avoid 
summer heat in Iraq, pilgrims could visit the ʿAtabat by train throughout the year, 
although peak seasons required additional fourth-class cars. In other Asian and Middle 
Eastern contexts, too, pilgrimage traffic attracted a large number of passengers. For India, 
Aguiar, Tracking Modernity, 19. For Egypt, Barak, On Time, 87. For Japan, Tadashi Uda, 
Tetsudo Nippon Bunkashiko (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 2007), 191-197. 
483 Vezarat-e Toroq, Rah Ahan-e Sarasar-e Iran, 1306-1317, 100. The percentage is 
based on Bongah-e Rah Ahan-e Dowlati-ye Iran, Amar-e Sal-e 1322-1323, 31. 
484 Danishvar, Didaniha, 14-15. 
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space enabled modernists to perceive visually that pious and poor Shiʿis in third- and 
fourth-class cars comprised the majority of the national community. 
The problem was that there were only about two hundred tickets per week 
available for these pilgrims after deducting the needs of prioritized passengers such as the 
Allied personnel, government officials, and other civilian passengers.485 Consequently, 
many of these pilgrims traveled on roofed freight cars unequipped with such basic things 
as lights, heat, proper ventilation, and water. Due to the danger of traveling in freight 
cars, the Railway Organization requested the government to prevent pilgrimage by not 
issuing passports,486 but the influx of pilgrims did not stop.  
The practice of traveling by roofed freight cars existed during the Reza Shah era 
as well,487 but with the reduced level of civilian passenger service, the demand for them 
increased. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below indicate the lack of freight cars to carry pilgrims. In 
1322 (1943-44), the number of passengers on fourth-class freight cars remained fairly 
low until the month of Dey. But during Shiʾi religious occasions such as ʿAshura (Dey 
16) and Arbaʿin (Esfand 1), freight cars were brought to handle the additional traffic, 
which resulted in the surge of passengers in fourth-class cars. In 1323 (1944-45), the 
supply of freight cars generally remained steady throughout the year, but when additional 
freight cars arrived to carry the returning pilgrims in Bahman and Esfand, the number of 
                                                
485 “Agahi az taraf-e bongah-e rah ahan-e dowlati-ye iran.” 
486 “Saneheh-ye istgah-e markaz-e garm: shayeʾat-e eghraqamiz haqiqat nadarad.” 
487 IOR/L/PS/12/3400/PZ4332. Khuzistan Diaries, No. 3, March 1937. 
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passengers increased.488 Therefore, although the available data are limited, it seems that 
much of the pilgrimage traffic was dictated by the availability of cars. When more cars 
became available, passengers quickly filled the space, making the railway journey 
perpetually congested. 
Nonetheless, given that the Railway Organization provided additional cars in 
anticipation of higher traffic during particular seasons, some speculative interpretations 
are possible. It appears that Iranian passengers preferred to travel in certain seasons, but 
the advent of railways may have alleviated the difficulties of traveling from cities like 
Tehran to the ʿAtabat and encouraged a more even distribution of pilgrimage traffic 
throughout the year. Before the Trans-Iranian Railway opened, the most common land 
route from Tehran to the ʿAtabat was through Hamadan, Kermanshah, and Khaneqin to 
Baghdad. In the late nineteenth century, most pilgrims left Iran in the fall to avoid the 
scorching heat of Iraq in the summer and returned to Iran by the spring, crossing the 
snowy mountains of western Iran. Thus, September and October were the peak months to 
cross the border to Iraq while other months had little traffic, with the difference between 
the peak and slack months occasionally reaching forty times.489 In addition to the peak 
season in the fall to winter, Iranian pilgrims traveled in especially large numbers for 
                                                
488 According to Mardan-e Ruz, the Railway Organization added two wagons per week 
for pilgrims returning from Iraq and carried approximately 2,000 passengers by the first 
week of March, which corresponds to the Iranian month of Bahman and Esfand. See 
“Khabarha-ye rah ahan: morajeʿat-e zovvari ke baraye ziyarat ʿatabat rafteh budand,” 
Mardan-e Ruz, March 7, 1945. 
489 Tomoko Morikawa. Shia-ha Seichi Sankei no Kenkyu (Shiʾite Pilgrimage to the 
Sacred ʿAtabat) (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2007), 67-9. 
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important Shiʾi events such as Ghadir Khom, ʿAshura, and Arbaʿin, although the 
distribution of various religious events throughout the year made pilgrimage valuable for 
Shiʾis at any time of the year.490  
With the advent of the railway, however, the flow of pilgrimage traffic seemingly 
went through some change. Pilgrims had a twenty-five hour ride on a train from Tehran 
to Ahvaz, followed by a two-hour car ride to Khorramshahr, and then to nearby Basra. 
From Basra, it took seventeen hours to Baghdad by the Iraqi railway. From Baghdad, 
Karbala was only about seventy kilometer away.491 Thus, instead of persevering in the 
snow of western Iran or the heat of the Persian Gulf, pilgrims had to endure only two 
train rides for a little over forty hours and car rides for several hours, although the heat in 
the ʿAtabat was unavoidable if they traveled in the summer.  
  
                                                
490 Ibid., 70. 
491 The travel time is based on “Agahi: barnameh-ye vorud va khoruj-e qatarha-ye 




Month 1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class 4th Class Total 
Farvardin 372 4,662 53,444 4,009 62,487 
Ordibehesht 408 5,096 40,391 1,570 47,465 
Khordad 379 3,934 39,238 1,501 45,052 
Tir 362 3,177 37,822 2,796 44,157 
Mordad 406 4,250 40,442 2,052 47,150 
Shahrivar 381 3,039 37,323 1,780 42,523 
Mehr 384 2,803 36,262 3,630 43,079 
Aban 409 2,964 37,338 4,124 44,835 
Azar 240 2,404 35,777 1,182 39,603 
Dey 228 2,796 36,210 6,493 45,727 
Bahman 811 4,229 41,291 7,754 54,085 
Esfand 234 3,212 37,662 25,748 66,856 
Total 4,614 42,566 473,200 62,639 583,019 
(Table 6.2) The number of passengers in 1322 (1943-44), excluding railway employees 
and passengers who paid a half price (government officials and Iranian military 
personnel). Based on a table in Amar-e Sal-e 1322-1323, page 72. Minor errors in the 
original table are corrected by the author. The Iranian solar calendar generally starts on 
March 21 in the Gregorian calendar, and each month has either 30 or 31 days except in 
leap years. Thus, the month of Farvardin is usually from March 21 to April 20, 
Ordibehesht is from April 21 to May 21, and so forth.  
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Month 1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class 4th Class Total 
Farvardin 732 5,784 47,791 14,759 69,066 
Ordibehesht 208 2,741 40,927 11,198 55,074 
Khordad 164 2,858 35,668 13,712 52,402 
Tir 254 2,581 36,350 17,279 56,464 
Mordad 221 2,938 41,271 17,856 62,286 
Shahrivar 242 2,678 30,933 15,786 49,639 
Mehr 257 2,559 38,141 17,486 58,443 
Aban 250 2,420 32,243 17,575 52,488 
Azar 244 2,450 30,146 16,957 49,797 
Dey 237 1,645 27,207 15,425 44,514 
Bahman 232 1,826 30,099 16,103 48,260 
Esfand 248 2,348 30,921 20,113 53,630 
Total 3,289 32,828 421,697 194,249 652,063 
(Table 6.3) The number of passengers in 1323 (1944-45), excluding railway employees 
and passengers who paid a half price (government officials and Iranian military 
personnel). Based on Amar-e Sal-e 1322-1323, page 72. Errors in the original table are 




Tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicate that some months had more passengers. The months of 
Esfand, and even more, Farvardin, had more passengers probably because of family 
visitations for the Iranian New Year. The months of Mehr and Aban, which, during the 
two years under discussion, corresponded roughly to the traditional season to start 
pilgrimage, had a small increase in the number of passengers, especially in fourth-class 
cars. The slight lag may be explained by the much shorter duration of the journey with 
the railway. During these two months, the number of passengers leaving the Tehran 
District of the railway increased, especially in 1322, when 30,377 used the Tehran 
District in Mehr as compared to 19,242 on the previous month of Shahrivar.492 
Nevertheless, compared to the difference of forty times in the nineteenth century, the 
flow of passengers seemed largely steady throughout the year, unless it was mediated by 
such external factors as the supply of cars and other political or economic circumstances. 
With the limited evidence available, it appears that the supposed epitome of secular 
modernity probably increased the visibility of Iran’s Islamic present in the public space 
throughout the year, side by side with vacationers, government officials, and foreign 
military personnel, hence the frequent references to pilgrims in various sources. 
Aside from making visible the religious orientation of the majority of passengers, 
the railway space visualized the economic divide in Iranian society. While such 
potentially disruptive elements as communist-newspaper sellers were prohibited in 
railway stations, beggars, whose presence increased since the occupation, were excluded 
                                                
492 Bongah-e Rah Ahan-e Dowlati-ye Iran. Amar-e Sal-e 1322-1323, 73. 
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from the trains and occupied a marginalized position outside the windows of the trains.493 
Yet, beggars remained a highly visible group in the railway space for travelers because of 
their presence on the platforms. On a ski trip to northwestern Iran in the late 1940s, 
Najmeh Najafi witnessed beggars, mostly children, who “had descended upon the 
platform like a swarm of locusts” at every station along the route to her destination.494 
Likewise, another traveler noticed “barefooted people with their children on both sides of 
the train,” collecting the food that passengers threw out of the window onto the platform 
in the southwestern province of Lorestan, which, as discussed in Chapter Four, was hit 
hard economically after the end of railway construction.495 Thus, similar to the 
porousness of the public space of new boulevards in Haussmannized Paris that David 
Harvey discusses, the railway space of mid-twentieth century Iran was very porous.496 
While inside the trains was theoretically reserved for paying passengers, right outside of 
them existed platforms, which were often unpatrolled by the gendarmerie in the 
provinces, allowing destitute beggars to wait for passenger trains, and thus making 
themselves highly visible to passengers. Their visibility revealed the hierarchically 
divided Iranian society. 
                                                
493 The gendarmerie patrolled to expel from Tehran Station newspaper sellers who sold 
such Tudeh-Party publications as Rahbar and Zafar as well as Mardom and Neda-ye 
Haqiqat. “Jelowgiri az Forush-e Ruznamehha-ye Azadikhah,” Zafar, 1 March, 1946. 
494 Najafi, Persia is My Heart, 143. 
495 Daneshvar, Didaniha, 13. 
496 David Harvey, “The Political Economy of Public Space,” in Setha Low and Neil 
Smith, eds., The Politics of Public Space (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 17-
34. 
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 Beggars were not the only group that experienced exclusion from the railway 
space. Many local populations along the route had to endure exclusion that stemmed from 
the unavailability of tickets for civilian passengers during the occupation.497 Disorder 
often occurred at ticket offices in railway stations as passengers swarmed to obtain 
tickets. The swarm was a natural consequence of the policy to start the sale of fourth-
class tickets, the most sought-after tickets among the poor, only one day prior to 
departure at stations on the route.498 Travelers became increasingly frustrated with the 
limited number of tickets. The problem of the restriction on ticket sales became 
particularly obvious among pilgrims who used the Iraqi railway from Basra to reach the 
ʿAtabat via Baghdad. Since the Iraqi railway did not restrict ticket sales, they demanded 
that the Iranian State Railway do the same. Otherwise, they just needed to rely on the 
thriving black market to obtain tickets.499  
 One example of complaints about the unavailability of tickets and the subsequent 
impossibility of travel came from the residents of Firuzkuh, a county between Tehran and 
the Caspian Sea. In 1945, residents of Firuzkuh filed a petition to the general manager of 
the Iranian State Railway, protesting about the imposition of a hefty fine for fare evasion, 
                                                
497 The difficulty of getting tickets for Iranian passengers is noted in “Doshvariha-ye 
Bongah-e Rah Ahan,” Mardan-e Ruz, 10 January, 1945, “Agahi az Taraf-e Bongah-e Rah 
Ahan,”  
498 “Agahi,” Mardan-e Ruz, 21 March, 1945.  
499 “Rah Ahan ra Bayad baraye Reqabatha-ye Eqtesadi-ye Zaman-i Solh Amadeh Kard,” 
Mardan-e Ruz, 20 May, 1945, and Bongah-e Rah Ahan-e Dowlati-ye Iran, Amar-e Sal-e 
1322-1323, 29. 
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which was quadruple the original fare.500 The petitioners explicitly attributed the petty 
crime of fare evasion to the unavailability of train tickets in the area, pointing out that 
Firuzkuh Station should sell at least twenty tickets daily considering that, in addition to 
visitors, 30,000 residents in the forty-six villages of Firuzkuh needed to travel. Yet, only 
four tickets were allocated to the station, and for some unexplained reasons, even those 
four tickets had occasionally not been sold, forcing local residents to travel without 
tickets.501 Therefore, according to this reasoning, fare evasion was a de Certeauian tactic 
that the weak used because they had no control over the rules that governed the railway 
space. Such actions as swarming to ticket offices and petitioning visualized the exclusion 
of many ordinary civilians from the benefit of the mobility that the railway promised to 
bring. 
 
                                                
500 Fare evasion was extremely common. For instance, in one instance, over forty 
passengers out of two hundred reportedly were ticketless freeloaders. “Tafsil-e Hadeseh-




(Figure 6.5) A cartoon satirizing fare evasion. Mardan-e Ruz, February 7, 1945. The 
cartoon was printed with the caption that read, “Does one person have to show several 
tickets?” The cartoon may indicate that the prevalence of fare evasion was common 
knowledge. 
 
 Along with other violations of regulations, fare evasion was only one of the many 
concerns that the Iranian State Railway held with regard to the behavior of the occupants 
of the railway space.502 The concern itself was not new, since as discussed earlier, 
modernist journalists criticized the disorderly behavior in the tramway space at the 
beginning of the Pahlavi period. By the late 1930s, however, reflecting the expansion of 
                                                
502 “Agahi: Jarimeh-ye Mosaferin-e bedun-e Belit,” Mardan-e Ruz, 31 January, 1945, 
and “Tafsil-e Hadeseh-ye Asafnak-e Rah Ahan.” 
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state power, the Iranian State Railway and its publications started to play a larger role in 
enforcing the de Certeauian strategy as codified regulations, implementing modernists’ 
demands from over a decade ago. The repeated appearances of these regulations in 
publications and the existence of witness accounts of disorderly behavior and petty 
crimes indicated not only the failure of the Iranian State Railway to regulate the space but 
also the heightened anxiety shared among modernists about the nature of the national 
community embodied in the railway space. 
For instance, in 1940, the gazette of the Iranian State Railway printed an article 
entitled “Duties of Railway Travelers (vazifeh-ye mosaferin-e rah ahan)” and urged 
passengers to use railway facilities properly. In addition to raising such issues as 
malfunctioning equipment because of inattention, it criticized passengers for bringing 
prohibited items into passenger cars rather than checking them to be transported in a 
separate car.503 Despite the luggage regulations, passengers continued to break rules.504 
For instance, one passenger hid headless geese, which were prohibited in the regulations, 
in his package, an approved kind of luggage, and put it on the luggage rack above his 
seat. Shortly after the departure, blood started to drip over other passengers, making a 
carpet of blood on the floor.505 Likewise, Mazandarani passengers came onboard with 
                                                
503 “Vazifeh-ye Mosaferin-e Rah Ahan,” Nameh-ye Rah, 1:1 (May 1940), 27. 
504 The regulations allowed each passenger to carry thirty kilograms of suitcases, bags, 
and small packages alone and prohibited bringing items that would exacerbate 
congestion, meaning such items as samovars and long carrying poles that tramway 
passengers often carried. Bongah-e Rah Ahan-e Dowlati-ye Iran, Amar-e Sal-e 1322-
1323, 31. 
505 Vazifeh-ye Mosaferin-e Rah Ahan,” 27. 
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baskets of lettuce and oranges rather than checking these items and transporting them in a 
separate car as required by the regulations.506 Since railway employees were known for 
their susceptibility to bribery, passengers who were caught while freeloading or bringing 
prohibited item often tried to negotiate with them, or even bribe them, to avoid penalty 
fees.507 Importantly, the article argued for the proper use of the railway space by likening 
the national railway to one’s house, because just like Iranians owned their houses, they 
owned the railway built by the state with their money. Then, it concluded by urging those 
who considered themselves more civilized to set examples for other passengers and make 
themselves, and Iran, worthy of railways.508 Therefore, by stressing the high visibility of 
disorderly conduct and the value of the railway as a national asset, the article tried to 
remind its modern middle-class readers of their need to continue the civilizing mission as 
railway travelers and reform the nature of the railway space, the embodiment of the 
nation. 
The visibility of undesirable elements in the railway space also affected individual 
modern middle-class travelers, usually tourists and vacationers, as the case of Mahmud 
                                                
506 Ibid. 
507 Passengers often bribed employees of the Iranian State Railway, including 
conductors and railway policemen. For instance, rather than purchasing a ticket for a 
second-class seat from Tehran to Ahvaz, which was 410 rial in 1945, passengers could 
bribe the conductor for 350 rial and sit in a second-class seat. Because this practice was 
fairly common, it was well-known that “whenever a train goes to and from Ahvaz, a 
considerable amount of money goes to railway employees, and perhaps their profit was 
not smaller than that of the Railway Organization itself.” For the official fare as of April 
1945, see “Agahi: Baha-ye Belitha-ye Mosaferi-ye Istgahha-ye Mohem,” Mardan-e Ruz, 
April 25, 1945. For the anecdote, see Arjomand, Shesh Sal, 261-2. 
508 “Vazifeh-ye Mosaferin-e Rah Ahan,” 29. 
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Daneshvar, a former office worker from Tehran, illustrates. In late 1945, he started his 
two-year journey across Iran by catching a southbound train from Tehran. He had 
numerous encounters in the railway space that ultimately helped his journey’s goal of 
getting to know his compatriots (hammihanan-e ʿaziz).509 When he got on the train, he 
immediately spotted a womanizer who slyly tried to keep the seats around him so that he 
could offer them only to well-dressed women. Then he saw a freeloader who was hiding 
in the bathroom to avoid ticket inspection. When he was caught, he bribed the police. 
Moreover, in the compartment, he found traces of theft since lamps, knobs, and drawers 
were missing, which made him uneasy because of the disgrace such a scene in the 
national railway space would make for Iran’s reputation among foreign visitors. When he 
witnessed beggars on the platforms, he unsympathetically compared them to monkeys in 
India that were fed by railway passengers. At Andimeshk Station in Khuzestan, he got off 
the train and talked to a porter. The porter asked him whether he was a northerner, which 
dumbfounded him since such words as northerner or southerner meant nothing form him, 
who identified himself only as Iranian. 510 Such encounters in the railway space frustrated 
him because of other Iranians’ perceived failure to use the space properly and embrace 
the Iranian national identity. At the same time, the encounters strengthened his sense of 
national duty and convinced him of the urgent need to complete his mission of traveling 
all around Iran and spreading civilization and nationalism. In short, his experience in the 
                                                
509 Daneshvar, Didaniha, 8. 
510 Ibid., 11-16. 
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railway space simultaneously strengthened his sense of national belonging and his 
understanding of the difference between himself and his compatriots.  
Of course, not all travelers reacted the same way. Disgusted with another wealthy 
female tourist’s negative reaction to beggars, Najmeh Najafi compassionately gave coins 
to beggars on platforms and repeatedly visited impoverished Turkish-speaking villages in 
the northwest to learn about their life and language.511 Therefore, there was a 
differentiation within modern middle-class railway travelers. Nevertheless, regardless of 
how they reacted, modern middle-class railway travelers reinforced their sense of 
national belonging while becoming acutely aware of their economic and cultural 
differences from other segments of Iranian society. 
Over the next two years, traveling at his own expense, Daneshvar visited not only 
areas accessible by train but also areas that he had to visit by car, donkey, or camel. 
Motivated by the zeal to inform his fellow Iranians of the historical heritage of their 
glorious homeland, he meticulously recorded what he saw along the way, from historical 
sites to natural surroundings, local customs, and even the reality of overwhelming 
poverty in cities and the countryside alike. In addition to recording his journey in writing, 
he also tried to convince locals that they were Iranians, not Dezfulis, Arabs, or Ajams, 
planted the Iranian tricolor flag at the apexes of such remote mountains as Kuh-e Taftan 
in Baluchistan and Sabalan in Azarbayjan and left graffiti on the walls of such caves as 
                                                
511 Najafi, Persia is My Heart, 148-157. 
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Darband in Semnan.512 Therefore, the visibility of divisions and exclusions in the railway 
space had the dual effects on the modern middle class to identify with other occupants of 
the space as their compatriot Iranians and to differentiate themselves from the rest of the 
national community that needed civilizing guidance from them. The discourse of the 
railway before 1938 created railway travelers like Daneshvar, who came to embody the 
railway traveler prototype in the 1940s. In turn, for the new railway travelers, the 
presence of heterogeneous groups of Iranians within the confined railway space after 
1938 concretized the object of the civilizing mission and enabled the praxis of the 
mission.  
Finally, the railway space also made the presence of foreigners visible to its 
occupants, particularly during the Allied occupation. Sometimes Iranian railway travelers 
developed a sense of their belonging through their encounters with foreigners. In 1945, 
Mohammad Arjomand, the former personal telegraphist to Reza Shah traveled from 
Tehran to Iraq, departing from Tehran Station to Ahvaz by train. During his railway 
journey, he had the pleasant experience of getting to know other Iranian and Iraqi 
passengers.513 His experience was not entirely pleasant, however. He also encountered 
the aloof attitude of British passengers, both military and civilian, who “did not speak a 
word” to him and other passengers both in a small railway compartment and an even 
smaller car.514 British passengers may have been orderly like the imagined European 
                                                
512 Daneshvar, Didaniha, 9 and 20. 
513 Arjomand, Shesh Sal, 261. 
514 Ibid., 262 and 266. 
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first-class passengers. Yet, that did not impress the Iranian traveler. He expected 
passengers to chat and share food during the journey, just like Iranian passengers around 
him did. Therefore, encounters with foreign passengers in the railway space could allow 
modern middle-class Iranians to articulate their differences from foreign passengers, 
create a vernacular behavioral code in the railway space, and reaffirm their Iranian 
modernist sensibilities that separated them from both the Iranian masses and foreigners. 
Thus, modern middle-class travelers after 1938 did not necessarily embody the railway 
traveler prototype constructed prior to 1938 as the replica of imagined European travelers 
in first-class cars. Rather, various encounters with both Iranians and non-Iranians 
continued to create new understandings of the self among Iranian railway travelers. 
 
Conclusion 
The railway space provided its occupants with a distinct experience. Contrary to the 
modernists’ imagination of a homogeneously Europeanized travelers, the Iranian railway 
space came to embody divisions and hierarchies of the nation. Travelers encountered 
different, and even competing, uses of the railway space among groups that were divided 
along various lines, including socioeconomic status, cultural orientation, religiosity, and 
ethnicity. For modern middle-class travelers, the railway space simultaneously reinforced 
their urge to learn more about the national community of Iran and made them aware of 
the difference from their distinct cultural orientation from other segments of society. 
 The case of semi-colonial Iran differed from other historical contexts in several 
ways. Most obviously, the belated arrival of the railway meant that some of the 
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controversial questions such as the mingling of men and women in the public space had 
been discussed prior to the opening of the railway, unlike the case of colonial India. Since 
the railway opened after the entrance of veiled women in the public space in the 1920s, 
followed by their forced unveiling in 1936, debates about gender relations in the railway 
space did not receive as much attention as elsewhere. Furthermore, the collapse of the 
central state in 1941 and the Allied Occupation that continued until 1945 made the 
Iranian case rather unusual. While railway projects in independent nations often 
materialized in the context of nation-building, in Iran’s case, the process of nation-
building was interrupted by the occupation, which restricted civilians’ mobility. In 
response to such restrictions, local populations sometimes came up with solutions to 
these challenges by freeloading or petitioning. Moreover, the occupation radically 
increased the presence of resented foreign occupiers such as the British in the railway 
space, which may have impacted the way Iranians shaped their understandings of the self 
as indicated by the example of Arjomand.  
After the end of the occupation, especially in the second half of the twentieth 
century, the Trans-Iranian Railway faced greater competition from other modes of 
transport and gradually became less important in Iranians’ travel experiences. When the 
restriction on civilian highway use ended and the inflated fare for motorized vehicles 
subsided, the comparative advantages of the railway disappeared in the late 1940s. 
Furthermore, intercity bus service and civil aviation developed rapidly, giving travelers 
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options other than the railway system.515 Yet, during the second quarter of the twentieth 
century, the Trans-Iranian Railway project and the new railway space played an 
important role in shaping understandings of the self among Iranian travelers, who 
encountered various passengers who visualized the heterogeneity of Iranian society. 
Moreover, travelers interacted with non-passengers such as Lor tribesmen who turned 
into beggars during the occupation and underpaid employees of the Railway Organization 
who received bribes from passengers. Although no evidence is available, it is conceivable 
that the railway space was also conducive to the shaping of understandings of the self 
among these groups. Thus, in the sense that it became the site for interaction among 
various segments of society, including vacationers, pilgrims, tribes, and railway workers, 








                                                
515 For aviation, see Abbas Atrush, Tarikhcheh-ye Havapeima’i-ye Bazargani dar Iran: 




State projects that aim to creating a nation through transportation infrastructure still 
continue in post-revolutionary Iran, and the rail network of the Islamic Republic 
continues to expand.516 In 2009, the same year that the Isfahan-Shiraz line opened, the 
line to link Kerman and Bam with Zahedan was completed. Zahedan, the capital of Sistan 
and Baluchistan Province, the home to Iran’s Sunni minority and the separatist movement 
Jondollah, was finally connected to the rest of Iran instead of only to Pakistan. By 
extension, the line connected the Indian rail system with European ones through Iran, 
finally realizing the dream of railway enthusiasts like Henry Drummond Wolff, although 
the difference in gauge hampers direct service. With the presence of Iran’s tricolor 
national flags and prominent political leaders, the official ceremony functioned as a great 
opportunity for the central government to display the firm grip of Tehran over the volatile 
province. In the ceremony, provincial institutions expressed their hope of increasing 
Iran’s exports to Pakistan, thereby strengthening the national economy.517 Moreover, the 
provincial government triumphantly proclaimed, “perhaps it (the coming of Iranian 
trains) was difficult to believe for the people of Sistan and Baluchistan. Until now, they 
                                                
516 International networks expand, too. Most recently, Iran announced a plan to link 
Khorramshahr and Basra in the hope of facilitating pilgrimage and trade. For an article in 
Iranian Students’ News Agency, see “Dastur-e Raʾis-e Jomhur baraye Ettesal-e Rah 
Ahan-e Khorramshahr beh Basreh,” ISNA, December 10, 2014. 
http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/93091912077 (retrieved on March 18, 2015) 
517 “Eftetah-e Rah Ahan-e Zahedan – Bam, Afzayesh-e Saderat-e Gheir-e Nafti,” 
Sazman-e Sanʿat, Maʾdan va Tejarat-e Sistan va Baluchistan, June 11, 2009. 
http://sbco.ir/main.asp?id=662 (retrieved on October 30, 2012) 
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have heard only the whistles of Pakistani trains while always anxiously waiting to hear 
the sound of Iranian trains’ whistles.”518 Thus, provincial authorities celebrated the 
changes the new line would bring about in the economy as well as in the daily auditory 
experience of the local population, shared by Iranians elsewhere in the country, and thus 
symbolically proclaimed the integration of the province to the rest of Iran.  
Yet, as the case of the Trans-Iranian Railway indicates, nation-building projects 
by the central government often lead to unintended consequences. The Trans-Iranian 
Railway project touched, albeit unevenly, many aspects of Iran’s social whole. This 
dissertation has examined how various segments of state and society in Iran experienced 
the coming of railways from the beginning of the technological imaginary in the second 
half of the nineteenth century to the aftermath of the completion of the Trans-Iranian 
Railway in the mid-twentieth century. The coming of railways to Iran was not simply a 
result of Pahlavi state policies imposed on society, which was passively molded into 
homogeneously Europeanized citizens. Rather, various groups in society actively shaped 
the meanings of railways, took advantage of the opportunities railways presented, 
however ephemeral they might have been, and sometimes wove them into their 
understandings of the self, the community, and the nation. Thus, the project created 
multiple experiences with railway technology that did not necessarily lead to a singular 
national imagination. 
                                                
518 “Rah Ahan-e Kerman – Zahedan, Masiri baraye Tahavvol-e Sharq-e Keshvar,” 
Purtal- Ostan-e Sistan va Baluchistan, February 8, 2012. 
http://www.sbportal.ir/fa/news/3998 (retrieved on October 30, 2012) 
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 In fact, railways started to impact state and society in Iran long before the Majles 
ratified the Trans-Iranian Railway project in 1927. The transport revolution of the 
nineteenth century sparked interests in railway projects in Iran among European 
governments and entrepreneurs, particularly British and Russian, who dreamed of 
penetrating interior Iran for strategic and commercial purposes. At the same time, the 
transport revolution outside of Qajar dominion enabled Iranian travelers, mostly the Qajar 
political elite, to experience long-distance journeys more safely and speedily. As Naseri-
period travelogues and treatises illustrate, while Iranian travelers in the Naseri period 
witnessed railways and experienced traveling by train in Europe, their first encounters 
with railways often occurred in Iran’s surrounding world such as India, the Caucasus, 
Russia, and Egypt. These encounters gradually shaped Iranian travelers’ specific 
understandings of railways that differed from the visions espoused in imperial railway 
projects. In terms of who should fund railway projects in Iran, the Qajar political elite 
initially assigned the role to foreign concessionaires. Yet, through observing other 
railways and railway proposals both inside and outside Iran, they increasingly found the 
involvement of Iranian capitalists more desirable. After the Constitutional Revolution, 
they considered the state responsible for railway construction. In terms of the goals of 
railway construction, the Qajar political elite came to emphasize creating a national 
economy with its center in Tehran. The notion of religiosity and animal-powered 
transport as antitheses to modernity also evolved through the same process of 
observation. Therefore, the Pahlavi state project of the Trans-Iranian Railway to connect 
the two seas via Tehran was the fruit of decades of imaginations by the Qajar political 
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elite, whose mobility allowed them to imagine an Iranian railway project based on both 
metropole and colonial experiences of railways, a benefit Iran enjoyed as a latecomer to 
the railway age. 
 Railway projects in independent states outside West Europe often took place in 
the context of centralization and nation-building, as illustrated by such cases as Japan 
after the Meiji Restoration, Mexico under Porfirio Diaz, Siam under Rama V, and Central 
Asia under Stalin. In this sense, Iran was typical, despite the belated arrival of railways. 
Constructing, operating, and using the Trans-Iranian Railway in the second quarter of the 
twentieth century intensified state-society and intra-social interactions within the context 
of Reza Shah’s attempts at centralization and nation-building. The interactions could take 
many different forms. For instance, since the Trans-Iranian Railway employed about 
50,000 workers at the peak of construction during the 1930s, it kept tribes along the 
railway route on the payroll and functioned to reduce the risk of rural insecurity when 
such Pahlavi policies as forced sedentarization impoverished nomadic tribes. 
Nevertheless, some tribes, such as the Bayranvands, were excluded from employment 
and were targeted for forced relocation to other provinces. Whereas Iran’s nationalist 
historiography tends to explain their exclusion by stressing their complete defiance to 
state presence, I have pointed out that the Bayranvands in fact tried to evaluate the 
circumstances presented by the railway project. They even demanded their inclusion in 
reaping the benefits of railway construction rather than being forced into destitution 
through the imposition of a sedentarized agricultural lifestyle.  
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Among the included tribal groups such as the Papis, while some construction 
laborers maintained their livestock, others became fulltime laborers paid directly by the 
contractors, who were in turn supervised by the Scandinavian consortium authorized by 
the Ministry of Roads to oversee the project. Construction laborers were sometimes 
socialized into the workers’ world and made demands along with other workers for better 
working conditions and compensation by petitioning various state institutions and 
protesting on construction sites. Importantly, the presence of European workers 
contributed to the shaping of specific demands that Iranian workers made, indicating that 
the difference in their contractual status may have contributed to the way workers 
perceived themselves. Moreover, interaction with state institutions did not necessarily 
disappear after the forced abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 and the subsequent period of 
chaos. On the contrary, petitioners felt safer filing complaints without worrying about the 
ramifications of their actions, and thus the number of petitions increased after the summer 
of 1941. 
 Railway workers, whose origins were more heterogeneous and transnational than 
hitherto acknowledged, also interacted with various state institutions, especially the 
Railway Organization, Iran’s largest state organization at the time. Immediately 
following the end of the Allied occupation in 1945, the Organization faced the growing 
presence of the Tudeh Party among workers, with its own apparatus of socializing 
workers into the world of Tudeh followers. In response, the Railway Organization 
attempted to mold railway workers into loyal employees by providing various perquisites 
and monopolizing the site of social interaction. Moreover, in the official narrative, the 
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Organization included the Trans-Iranian Railway’s contribution in advancing the Allied 
causes in World War Two while concluding that workers should be proud of the 
Organization because of this contribution. As workers’ petitions demonstrated, however, 
Iranian railway workers used the same narrative of their contribution in war efforts but 
concluded that they, the workers, deserved a better life and made demands of the Railway 
Organization in terms of their working and living conditions in the postwar period. 
Therefore, rather than being molded into loyal employees of the Organization, railway 
workers actively engaged in defining their place in relation to the Iranian nation and the 
national project of the Trans-Iranian Railway. 
 The coming of the Trans-Iranian Railway created the new railway space. It was in 
this public space that heterogeneous groups in the Iranian nation interacted. Despite the 
Iranian modernists’ insistence on creating a homogeneously Europeanized railway space, 
the railway space of the Trans-Iranian Railway came to embody hierarchies and divisions 
within Iranian society. As the embodiment of the Iranian nation, the railway space came 
to be occupied by various groups, including modern middle-class vacationers, pilgrims, 
communists, British officers, Lor beggars, corrupt conductors, and Dezfulis who did not 
believe they were “Iranian.” As the cases of modern middle-class travelers indicated, they 
simultaneously identified themselves with the larger Iranian nation while, as the modern-
middle class with specific cultural sensibilities, separating themselves from the rest of the 
occupants of the space. Thus, travelers also shaped understandings of the self through 
intra-social interaction in the new railway space. 
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 In these interrelated narratives of how Iranian society experienced the coming of 
railways, transnational connections played a significant role. Throughout this dissertation, 
I have paid particular attention to a few specific cases, including Naseri-period Iranian 
travelers, the large presence of skilled workers from various parts of Europe, and the 
origins of first-generation Iranian railway workers. Additionally, I have mentioned such 
examples as the large number of Iranian railway passengers heading to the holy cities in 
Iraq, which exemplified how the national project of the Trans-Iranian Railway facilitated 
pilgrimage across borders. Also, based on their experiences of traveling by train in Iraq, 
returned pilgrims complained to the Iranian State Railway about the restrictions on ticket 
sales. These examples demonstrate the importance of the spatial mobility of non-state 
actors who traveled abroad. They also illustrate that Iranians had multiple opportunities 
to encounter railway technology outside Iran precisely because of the belated arrival of 
railways to Iran. While technological interactions initiated by the Pahlavi state were often 
with Europe and America, non-state actors witnessed and experienced railways in India, 
Iraq, Egypt, Russia, the Caucasus, and Anatolia in addition to Europe. In some cases, 
travelers experienced railway technology in such distant places as Japan.519 Therefore, in 
order to understand the history of technological interactions after the transport revolution 
of the nineteenth century, historians need to embrace a more global framework that goes 
beyond the overemphasis on encounters between Iran and the West. Although Iranians 
often equated the possession of railway technology with European modernity, as this 
                                                
519 For Qajar-period Iranian travelers to Japan, see Hashem Rajabzadeh, “Japan as Seen 
by Qajar Travelers,” in Elton L. Daniel ed., Society and Culture in Qajar Iran: Studies in 
Honor of Hafez Farmayan (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2002), 285-310. 
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dissertation has illustrated, Iranians’ imaginations of and experiences with railway 
technology occurred on a much broader scale. 
 Admittedly, the experiences that can be reconstructed from available sources are 
tantalizingly fragmented. We still do not know the origins of the vast majority of early 
railway workers. Petitions by displaced landowners and disabled laborers often do not tell 
us what happened in the end. Nevertheless, this dissertation has demonstrated that the 
coming of railway technology, the imagined essence of modernity, did not create a 
singular narrative in Iran. The heterogeneity of the ways in which various segments of 
Iranian society understood and used the Trans-Iranian Railway attests to the active 
engagement of individuals and groups in assessing the constantly changing 
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